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ABSTRACT
I explore the relationship between partisan votes and 
partisan seat allocation in U. S. state lower-house elec­
tions. Specifleally, I measure the representational form 
(the rate of partisan seat changes given particular parti­
san vote changes) and partisan bias (asymmetry in the 
seats-votes relationship) of 441 lower-house state legisla­
tive elections in 46 states from 1968 to 1987. I then test 
a number of hypotheses that have been advanced to explain 
variation in representational form and partisan bias.
Values for representational form and partisan bias are 
generated by creating simulations from actual election 
results. I simulate seat gains made by Republicans given 
one percent uniform party vote swings across all districts 
and assuming Republicans would win between 35% and 65% of 
the mean district vote. After generating 31 data points 
for each election year, I use a logit equation to opera­
tionalize representational form and partisan bias for each 
election year in each state. These data then become depen­
dent variables in pooled, cross-sectional time-series 
analyses used to explain variation in representational form 
and partisan bias across time and across states.
As in previous studies, I find that representational 
form is declining over time. 1 also find that representa­
tional form is a function of party competition across 
election districts. In elections having a large number of
xiv
competitive districts, there is a rise in the value of 
representational form. The size of election districts (by 
population) as measured by Taagepera's Index has a positive 
but substantively weak effect on representational form. 
Effective district magnitude (the existence of multimember 
districts) also has a positive but substantively weak 
impact on representational form.
It was thought that partisan bias would result from 
partisan gerrymandering during redistricting. While party 
control of redistricting does have the hypothesized effect 
in eight of the nine even-numbered election years, only in 
1970, 1976, and 1982 did gerrymandering effects reach 
statistical significance. The results for partisan bias 
support recent studies that suggest that gerrymandering at 
the state level is not pervasive but does occasionally 
occur.
xv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, legislative elections 
have become the focus of a great deal of scholarly 
research. Students of Congress and of state legislatures 
have produced a voluminous literature on legislative elec­
tions. This study is another contribution to the growing 
body of research concerning state legislative elections.
Specifically, this study is concerned with the rela­
tionship between partisan votes and partisan seat alloca­
tion in U. S. state legislative elections. Following the 
pathbreaking work by King and Browning (1987), I measure 
the form of representation and the level of partisan bias 
found in elections in the states. Finally, I test hypothe­
ses pertaining to factors explaining the levels of partisan 
bias and representational form found in these elections.
A few efforts have been made to identify partisan bias 
and representational form in the U. S. states. However, my 
study expands previous work by including more states (46) 
over a more inclusive time period (1968-87). Also of 
importance is the fact that I use individual elections in 
each state as the units of analysis and employ a pooled 
cross-sectional time series analysis to test my models.
1
2SEATS-VOTES RELATIONSHIPS AND REPRESENTATION
Components of Representation
In much of the previous work on representation, the 
emphasis has been placed on the activities of elected 
representatives. Representation, in essence, is what 
representatives (usually defined as legislators) do. In 
Pitkin's words, representation is "acting in the interest 
of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (1967,
2 06). This behavioral definition of representation is 
believed to have a number of components.
Policy responsiveness refers to the extent to which a 
legislator's committee activities, roll-call behavior, and 
oversight activities conform to the policy views of his or 
her constituents (Eulau and Karps 1978, 63; Fiorina 
1974, 1; Jewell 1982, 18). The legislator serves as the 
conduit through which constituency demands are transformed 
into public policy. The question of policy congruence 
between legislator and constituents has been the subject of 
a number of scholarly endeavors (See, for example, Clausen 
1973; Erikson 1978; Glazer and Robbins 1985; Herring 1990; 
Jackson and King 1989; Kingdon 1977; Kuklinski 1977;
HcCrone and Stone 1986; Miller and Stokes 1963; Sullivan 
and Uslaner 1978; Wright 1989; Wright and Berkman 1986).
Allocation responsiveness pertains to the efforts of 
the representative to provide public goods and services to 
his or her constituents as a group or as individuals (Eulau
3and Karps 1978, 65-66; Jewell 1982, 19-20). To use the 
vernacular, this component of representation concerns the 
extent to which a legislator is able to "bring the bacon" 
(i.e., public projects) back to the district. As noted by 
Eulau and Karps (1978, 65), this component of representa­
tion was traditionally viewed as a "public good;1' however, 
"with the expansion of the government's role in all sectors 
of society, the distinction between public and private 
benefits is difficult to maintain." Furthermore, some 
individuals within the district may "make more use of the 
benefits" than others (1978, 65). The legislator attempts 
to anticipate constituents' needs and may even stimulate 
their wants. The point is that, as with policy respon­
siveness, the emphasis is on the behavior of the individual 
representative.
Service responsiveness concerns the legislator's 
ability to provide specialized benefits to an individual or 
group of individuals within the district (Eulau and Karps 
1978, 64; Fenno 1978, 101-135; Jewell 1982, 20). This 
could involve assistance in dealing with a government 
agency, pressuring bureaucrats to skirt rules, providing 
government jobs, or intervening with landlords or utility 
companies on behalf of a constituent. The idea is that 
representatives can use their positions to solve conflicts 
that have little to do with policy considerations.
4Finally, there is a type of responsiveness that 
involves communication between legislator and constituency 
(Fenno 1978; Jewell 1982, 20-21). Some have dubbed this 
component of representation "symbolic responsiveness" and 
have defined it as a psychological attachment of constitu­
ents to legislator (Eulau and Karps 1978, 66-67). others 
have emphasized the belief that representatives can 
heighten their support by visiting their districts and 
"presenting" themselves to the voters, allocating staff to 
the district to keep in touch with constituents, and by 
taking the time to explain their work and their policy 
stances to the "folks back home" (Fenno 1978, 31-99,
136-46, 242).
Importance of the Electoral System
In addition to the behavior of legislators, it is 
possible that the electoral system has an affect on repre­
sentation. For example, before representatives are free to 
take actions that may (or, for that matter, may not) pro­
vide benefits to their respective districts, elections 
determine who will and who will not be present in the 
legislature in the first place. Candidates in the United 
States and other democracies compete in elections to see 
who will be in a position to "represent." Only candidates 
who pass the hurdles placed before them in the electoral 
system win the opportunity to practice representation.
In the United States and in other democratic political 
systems, parties serve as the vehicles through which candi­
dates compete for legislative seats. Though the general­
ization may be less applicable to legislative elections in 
the U. S. than to those in Western European nations, candi­
dates are judged to a greater or lesser degree by their 
party affiliation and by their consequent attachment to 
their party's platform. In turn, the voters' desires are 
implemented by the winning legislative party or parties 
through the legislative machinery.
The fact that members of the winning party usually 
have the ability to pass their policies and provide bene­
fits to their supporters highlights the importance of the 
method in which seats are translated into votes in legisla­
tive elections. Far from being a trivial matter destined 
for status as an endnote in the annals of representation, 
the relationship between seats and votes in legislative 
elections could have a direct bearing on politics and 
policy in any democratic polity. Thus, the electoral 
system is itself an important subject of study to political 
scientists and to other scholars who may be concerned with 
representation. The literature on the swing ratio (e.g. 
Browning and King 1987; Campagna 1991; Caropagna and Grofman 
1990a; Campagna and Grofman 1990b; King and Browning 1987; 
Lijphart 1990; Niemi and Fett 1986; Ragsdale 1983;
Taagepera and Shugart 1989) is testimony to the importance
6that researchers place on electoral structure as an element 
in representation.
Seats, Votes, and Democratic Theory
In addition to empirical theorists, normative politi­
cal theorists have also acknowledged that the seats-votes 
relationship is at the very heart of the issue of represen­
tation in a democratic polity. In some quarters it is 
thought that proportional representation is the representa­
tional form that is "fairest" or that best represents the 
entire polity. In proportional representation systems, the 
percentage of seats allocated to a party equals the per­
centage of the votes won by that party (i.e., a one percent 
increase in votes results in a one percent increase in 
seats). Others, however, suggest that a majoritarian form 
of representation is best. Majoritarian forms of represen­
tation expand the leading party's share of legislative 
seats beyond the percentage of the vote won (at least when 
the vote is close to the 50% range) (See Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989). The inflation of seats to votes under 
majoritarianism is believed to provide stability in the 
legislature (and government) by producing a stronger legis­
lative majority (and ruling coalition). This seat inflation 
in a majoritarian system also provides the winners with a 
sense that they have a mandate to implement the party's 
agenda, even if the mandate is built on a seat advantage 
that is artificially high when compared to their votes.
7Although majoritarian systems do inflate the allocation of 
seats in favor of the dominant party, it is arguable that 
such systems should not be deemed unrepresentative. As 
long as each party can win the same percentage of seats by 
winning a certain percentage of the vote, a majoritarian 
election system may be viewed as unbiased, and hence repre­
sentative.
Dahl (1956, 63-89) is concerned with the democratic 
dilemma of encouraging minority representation within a 
framework of majority rule. Dahl does not proscribe a 
particular system of representation; in fact, he appears to 
be somewhat ambivalent on the issue. On one hand, one 
could argue that he seems to favor a majoritarian pattern 
of representation. He insists that a democracy must guar­
antee that candidates or policies with the most votes 
should displace alternatives with fewer votes. In a multi­
party democracy with a proportional representation 
electoral system, it is possible that the party that wins 
the most votes and engages in formation of the government 
failed to win a majority of the votes. Depending on the 
governing coalition negotiated by party leaders, it is 
conceivable that some policies that are favored by a major­
ity of the voters will not be enacted. While policies that 
are favored by a majority of voters may not be enacted in 
two-party systems either, this is more a result of weak 
partisanship among voters and officeholders than the result
8of institutional arrangements. For example, in two-party 
systems (which usually have a majoritarian electoral sys­
tem) parties may not have a policy agenda that is ideologi­
cally consistent, voters may not consistently link policy 
alternatives with the respective parties, or voters may 
engage in split-ticket voting (thus minimizing the possi­
bility for effective policymaking by the government). 
However, these "flaws" in the policymaking ability of the 
government in two-party democratic systems do not result 
from electoral laws.
On the other hand, however, one could argue that Dahl 
appreciates the inclusivity that is present in proportional 
representation systems. Dahl believes that the ability of 
an individual or group to have their preferences included 
in the policy agenda is critical in a democracy. While one 
might have difficulty determining whether a majoritarian or 
proportional system of representation better facilitates 
policy discussion before an election, it appears that more 
diverse groups will be better represented in policy discus­
sions after elections in multiparty, proportional represen­
tation systems. Legislators and party leaders must keep 
each party in the government satisfied for the governing 
coalition to survive. Ultimately, Dahl concludes that 
minority interests will be represented adequately by either 
arrangement in a socially complex society because of over­
lapping patterns of individual interests. His assumption
9seems to be shared by Pitken (1967), who argues that repre­
sentation is guaranteed so long as elections are frequent 
and fair.
While it is not inconceivable that proportional repre­
sentation could result from plurality systems with single­
member districts (such as is found in some elections in the 
U. S. states), it seems more likely that the seats-votes 
ratio will differ from the proportional representation 
value in these particular election systems. The fact that 
the great majority of U.S. state legislative elections are 
conducted in single-member districts with a "plurality 
winner" rule means that losing candidates can poll a rela­
tively high percentage of the vote but not win the seat. 
Thus, while losing parties can win as much as 49% of the 
total vote, they can conceivably win no seats.
Finally, there is the issue of the dynamic relation­
ship between seats and votes under different forms of 
representation. In election systems where there is a 
proportional relationship between seats and votes, many 
scholars would argue that vote changes are adequately 
translated into legislative seats. In single-member dis­
trict, plurality election rule systems, however, a 
proportional relationship between seats and votes in the 
aggregate might suggest that the allocation of seats is not 
as responsive to changes in the partisan choice of voters 
as some might wish. Assuming that an inflated majority is
10
desired to facilitate the winning party's ability to gov­
ern, one might argue that a system in which seat changes 
are more responsive to vote changes is preferred. In 
addition, if a relatively large shift in the aggregate 
partisan vote does not result in a relatively large seat 
change in a single-member district plurality winner sys­
tems, it may be the case that one party has benefitted from 
partisan gerrymandering or that incumbents from both par­
ties have benefitted from redistricting arrangements.
THE CONCEPTS OF PARTISAN BIAS 
AND REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
In an election system with proportional representation 
rules, obviously, the percentage of votes won by a party 
will equal the percentage of legislative seats allocated to 
that party. There are two characteristics of the seats- 
votes relationship that can cause the partisan percentage 
of seats to deviate from the partisan percentage of the 
votes. This deviation could result from the representa­
tional form found in the election system or from partisan 
bias that may exist in the election system.
Representational Form
Gary King and Robert X. Browning (1987) suggest that 
there is a distinction between two important aspects of the 
relationship between partisan votes and partisan seat 
allocations in legislative elections. Partisan representa­
tional form pertains to the change in seats associated with
11
the change in the partisan percentage of the vote. Repre­
sentational form can be proportional, winner-take-all, or 
variations on a majoritarian form.
Proportional representation refers to an election 
system in which the percentage of the votes won by a par­
ticular party yields the exact same percentage of seats for 
the party. Alternatively, a winner-take-all system is 
characterized by the situation in which the party that wins 
50% plus one vote wins all the legislative seats. Some­
where in between the proportional system and the winner- 
take-all system is the majoritarian election system. In 
such a system, there is an exaggeration of seats won by the 
winning party, although the discrepancy between percentage 
of seats and votes won by the winning party is not as great 
as in the winner-take-all system. A party in a majori­
tarian system usually wins few seats until it approaches 
50% of the vote; each incremental percent of the vote won 
close to the 50% mark results in a seat gain of greater 
than one percent. As the party's percentage of the vote 
continues to increase above the 50% mark, at some point 
seat gains will again be smaller than one percent for each 
incremental percent of votes won.
Partisan Bias
King and Browning define partisan bias as "asymmetry 
[in] the seats-votes relationship, resulting in an unfair 
partisan differential in the ability to win legislative
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seats: the advantaged party will be able to receive a
larger number of seats for a fixed number of votes than 
will the disadvantaged party (1987, 1251-52)." They 
believe that partisan bias is absent in a system in which 
"x% of the Democratic votes produces an allocation of y% of 
the seats to the Democrats, then in another election under 
the same system x% of the Republican votes would yield the 
same y% Republican allocation of seats (1987, 1252). In 
other words, a system in which the Democrats won 55% of the 
votes and 60% of the seats would not necessarily be a 
biased system. Only in the case in which Republicans won 
55% of the votes and won more or less than 60% of the seats 
would there be a partisan bias according to the standard 
proposed by King and Browning.
According to King and Browning, then, the measure of 
bias is independent of the estimation of representational 
form. The techniques I use to measure form and bias and to 
test to see whether the losing party would win more or 
fewer seats than the winning party at a certain percentage 
of the vote are explained in detail in a later chapter of 
this work. In addition, the empirical distinctions between 
form and bias are graphically displayed in Chapter Three of 
this dissertation.
THE PURPOSE OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation has a twofold purpose. First, I 
estimate bias and representational form for 46 U. S. state
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legislatures from 196B to 1986. Every lower house election 
for these states in each year will be studied.
After the levels of partisan bias and representational 
form have been measured for each election in the time 
series, the second purpose of the research is to explain 
variation in bias and representational form over time and 
across states. This portion of the project involves the 
use of pooled data in an attempt to explain the causes of 
changes in bias and form from state to state and from one 
time period to the next.
There are a number of reasons why such a study is 
warranted. First, there has not been an attempt to measure 
partisan bias and representational form for individual 
elections in the U. S. states for a twenty-year period of 
time. In past attempts to measure bias and representa­
tional form, researchers have aggregated elections to 
generalize about an election system for an extended period 
without noting the pecularities of individual elections 
(King and Browning 1987; Niemi and Jackman 1991). In those 
studies where individual elections are analyzed, only a 
small number of states are used (Browning and King 1987; 
Campagna 1991; King 1989).
Second, there have been relatively few attempts to 
explain variation in representational form and partisan 
bias in the U. S. states. King and Browning (1987) have 
tested very parsimonious theories about representational
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form and bias in congressional elections and Taagepera and 
Shugart (1989) and Rae (1967) have studied representational 
form and partisan bias in national elections in a number of 
nations. Campagna (1991) has measured bias as a result of 
partisan redistricting but, as noted above, only for a 
small number (15) of states. Niemi and Jackman (1991) have 
examined changes in the swing ratio. Niemi and Jackman 
have also analyzed changes in partisan bias as a result of 
partisan redistricting for almost all the states over 
decades but not in individual election years. As yet, 
however, in no single study has a researcher utilized the 
King and Browning measure of representational form and 
partisan bias and sought to test variation in both of these 
components for individual elections in each of the U. S. 
states. Furthermore, previous models used to explain 
variation in representational form have been simplistic. I 
examine variation in representational form using a more 
comprehensively specified model.
THE EMPHASIS ON THE U. S. STATES 
Why should one be interested in such a study at the 
U. S. subnational level? The fact is that since district- 
level data for U. S. state legislative elections over a 
twenty-year time period have become available in computer- 
readable format, state legislative elections have become an 
area of increasing scholarly attention. Certainly data 
availibility tends to spark interest in an area of
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research. However, aside from the fact that available data 
often results in scholarly inquiry, there are at least two 
other more important reasons why state legislative elec­
tions might become topics of interest to political scien­
tists and other scholars.
First, the U. S. states provide an excellent laborato­
ry within which comparative political and social research 
can be conducted. As electoral systems continue to be of 
interest to political scientists, the existence of the U.
S. states and their 50 electoral systems (each with their 
own political and social idiosyncracies) offer opportuni­
ties to test seats-votes relationships in a comparative 
setting. It is possible to test the generalizability of a 
number of hypotheses that have been found to apply to 
legislative elections throughout the world.
The ability to conduct such comparative research is 
important in extending scientific Knowledge about partisan 
votes and partisan seat allocation in legislative elec­
tions. Few examples of comparative research on partisan 
bias and representational form exist (with the exceptions 
noted above). As new cases are examined over longer time 
periods and new variables are introduced to explain the 
seats-votes relationship, our Knowledge of legislative 
election processes should be expanded.
Second, the present study should shed some light on 
the political process in the U. S. states. Only recently
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have the electoral systems of the states been studied 
systematically. Little is known about the seats-votes 
relationship in the states, and almost nothing is known 
about why certain patterns exist. In fact, researchers 
have only recently studied individual elections over a 
lengthy period of time for 15 states. Furthermore, no 
attempt seems to have been made to explain representational 
form in U. S. state legislative elections.
Because the great bulk of the literature on the swing 
ratio is confined to research on the U. S. Congress, it is 
possible to study the seats-votes relationship at the U. S. 
state level in light of previous findings concerning con­
gressional elections. In a sense, there is the opportunity 
to compare U. S. state-level processes with U. S. national- 
level processes. Implicit in this discussion is the 
assumption that the U. S. states, with their social, eco­
nomic, cultural, and political diversity, are worthy in 
their own right to serve as units of analysis in social 
science research. Therefore, the present study is intended 
to provide knowledge about election systems in general and 
about state legislative election systems in specific.
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION
The research findings presented in this dissertation 
are divided into seven chapters including the first, intro­
ductory chapter. The second chapter consists of a discus­
sion of the literature concerning the various approaches
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taken to study the seats-votes relationship in legislative 
elections. In Chapter Two, I also summarize the substan­
tive findings of previous work on the seats-votes relation­
ship.
In the third chapter, more detail is provided on the 
theoretical bases of partisan bias and representational 
form, with particular attention paid to the King and 
Browning conceptualizations. In addition, in the third 
chapter I submit theoretical explanations for why certain 
patterns of representational form should exist and why 
partisan bias may or may not exist in legislative elec­
tions. I suggest that representational form in a state 
will be a function of partisan competition at the district 
level and of such election rule variables as district size, 
number of seats, and the presence or absence of multimember 
districts. Partisan bias is believed to be the result of 
party control of the redistricting machinery and intent to 
manipulate the district boundaries for partisan gain.
In Chapter Four, I discuss the data and the methods I 
use to estimate bias and representational form. In addi­
tion, I also operationalize the independent variables used 
to test my hypotheses about why partisan bias and represen­
tational form vary from state to state and from one year to 
the next in any given state. In Chapter Five, I present a 
description of the findings concerning the magnitude and 
frequency of the values of representational form and
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partisan bias. Chapter Six contains the results of my 
analysis for the representational form model and for the 
partisan bias model. In the final chapter, Chapter Seven,
I discuss the implications of my findings and the conclu­
sions that can be drawn from the research.
CONCLUSION
One of the important assumptions made in this disser­
tation is that an electoral system is as important a 
component of representation as is the behavior of elected 
representatives. The allocation of partisan seats in a 
legislature according to partisan votes is an important 
element in a democratic form of government. As such, 
election systems are political phenomena worthy of study. 
This research project fills a gap in the literature on 
U. S. state legislative elections by analyzing data from 
441 elections in 46 states from 1968 to 1987.
Of specific interest in this study are two character­
istics of seats-votes relationships that are identified by 
King and Browning (1987) as being conceptually and empiri­
cally distinct: representational form and partisan bias.
My first goal is to measure partisan bias and representa­
tional form for each election in the time series. My 
second purpose is to explain variation in representational 
form and partisan bias over time and among states with 
models that incorporate variables related to partisan
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competition at the district level, election rules, and 
partisan ability and intent to engage in gerrymandering.
This study is warranted by the relative inattention 
paid to election systems at the U. S. subnational level.
In previous attempts to study seats and votes in the U. S. 
states, researchers have utilized only a few states, a 
relatively short time period, or have aggregated elections 
to generalize about an election system as a whole rather 
than analyzing individual elections. Additionally, there 
have been no attempts to explain representational form and 
few attempts to explain partisan bias at the state level. 
These oversights in the scholarly literature on legislative 
elections are particularly striking considering the rich 
possibilities for comparative research with the U. S. 
states as units of analysis. Finally, I argue that the 
states are important political entities that are worthy of 
study in their own right. This dissertation then is both 
an attempt to understand better the process of seat alloca­
tion by votes in legislative elections in general and an 
attempt to fill gaps in the literature on U. S. state 
politics. In the next chapter, I review the literature 
relating to the seats-votes relationship in legislative 
elections.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
As stated in the first chapter, the purpose of the 
second chapter is to examine the literature concerning the 
seats-votes relationship in legislative elections. I 
describe the attempts to define the seats-votes relation­
ship in terms of a "swing ratio" and the various formula­
tions of partisan bias. Special attention is paid to the 
King and Browning method of measuring representational form 
and partisan bias. I also examine the various approaches 
to the use of data in this line of research and discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of each method. A summary of the 
findings pertaining to representational form and partisan 
bias in U. S. national, U. S. state, and non-U. S. national 
elections is provided.
EARLV APPROACHES TO DEFINING THE SWING RATIO 
Early attempts to measure the seats-votes relationship 
have stressed the importance of the swing ratio, which can 
be defined as the number or percentage of seats that will 
change party hands given a particular change (usually one 
percent) in the percentage of the vote won by the party 
under consideration. There are several approaches avail­
able for measuring the swing ratio. One involves using 
actual election data from two elections (Nayhew 1978). In 
this manner, one simply calculates the change in a party's 
seat shares divided by the party's change in vote shares
20
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from one election to the next. Using regression analysis, 
the swing ratio (analogous to representational form) would 
be determined by the slope of the regression line charted 
through only two points (elections).
Figure 2.1(a) illustates the biyearly method of calcu­
lating the swing ratio. Using hypothetical data, one can 
assume that Republican candidates in 1990 poll 48% of the 
votes and only win 40% of the seats. In 1992, Republicans 
win 52% of the votes and 52% of the seats. Rather than 
calculating the regression line between the two points, one 
can more easily determine the swing ratio in the manner 
noted in the preceding paragraph. The swing ratio using 
these two elections would be 3.00 since the change in seats 
of 12% corresponds to the change in votes of 4% (i.e., 
1 2 / 4 = 3 ) .  If one used the 1992 and 1994 elections to 
calculate a swing ratio, the results would equal one since 
an eight percent change in votes (from 52% to 60%) produces 
an eight percent change in seats (from 52% to 60%).
Another approach is to use actual multiyear election 
data to measure system responsiveness and party bias. The 
difference between this technique and the biyearly form is 
that the multiyear approach involves charting the regres­
sion line through a number of data points (Niemi and Fett 
1986, 77-78). Such an approach is undertaken by Rae 
(1967). Rae uses data from 1945 to 1964 from Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West
Figure 2.1(a)
Biyearly Calculation of Swing Ratio with 
Hypothetical Data, 1990-94
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Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United States. Rae does not utilize 
regression in his study, but he does identify patterns of 
deviation between seats and votes using bivariate regres­
sion.
Tufte (1973) also uses the historical data method. He 
employs longitudinal data on legislative elections from 
Great Britain (1945-70), New Zealand (1946-69), the United 
States (1868-1970), and the states of Michigan (1950-68), 
New Jersey (1926-69), and New York (1934-66). Tufte illus­
trates that changes in the representation coefficient can 
be charted over time using groups of three successive 
elections (or election "triplets") and by producing a 
representation coefficient for each four-year period of 
time in U.S. congressional elections (See Tufte 1973, 550, 
table 6).
Figure 2.1(b) provides an example of how a multiyear 
swing ratio is produced. The data points in this figure 
represent results for Republicans in hypothetical elections 
from 1980 to 1998. The percentage of seats and the per­
centage of votes for these 10 elections are plotted on a 
chart. A regression line representing the best fit among 
the data points is created. This regression line is then 
used to calculate the swing ratio. In the example in 
Figure 2.1(b), one can quickly calculate the approximate
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awing ratio value by examining the seat change given some 
change in vote increment. It can be observed that a change 
in Republican vote from 4 5% to 50% corresponds to an 
approximate increase in seats from 41% to 51%. This sug­
gests that a 5% change in votes causes a 10% change in 
seats; therefore, the swing ratio for this 10-year election 
series is 2.00.
Some of the early work in the subject area stressed 
more advanced approaches to the study of the swing ratio. 
James P. Smith, who published as early as 1909, discovered 
that the relationship between seats and votes in British 
legislative elections could be calculated by the formula:
A / B - C3 / D\ (2.1)
where A = number of seats won by winning party, B * number 
of seats won by losing party, C = % votes for winning 
party, and D - % votes for losing party. Kendall and 
Stuart (1950) note that this "law of cubic proportion" or 
"cube law" operated in Britain in 1935 and 1945 and in New 
Zealand in 1949. However, Kendall and Stuart point out 
that the heavily Democratic vote in the southern United 
States during the 1944 U.S. congressional election caused a 
lack of uniformity in the distribution in proportion of 
votes won by the Democrats across the country. Neither did 
the cube law apply to U.S. House of Representatives elec­
tions in 1888-92 or 1966-70 (Tufte 1973). A number of 
approaches to the study of the translation of votes into
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seats have emerged as a result of these earlier research 
efforts.
FORMULATIONS OF REPRESENTATIONAL FORM 
AND PARTISAN BIAS
The early approaches to calculating the swing ratio 
are overly simplistic. The biyearly and historical methods 
assume a linear relationship between seats and votes. 
Likewise, the cube law specification suggests that the 
swing ratio will always be close to 3.00 in single-member, 
plurality winner districts. The notion that vote changes 
always produce seat changes in some linear or cubic propor­
tion has been challenged by researchers over the last 
several years.
The King and Browning Formulation
King and Browning (1987) believe that there are two 
distinct, important characteristics of the seats-votes 
relationship in legislative elections: representational
form and partisan bias. They suggest that one can measure 
the representational form (formerly known as the swing 
ratio) and the partisan bias in an election system using 
only one model. They apply to congressional elections from 
1950 to 1984 a variation of a model first suggested by 
Tufte in 1973. The popular version of the King and Brown­
ing formulation that is commonly used by most practitioners 
is:
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(S / [1 - S]> = b (V / [1 - V] )c (2.2)
where S is a particular party's share of the legislative 
seats, v is the same party's percentage of the vote won in 
the election, b is the parameter that measures partisan 
bias, and c is the parameter for representational form.
The advantage of this model is that it captures the range 
of possible functions that can characterize the relation­
ship between partisan votes and partisan seats.
In their equation, King and Browning explicitly dif­
ferentiate between the form of representation and partisan 
bias. The form of representation is represented by a 
coefficient ranging from 0 (no responsiveness of seat 
changes to vote changes) to infinity [o€ ] (with the infi­
nity value representing a winner-take-all form of repre­
sentation) . A representational form parameter of 1.0 
indicates a system of strict proportional representation.
A coefficient between these extreme values (usually thought 
to be close to 3.0 by those who identified tne "cube law" 
of British elections) exemplifies a majoritarian form of 
representation, where vote percentages close to 50% (but 
not equal to 50%) result in exaggerated seat gains for the 
winning party. Thus, as c increases (controlling for b), 
the election system takes on a more majoritarian form.
These ideal types of seats-votes curves can be visualized 
in Figure 2.2. The nuances of these ideal types will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Three of this work.
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The parameter for bias is independent of the represen­
tational form of the election system and both parameters 
are calculated simultaneously. As the bias parameter 
varies, one can identify how the seats-votes curve shifts 
in favor of one party or the other. That is to say, the 
bias parameter measures the degree to which parties that 
win the same percentage of the vote at any particular 
representational form win identical percentages of the 
seats in the legislature. In the case of King and 
Browning's equation, a bias parameter of 1.0 equals no 
bias, a parameter of less than 1.0 equates to bias toward 
the Democrats, and a parameter value of greater than 1.0 
indicates that the system gives an "unfair" advantage to 
the Republicans.
The Importance of the King and 
Browning Formulation
King and Browning's work signals a break with the 
early, elementary models of the swing ratio and with the 
later, more sophisticated attempts to model the seats-votes 
relationship. They follow up on the suggestion by Tufte 
(1973) and Grofman (1983) that there is not always a linear 
relationship between seat changes and vote changes. Like­
wise, they agree with Tufte that the seats-votes relation­
ship need not follow the cube law pattern. Rather, they 
choose to model the seatB-votes relationship to depict the
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varying nature of this relationship. Thus, they are able 
to provide operationalizations for representational form 
and partisan bias for all types of legislative elections.
Second, the mere idea that partisan bias exists as a 
characteristic of the election system that is distinct from 
representational form was a break from previous research. 
Although Tufte (1973) and Grofman (1983) hinted that this 
might be the case, they did not investigate this possi­
bility with election data to the extent that King and 
Browning did. In fact, this theoretical and empirical 
breakthrough is closely related to the fact that King and 
Browning do not specify any particular representational 
form parameter in their model. In essence, by assuming 
that the seats-votes relationship was linear, previous 
researchers had identified as bias any deviation between 
the percentage of the seats and the percentage of the votes 
won by a particular political party. King and Browning 
attribute some of this deviation to the fact that the 
representational form may not be proportional. If the 
system were majoritarian in nature, then some deviation 
between the proportion of the seats and votes garnered by a 
party would be expected (assuming that one were examining 
the relationship at other than the 50% vote point on the 
continuum).
Therefore, King and Browning suggest that early 
attempts to measure bias were not measuring bias at all
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(or, at least, not exclusively). Partisan bias exists only 
as asymmetry in the actual representational form found in 
the system. Because previous research assumed some parti­
cular relationship between partisan seats and partisan 
votes, therefore, previous models used to measure bias 
and/or representational form were misspecified and did not 
correctly measure either characteristic of the election 
system. Because their model allows for the form of bias to 
depend on the type of representational form and therefore 
allows "for every possible degree of partisan bias and 
every possible form of democratic representation," they 
believe their model to be more realistic than other models 
of the seats-votes relationship (King and Browning 1987, 
1256).
Other Formulations of the Seats-Votes Relationship
Other approaches to the study of the seats-votes 
relationship that are similar to that of King and Browning 
have emerged in the literature. As a forerunner of King 
and Browning, Grofman (1983) compares the mathematical 
properties of the measures of bias and proportionality that 
had appeared in the literature up until the time of his 
writing. He finds the swing ratio of Tufte calculated "in 
the neighborhood" of 50% of a party's votes to be an appro­
priate measure of proportionality in the seat-votes rela­
tionship.
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However, Grofman believes that "bias as a gini-index- 
like measure of the area under seats-votes discrepancy 
curves is best able to deal with properties of the seats- 
votes relationship over the entire range of [votes]" 
(Grofman 1983, 308, 317). Grofman's equation (1983, 314) 
is based on the uniform partisan swing approach to data 
collection:
where D is partisan bias, x is vote share, S, (x) is seat 
share of party l corresponding to a vote share of x, S2(x) 
is seat share of party 2 corresponding to the same vote 
share of x, and D4(x) (obviously) is the seat share of 
party 1 if its vote share is x minus the seat share of 
party 2 if its vote share is x. Grofman also notes that if 
the seat percentage and vote percentage are linearly 
related, i.e., if:
where S is a party's seats, B, is the regression coeffi­
cient for the vote percentage when seats are regressed on 
vote percentage, V is a party's vote percentage and is the 
error term when seats are regressed on vote percentage, 
then Equation 2.3 becomes:
(2.3)
S - B,V + T, (2.4)
D -  ,X + Y )  -  [ 1  -  B , ( l  -  X)  + Y)
--J5l * B, - 2 Y  
-
-  ( . 5  -  X) ( 1  -  B,  -  2f) ,
(2.5)
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where D, B,, x, and 04 are defined as in Equations 2.3 and 
2.4. Grofman does "not bother to work out the implications 
for [partisan bias] of a nonlinear seats-votes relation­
ship . . ." (Grofman 1983, 314). He goes on to stress
that a "normalized measure of bias" ranging from -1.0 to
1.0 might be optimal, although such a recalculation of his 
"ideal equation" does not appear to be essential.
To illustrate how this technique operates, Grofman 
uses data produced by Scarrow (1981). Scarrow uses the 
uniform partisan swing approach to calculate partisan seats 
and votes. However, Scarrow only estimates bias from 
hypothetical swings of plus and minus 5% of the vote around 
the 50% mark (i.e., from each parties hypothetical vote of 
from 45% to 55%).' In addition, Scarrow does not use 
regression but calculates bias as the net difference at 
each point. Grofman takes the data from Scarrow and puts 
it in a graph format for purposes of illustration. Table
2.1 is a reproduction of the Scarrow data from the Connec­
ticut Assembly elections of 1970 and 1972. These data are 
produced by excluding uncontested elections and calculating 
the two-party vote for Republicans and Democrats. As noted 
by Grofman, in the 1972 Connecticut Assembly there is a 
bias reversal: "below 53 percent of the votes D4 indicates
a Republican advantage, above 53 percent of the vote D4 
indicates a Democratic advantage (Grofman 1983, 310)."
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DEMOCRATIC AND REPU31ICAN SEAT SHARES IN THE CONNECTICUT ASSIMULY 
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FOR HYPOTHETICAL ELECTIONS BASED ON UNIFORM SWINGS ACR05S ALL DISTRICIS 
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Source: Scarrow (1981, Table III). Cell entries indicate seat percentages that a party
would have achieved at the (column) specified vote share. Arrows indicate actual 
election outcomes. Boxed outcomes represent situations where a party with a vote 
share less (more) than .5 would achieve a projected seat share greater Ileus) 
than .5.
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4 are Grofman's efforts to graph the 
data from Scarrow (1981). Grofman suggests that the best 
measure of bias is the area between the respective party 
curves: "Moreover, if we use a positive sign for the area
where the curve for party l is above that for party 2, we 
have a natural way of capturing in a single number the net 
bias over a range of election outcomes (1983, 310)."
There are two differences between the methods of King 
and Browning (1987) and the suggestions made by Grofman 
concerning the Scarrow data. First, the former emphasize 
the need to allow the representational form coefficient to 
be unspecified by the researcher. Second, King and 
Browning prefer to measure bias as deviation from a "no 
bias" curve given the particular estimate of representa­
tional form found in the election. In this particular 
circumstance, Grofman seems to assume that the system 
should be proportional and then measures bias as the devia­
tion between points on the curve for each party. Nonethe­
less, as mentioned earlier, Grofman does recognize that an
election system does not necessarily have to be propor­
tional; he simply does not test this assumption with data.
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) introduce a twist to the 
King and Browning model. Their equation, which they argue 
is applicable to plurality elections is:
(SK / SL) = (VK / VL)\ (2.6)
where n = log V / log E, where SK is the seats for the
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winning party, s, is the seats for the losing party, VK is 
the votes for the winning party, VK is the votes for the 
losing party, V is the total number of voters, and E is the 
total number of electoral districts. The authors are not 
really interested in producing a parameter measuring parti­
san bias. As shown in Figure 2.5, however, they do plot 
curves on a graph with the x-axis as percent vote shares 
and the y-axis as the advantage ratio (% seats / % votes) 
to illustrate how different electoral systems deviate from 
strict proportionality in the seats-votes relationship. 
Taagepera and Shugart are more concerned with measuring the 
form of representation and identifying independent vari­
ables that explain the representational forms (1989,
166-93). Their equation could perhaps be transformed to 
include a bias parameter. However, because the present 
research program specifies party-related causes of partisan 
bias, the work by Taagepera and Shugart is important pri­
marily for its contribution to explaining representational 
form.
In addition, a number of other researchers have 
recently applied the King and Browning approach with slight 
modifications to a variety of electoral contexts. Niemi 
and Jackman (1991) apply both the biyearly swing ratio 
model and the King and Browning approach to ICPSR election 
data in their study of state legislative elections in 45 
states in the 1970s and 1980s. Campagna (1991), Campagna
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and Grofman (1990a), and Browning and King (1987) alao 
adopt King and Browning's method in their studies of U. S. 
state legislative election systems. Garand and Parent 
(1991) use the same approach in their work on the U. S. 
electoral college as do Gelman and King (1990) in their 
work on Congress. In addition, King (1990) borrows the 
same technique in his study of multiparty democracies. 
Ansolabehere and King (1991) also apply the King and 
Browning method to presidential primaries and caucuses in 
1976-88.
DIFFERENT METHODS OF USING DATA 
In addition to the variety of ways in which seats- 
votes relationships can be defined, there is a dispute in 
this area of research as to how to use election data to 
best represent the relationship. The two approaches to 
employing data for studying the seats-votes relationship in 
legislative elections are to use actual election results or 
to use hypothetical data that are generated from an actual 
election result. Both of these methods have been used by 
scholars of voting behaviour. Each approach has particular 
advantages and disadvantages.
Use of Actual Election Results
As noted previously, one approach to using data to 
study the relationship between partisan seats and votes is 
to employ actual election data from two elections. Another
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approach is to use actual election data from multiple 
elections to measure system responsiveness and party bias. 
The point is that in both cases, data on seats and votes 
from actual elections become points through which a regres­
sion line is drawn.
Both Rae (1967) and Tufte (197 3) utilize historical 
election data. Other researchers have used the historical 
approach to measure partisan bias and responsiveness in 
electoral systems. Niemi and Jackman (1991), Gryski, Reed, 
and Elliott (1990), and Browning and King (1987) apply the 
historical method to U.S. state legislative election sys­
tems. Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 156-98) and King (1990) 
use the historical method to chart seats-votes curves for 
national lower house elections in the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, Canada, the United States, Finland, Japan, Aus­
tria, Switzerland, Italy, and the Netherlands. While most 
of their findings are calculated using another approach, 
Garand and Parent (1991) also report some results for the 
U. S. electoral college that are based on historical data.
Use of the Uniform Partisan Swing Method
Alternatively, Butler (1951) suggests that partisan 
bias can be discovered by using data from one election. 
Taking actual election returns from Great Britain, Butler 
makes the case that one could create hypothetical data by 
increasing the district vote for the other major party by 
certain increments (preferably one percent). The changes
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in seats provided by the hypothetical incremental changes 
in votes should tell the researcher much about which party 
benefits from the electoral arrangement. Butler ultimately 
concludes that partisan bias can be identified by examining 
the partisan seat distributions when the respective parties 
are provided with 50% of the hypothetical two-party vote. 
The uniform partisan swing method was eventually adopted by 
Campagna and Grofman (1990b) and Gelman and King (1990) to 
measure bias and responsiveness for U.S. congressional 
redistricting, by Scarrow (1981, 1982, 1983) to measure 
bias in state legislative elections in New York and Con­
necticut, by King (1989) to estimate responsiveness and 
partisan bias in six U. s. state House of Representatives 
elections after redistrictings, by Campagna and Grofman 
(1990a) and Campagna (1991) to measure responsiveness and 
party bias in 15 state upper and lower houses, and by 
Backstrom, Robins, and Eller (1978) to identify partisan 
bias in the Minnesota state senate election of 1972. In 
addition, Garand and Parent (1991) apply the uniform parti­
san swing method to measure partisan bias and responsive­
ness in the U. S. electoral college system.
Advantages of Using Actual Election Results
A number of researchers have argued the merits of the 
three methods of data application. Either of the tech­
niques using actual election results has the advantage of 
data availability. Even state legislative election data
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are now relatively easy to utilize. Basically, the use of 
actual data means that one does not have to go through the 
step of manipulating the data to see how many seats are won 
by a party given incremental changes in the partisan vote 
percentages.
Aside from being easier to employ, the two approaches 
in which election results are utilized are satisfying in 
the sense that one is not asking "what might have been” but 
is instead dealing with what actually transpired in any 
given election. Election results from the uniform partisan 
swing method are simulated. One is measuring what would 
have happened if voters would have changed their prefer­
ences at the same rate across all election districts. Some 
researchers might be philosophically opposed to a technique 
that makes the latter assumption; others may be in opposi­
tion to any method other than one that makes use of only 
actual election results.
Disadvantages of Using Actual Election Results
A biyearly measure of the swing ratio is susceptible 
to wide fluctuation. Odd swing ratios would result, for 
example, in a case in which a party won 50% of the votes 
and 49% of the seats in one election and 49% of the votes 
and 50% of the seats in the following election [swing ratio 
— (49 - 50) / (50 - 49) — -1.001]. Even the use of only 3 
or 4 elections, a practice adopted by Tufte, causes very 
unstable estimates. A small sample of cases means that one
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exceptional election outcome (i.e., an outlier) can unduly 
affect the calculation of the swing ratio. Of course, the 
biyearly swing-ratio measure and Tufte's election triplets 
can be useful for identifying anomalous elections, but for 
providing generalizations about an election system as a 
whole a longitudinal approach should be employed. Niemi 
and Fett (1986), however, note that the multiyear form of 
the historical approach, if it involves a large enough 
number of elections (certainly more than Tufte's three), 
solves this problem of the fluctuating swing ratios.
The multiyear approach also has its limitations, 
however. Findings can be affected by the length of the 
time period used. Scholars must walk a fine line between 
choosing a time period that is so long that important 
shifts in the swing ratios are masked or so short that 
generalizations about the partisan bias and representa­
tional form of the system cannot be made. For election 
data collected over long periods of time, divisions in the 
time series are encouraged by Niemi and Fett. Divisions 
that are extremely short may make it difficult to determine 
what the swing ratio is at the "current" time until newer 
data become available. The researcher must be sensitive to 
these problems of temporality and roust be guided by theory 
and previous research in making politically-relevant divi­
sions of the data.
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A second disadvantage of the historical approach (both 
biyearly and multiyear) is that this formulation of the 
seats-votes relationship is especially sensitive to whether 
uncontested elections are included or excluded from the 
data set. The variation in uncontested elections over time 
means that partisan percentage of the vote will sometimes 
be inflated, thus affecting the calculation of the swing 
ratio for the time perod. Suggestions on how to how to 
alleviate this problem will be discussed later in the work.
Third, swing ratio or responsiveness parameter values 
may differ depending on which seats and votes data are 
actually used. This problem is only faced by scholars of 
the U.S. congress, however. For reasons that are not 
entirely clear, the two compilations of data most commonly 
employed —  one set accumula- ted by Stokes and Iverson 
(1962) from Historical Abstracts and U.S. Statistical 
Abstracts and the other compiled by Clubb and Austin (1984) 
from Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections —  
have slight discrepancies. The discrepancies are most 
acute before 1930 (Niemi and Fett 1986, 76-79, 84-87). 
However, as previously mentioned, this is not a problem for 
those who want to study state legislative elections.
Advantages of the Uniform Partisan Swing Approach
The "single-year" or uniform partisan swing method 
also has its advantages and disadvantages. On the positive 
side, this method is not dependent on past election
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results. This makes it particularly useful for judging the 
fairness of a redistricting plan after only one election 
(Niemi and Fett 1986, 82). It is also useful in identify­
ing an anomalous election without grouping two or three 
elections together. A related advantage is that trends in 
bias and representational form can be charted cross- 
sectionally for each election and longitudinally for the 
series as a whole (Garand and Parent 1991, 7).
A second advantage to the uniform partisan swing 
approach is that the swing ratio or representational form 
coefficient is less dependent on how votes are counted 
(i.e., whether uncontested elections are included in the 
data set) than is the case with the historical approach. 
Unlike the historical method, the uniform partisan swing 
approach utilizes hypothetical changes in votes from a 
single election. The results from using the latter method 
are thus not dependent on how data is coded in the previous 
election(s). Rather, the uniform partisan swing approach 
involves the coding of hypothetical data from the actual 
results from one election. One would have to chart seat 
changes given a 50% reduction in a party's vote in order 
for the winner of an uncontested seat to "lose" that seat. 
Thus, it is only at the extreme margins of plotting vote 
increments that seat changes will occur (Niemi and Fett 
1986, 87).2
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However, measures of partisan bias are sensitive to 
the inclusion or exclusion of contested elections regard­
less of which method of data collection is chosen (Tufte 
1973, 542-43). For example, under the uniform partisan 
swing method, a Republican who ran uncontested would be 
listed at 100%, 99%, 98%, etc., for 1% incremental decreas­
es in Republican vote. The resulting percentage of Repub­
lican vote at the state level would be different depending 
on whether the researcher included uncontested elections.
Third, if one wanted to do so, one could use the 
uniform partisan swing approach to estimate representa­
tional form and partisan bias for vote proportions that are 
larger or smaller than historical vote proportions. For 
instance, plotting extreme vote proportions would allow one 
to test whether or not both parties in any given state 
could win all the seats in the state legislature with the 
same percentage of the vote (Garand and Parent 1991, 7).
The historical method, of course, is limited by actual 
election outcomes.
Disadvantages of the Uniform Partisan Swing Approach
There are three weaknesses in the uniform partisan 
swing approach. One weakness results from the manner in 
which the technique has been applied and the other two are 
inherent weaknesses. Niemi and Fett (1986, 80) criticize 
Butler for only using 11 points (plus and minus 5% of the 
two-party vote won by a particular party and the actual
two-party percent of the result won by that party) rather 
than a larger number of points. Of course, as noted in the 
preceding paragraph, the vote percentage points used by 
Butler are not etched in stone. It is conceivable that 
hypothetical data could be charted for a party from 0% of 
the vote to 100% of the vote in the districts. In fact, 
one could produce estimates of partisan bias and represen­
tation for a number of different data points and compare 
results to discover the implications of charting a certain 
number of points.
Second, the uniform partisan swing method obviously 
contains the assumption that vote changes occur uniformly 
across election districts. This assumption is problematic 
for a number of reasons. If a candidate wins by an 
extremely large margin of the vote, then the plotting of 
hypothetical increments across all districts could cause a 
candidate to receive over 100% or less than 0% of the vote.
In addition, the assumption of uniformity of vote 
swings is not necessarily valid empirically. The appeal of 
individual candidates and the possibility that issues that 
are salient to the campaign are district-level issues 
rather than state or national issues makes it implausible 
for one to assume that partisan percentage of the vote 
would change uniformly across districts. For example, a 
party with an incumbent of lengthy tenure in one district 
would, ceteris paribus, receive a higher percent of the
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vote than would a candidate who carries the party label but 
who is running for an open seat. Another example would be 
the case of an incumbent who is penalized by the electorate 
due to a scandal while other partisans are judged on the 
basis of party label, state issues, constituency service, 
or their unscandelous record. Furthermore, the assumption 
of uniform vote swings denies researchers the opportunity 
to differentiate between electoral forces that occur at the 
national or state level from those that are unique to the 
election district (King 1989).
Niemi and Fett, who minimize the problem of unifor­
mity, state that the hypothetical approach is simply meant 
to be "a general measure of the relationship between votes 
and seats won" rather than an explanation of specific 
election outcomes (1986, 82). King (1989), however, incor­
porates a complex measure of mean voter preference 
distribution. King's parameters include a measure of the 
direction and degree of skewness and the peakedness of the 
preference distribution. King's use of this technique is 
an effort to produce district differences in hypothetical 
vote swings based on past district diferences in vote 
swings.
The third apparent disadvantage to the uniform parti­
san swing approach is that, in fact, the data are not 
actual election results. As with the second disadvantage 
of this method, however, it should be remembered that the
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hypothetical method is a tool. As suggested by Niemi and 
Fett (1986, 82), "the hypothetical swing ratio [as applied 
to U. S. congressional elections] measures what the effect 
on the number of seats would be either of electoral forces 
not directly controllable by the party (e.g., the state of 
the national economy) or of forces that are rather broadly 
and uniformly felt (e.g., nomination of an especially 
popular or unpopular presidential candidate)." It should 
be noted that King (1989) also argues that the uniform 
partisan swing approach to applying data is superior to the 
historical data gathering technique. Furthermore, one 
should be reminded that the uniform partisan swing method 
does use the values from actual election results as the 
basis on which the hypothetical data are plotted.
SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS ON SEATS AND VOTES 
The literature on the seats-votes relationship gene­
rally falls into three categories of election studies:
U. S. national elections, non-U. S. national elections, and 
U. S. state elections. In reporting the findings from 
these three types of elections, one can also differentiate 
between the findings concerning each of the two character­
istics of the seats-votes relationship, representational 
form and partisan bias. In this section of the chapter, 
the findings concerning representational and partisan bias 
in the range of electoral contexts are reported.
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U. S. National Elections: Representational Form
In this section, the findings pertaining to U. S. 
national elections are discussed. Several kinds of elec­
tion contests —  congressional elections, presidential 
elections, and presidential nomination contests —  fall 
under the rubric of U. S. national elections. Table 2.2 
summarizes the results of studies pertaining to representa­
tional form in these elections.
One of the early works on Congress was undertaken by 
Dahl (1956). Dahl examines the swing ratio for both Houses 
of Congress in elections between 1928 and 1954 (1952 for 
the Senate). In a foreshadowing of things to come, Dahl 
(1956, 148-49) regressed Democratic percent of the two- 
party seats on Democratic percent of the two-party vote 
(with an error term included), and finds that the coeffi­
cient for the independent variable is 2.5 in the House 
(RJ= .916) and 3.02 in the Senate (RJ».951) .
Tufte (197 3) illustrates that the responsiveness 
coefficient for elections to the U.S. House of Represen­
tatives was 2.39 for 1868 to 1970. For 1948 to 1970, 
however, the responsiveness coefficient declined to 1.93. 
Using triplets of elections, Tufte shows that the respon­
siveness coefficient was declining in U.S. congressional 
elections over time (6.01 in 1870-74 and 0.71 in 
1966-70).
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Table 2.2. suamary 
Rapraintttioul Pora, O.
of Results for 
8. National Elections
Authors Political
System
Range of 
Scores
Comment
Dahl (1956)
Tufte (1973)
King and 
Browning (1987)
King (1990)
Taagepera and
Shugart (1989)
Campagna and 
Grofman (1990b)
King and 
Gelman (1991)
Geer (1986)
Ansolabahere 
and King (1990)
Garand and 
Parent (1991)
Congress
(1928-54)
Senate
(1928-52)
Congress 
(1868-1970)
Congress
(1948-1970)
Congress
(1870-74)
Congress 
(1966-70)
Congress
(1950-84)
Congress
(1946-86)
Congress
(1950-70)
congress
(1980)
Congress
(1982)
2.50 
3 . 02 
2 . 39 
1.93 
6.01 
0.71 
0. 93-V 
1.78
Congress 1.30-2.50 
(1946-86)
Pres. Prim. 1, 
(1972-84)
Pres. Prim. 0. 
and Cauc. 
(1976-88)
Electoral 1. 
College 
(1872-1988)
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Uses election 
triplets
Uses election 
triplets
Host states are 
between 1.0-3.50
2.93
11-2.18 All states in
agg. produce 1.62
68-1.85 All states in
agg. produce 1.77
05-3.71 Host values are
between 1.23-2.01
96-6.56 Host values are
between 2.16-3.10
45-8.47 Host values are
between 4.00-6.00
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King and Browning (1987) measure representational form 
for each state for the U. S. congressional elections 
between 1950 and 1984. They find that the representation 
coefficient ranged from 0.93 (in California) to infinity 
(in five states), with 26 states having values ranging 
between 1.00 and 3.50. For purposes of comparison.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the frequency of representational 
form coefficients in the states in the King and Browning 
study. The authors also present a short section of 
research in which they provide empirical evidence that 
Taagepera's index (which measures "the number of districts 
relative to the number of voters") and party competition 
(measured by a standardized version of the Ranney index) 
are strongly, positively correlated with the representation 
coefficients. King (1990) estimates the representational 
form parameter in the aggregate for U. S. House elections 
(1946-86) to be 1.78.
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) measure the representa­
tional form of elections to the U. S. House of Representa­
tives from 1950 to 1970. They examine the coefficients for 
the time series as a whole. They find that the congres­
sional election system had a representational parameter of 
2.93, closely following what would have been expected under 
the cube law.
Campagna and Grofman (1990b) measure bias and repre­
sentational form parameters for U. S. congressional
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elections in 1980 and 1982 and for states categorized toy 
party control of the redistricting machinery in the same 
years. They discover that the swing ratio is 1.62 in 1980 
and 1.77 in 1982 for states in the aggregate. In both 
these years, elections in states in which one party con­
trols all three state institutions (both houses of the 
state legislature and the governorship) that are concerned 
with redistricting had larger swing ratios than did states 
with divided control of government (1990, 1249). When they 
delete states in which redistricting was performed toy the 
courts or by a commission, the pattern remains the same for 
1980 but changes slightly in 1982 (1990, 1252). In the 
latter election, the form parameter rises to 1.93 and 
states with two institutions controlled by Republicans 
produce a higher form coefficient (1.82) than do states 
with complete Democratic control (1.79)
King and Gelman (1991) estimate representational form 
for individual U. S. congressional elections from 1946 to
1986. They find that every election except 1986 falls 
between the 1.50 and 2.50 values for representational form. 
In addition, they discern a clear trend in which represen­
tational form declines over time. In fact, the form values 
decline from approximately 2.30 in the immediate post-War 
years to 1.30 in 1986 (King and Gelman 1991, 126-27).
The consensus for congressional elections is that 
representational form seems to be somewhat majoritarian.
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As the coefficients in the previous studies suggest, how­
ever, U. S. congressional elections are less majoritarian 
than what would be expected if the cube law were applica­
ble. There also seems to be a trend toward decreasing 
responsiveness of seat changes to vote changes in the 
competitive range as time progresses.
Geer (1986) adopts a "delegates/votes" ratio for 
primary elections for the Democrats in 1972-84 and for 
Republicans in 1976 and 1980. He finds that the primary 
systems are very close to proportionality, ranging from 
1.23 (Democrats in 1976 and 1980) to 2.01 (Republicans in 
1976). An examination of the delegates/votes ratios for 
individual candidates also shows that those who win the 
nominations also have ratios that tend to be proportional. 
Two exceptions to the latter trend are the more "majori­
tarian" victories of McGovern in 1972 (responsiveness 
coefficient of 2.30) and Ford in 1976 (2.14).
Ansolabehere and King (1990) also study presidential 
nomination contests but they employ the King and Browning 
technique to measure representational form and bias, they 
use data from 1976 to 1988, and they control for election 
rules. They find that Republican contests are more respon­
sive to vote changes than are Democratic contests. Also, 
not surprisingly, primaries without rules that demand 
proportionality between seats won and delegates won (i.e., 
having district plurality rules) have a higher
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representational form than do proportional rule primaries 
and caucuses. Ansolabehere and King find that the form 
coefficients range from 0.96 in Democratic caucuses in 1976 
to 6.56 in Republican district plurality primaries in 1976. 
While their results are similar to those of Geer, they find 
that when they disaggregate partisan contests by type of 
election rule district plurality primaries for both parties 
are quite majoritarian (with most coefficients ranging from 
2.16 to 3.10).
Garand and Parent (1991) study the representational 
form of the electoral college. In this work, the electoral 
college is found to be highly responsive to votes, with the 
representation coefficient of 5.38 indicating a system 
somewhere between majoritarian and winner-take-all. The 
representation parameter for individual presidential elec­
tions ranged from 1.45 in 1924 to 8.47 in the hotly con­
tested election of 1960.
The results indicate that there is a variety of repre­
sentational form patterns for U. S. national elections. 
Presidential elections are highly majoritarian, most likely 
because such contests involve winner-take-all rules in 
relatively large electoral units (the U. S. states). 
Presidential primaries with winner-take-all rules also have 
relatively large representational form values. Congres­
sional elections, which of course have districts that are 
smaller than the electoral units for presidential
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elections, have slightly majoritarian patterns. Presiden­
tial primaries and caucuses with proportional (or nearly 
proportional) winner rules exhibit representational form 
coefficients that are very nearly proportional.
U. S. National Elections: Partisan Bias
As is the case with representational form, it is 
possible to measure partisan bias in national elections in 
the United States. Most of the authors cited in the pre­
ceding section also report findings for partisan bias.
Thus, the findings pertaining to bias in congressional and 
presidential elections are discussed in this section. A 
summary of the results of these findings is provided in 
Table 2.3.
Tufte (1973) measures partisan bias in elections to 
the U.S. House of Representatives from 1866 to 1970. He 
defines bias as the proportion of vote required to give a 
particular party of the researcher's choosing a majority of 
legislative seats. He finds that there was a slight bias 
in favor of the Democrats in that only 49.1% of the vote 
was needed to gain a majority of the seats (i.e., partisan 
bias toward the Democrats of 0.9%). From 1948 to 1970, the 
Democratic bias increased to 1.2%. Using triplets of elec­
tions, he finds that the median absolute partisan advantage 
was 1.4%, and that the Democrats were benefitted by bias in 
10 of the 17 election triplets.
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Tibia 2.3. Suaury of Rasulta for 
Partisan Bias, u. 8. National Blaetions
Authors Political
System
Range of 
Scores
Comment
Tufte (1973)
King and 
Browning (1987)
King (1990)
Congress
(1868-1970)
Congress
(1948-1970)
Congress
(1870-74)
Congress
(1966-70)
Congress
(1950-84)
Congress
(1946-86)
0.9%
(Dem.)
1.2% 
(Dem.)
1.4%
(Rep.)
0.71 
(Dem,)
—. 92— H  . 12
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Uses election 
triplets
Uses election 
triplets
Negative values 
are natural log of 
bias in Repub. 
direction; 
positive values 
are natural log of 
bias toward Dems. 
Most states have 
values between .50 
and -0.50.
-0.11 Value represents 
sign. Demo, bias
Campagna and 
Grofman (1990b)
King and 
Gelman (1991)
Garand
Parent
and
(1991)
Congress -6.8%— 1-4 . 5% 
(1980) (Rep.) (Dem.)
Congress -5.8%-+1.7% 
(1982)
Congress -.15— *-.08 
(1946-86)
Electoral -.98-+.38 
College 
(1872-1988)
All states agg. 
produce Demo, bias 
of 4.4%
All states, agg. 
produce Demo, bias 
of 1.3%
Interpreted as in 
King and Browning 
Most values are in 
—0.11—+0.02 range.
Party direction of 
signs is opposite 
from King and 
Browning 1987.
Most values are in 
-0.35-+0.10 range.
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Tufte also points the way toward future research. He 
illustrates that the uniform partisan swing method is 
applicable to U.S. House of Representatives elections by 
charting hypothetical data for 1968. He finds that the 
partisan bias was approximately 4.8% at 50% of the vote (in 
favor of the Democrats) rather than the 7.9% bias found for 
the 1966-70 election triplet. He also notes that a logit 
model could be used for his exercises, but he abandons this 
approach in favor of the more easily interpretable coeffi­
cients of the linear model.
King and Browning (1987) measure partisan bias in each 
state for U. S. congressional elections from 1950 to 1984. 
They do not convert their coefficients into a percentage of 
bias at 50% of the vote, but rather report the actual 
regression coefficients. The bias coefficients range 
from -0.92 (Republican bias in Maine) to 1.12 (Democratic 
bias in Texas). Thirty-one states had bias coefficients 
between -0.3 and 0.3. Half of the 48 states in the study 
exhibit a Republican bias and the other half have Demo­
cratic biases. Only six states have bias coefficients that 
exceed their standard errors; of these six states, three 
are biased toward the Democrats and three have Republican 
biases. The authors also note that Democratic partisan 
bias is significantly related to Democratic party strength 
(King and Browning 1987, 1265-66). Figure 2.7 illustrates 
the frequency of partisan bias coefficients in this study.
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Figure 2.7. Frequency of Partisan Bias 
Coefficients Cor Each Stats in Congressional 
Elections, 1950-84.
1 6% J
12% H
0 .4  0.6
Source: King and
Browning (1987)
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Campagna and Grofman (1990b) find that the bias para­
meters for congressional elections in 1980 and 1982 were 
significant and worked to the advantage of the Democrats.
At 50% of the vote, Democrats would have won 54.4% of seats 
in 1980 and 51.3% of seats in 1982. Excluding states in 
which redistricting was performed by courts or commissions, 
however, reveals that Republicans received the benefit from 
bias: at 50% of the vote, Republicans win 50.1% of the
seats in 1980 and 50.2% of the seats in 1982. In cases in 
which states with non-legislative redistrictings were 
excluded and in cases where these states were included, the 
effects of party control of redistricting were the same. 
Split-party control resulted in Republican bias in 1980 and 
in 1982. Democratic control of redistricting resulted in 
Democratic bias in 1980 and 1982, although bias was statis­
tically significant only in the latter year. Republican 
control of redistricting ensured a strong Republican bias 
in 1982, but Republican control of redistricting in 1980 
surprisingly resulted in a strong bias in favor of the 
Democrats (1990, 1249-1252).
King and Gelman (1991), controlling for incumbency 
advantage, chart partisan bias in congressional elections 
from 1946 to 1986. The largest bias toward the Republicans 
occurs in 1946 (log of bias of -0.14). The 1984 election 
is most biased toward the Democrats (0.07). Most elections
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show a bias favoring the Republicans. However, there is a 
clear trend in bias over time toward the Democrats.
The differences in findings between Tufte and King and 
Browning probably represent methodological differences and 
or differences in the time periods each researcher studied. 
Since Tufte is assuming a linear relationship between seats 
and votes, the Democratic bias he discovers may be due to 
the possibility that Democrats benefit from states having 
majoritarian systems rather than benefitting from actual 
partisan bias. Additionally, the fact that Tufte is mea­
suring bias using election triplets while King and Browning 
are using data points from 1950 to 1984 probably account 
for some differences in findings. Finally, it may well be 
the case that the difference in the way each researcher 
aggregates party votes causes differences in outcomes.
While Tufte calculates party vote as the aggregate vote for 
each party, King and Browning employ aggregate district 
vote percentages for each party as the starting point for 
their analysis.3
In addition, Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 106-107) 
determine the deviation from proportionality of U. S. House 
elections in 1984. Their formula is:
D - <l/2)£ | s, - v, | (2.7)
where [£ ] is the summation over all parties in the elec­
tion. They determine that the deviation from proportional­
ity for the election in question is 6.7%. Taagepera and
Shugart (1989, 138-39) also calculate the "break-even 
point" for both houses of the U. S. Congress. This point 
represents the share of votes at which the average seats- 
votes curve intersects with the curve that would represent 
proportional representation. For the Senate (1912-1970), 
the break-even point is 47%; for the House of Representa­
tives, this point is 4 6%. As an example of what the break­
even point represents, one can say that when the minority 
party in Senate elections receives 47% of the vote it will 
win approximately 47% of the seats. Should the minority 
party win less than 47% of the votes, it will increasingly 
win a disproportionately lower percentage of the seats.
Of course, as has been noted previously, researchers 
have been accused by King and Browning of confounding 
partisan bias and representational form. Researchers who 
assume a linear relationship between seats and votes or who 
do not offer empirical distinctions between form and bias 
are especially suspect. It is difficult to know if devia­
tion from proportionality and break-even points are results 
of partisan bias or a majoritarian representational form.
Garand and Parent (1991) estimate bias for the U. S. 
electoral college for each presidential election from 1872 
to 1988. Of these 30 elections, 22 are biased toward the 
Democrats and eight are biased toward the Republicans. 
Fourteen of the bias coefficients that favor the Democrats 
are significant at the .05 level. Of the eight bias
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coefficients that favor the Republicans, four are signifi­
cant at the .05 level. The bias coefficient for the tine 
series as a whole is in the direction of the Democrats but 
does not reach even the most liberal level of statistical 
significance. The worst example of bias occurs in 1948, 
when if Republicans had won 50% of the popular vote they 
would have won only 27% of the electoral vote.
Additionally, Geer (1986) provides evidence of bias in 
presidential primaries. He finds that the vote typically 
needed by all candidates to win 50% of the delegates ranged 
from 37.7% to 49.7%. Nomination winners, however, uni- 
formally benefit disproportionately from primary rules.
The most extreme example is in 1972 when McGovern needed 
only 3 0.7% of the votes to win 50% of the delegates. The 
least amount of bias is found in the Republican primary of 
1976 when Ford needed 4 5.9% of the votes to win 50% of the 
delegates.
Ansolabahere and King (1990) also find that nomination 
winners generally (but not uniformly) benefit from a bias 
in the election system. However, when they control for the 
election rules of the nomination process, the magnitude of 
the bias is generally small (and not statistically signifi­
cant). For the years 1976 to 1988, significant bias is 
found in 25% of cases involving Republican contests and in 
29% of Democratic cases. Republican bias is highest in 
primaries with proportional winner rules and Democratic
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bias is highest in district plurality primaries and cau­
cuses. The worst cases of bias occur in 1988: Bush bene­
fits against Dole in 1988 Republican proportional winner 
primaries and Dukakis benefits versus Jackson in Democratic 
district plurality primaries. In only one case, the 1988 
Democratic caucuses in which Gore receives a bias against 
Dukakis, does the eventual nomination winner experience a 
significantly large bias to his detriment.
In general, there seems to be a bias toward the Demo­
crats in congressional elections. Tufte (1973) finds a 
Democratic bias of approximately one percent from 1866 to 
1970, with slightly higher levels of bias later in the time 
series. Campagna and Grofman (1990b) also find Democratic 
biases of 4.4% and 1.3% in congressional elections in 1980 
and 1982, respectively. The electoral college system for 
presidential elections also appears to be biased by the 
Democrats. Of the 30 presidential elections from 1872 to 
1988, 14 were significantly biased in favor of Democrats, 
four were significantly biased toward the Republicans, and 
12 contained very small levels of bias (generally in the 
direction of the Democrats). In presidential candidate 
selection processes, winners generally benefit from levels 
of bias that are usually rather small but occasionally are 
quite large.
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Non-U. S. National Elections: Representational Form
Though most of the literature on the seats-votes 
relationship is confined to the U. S. context, there is 
some research on national legislatures other than the U. S. 
Congress. Because some of the scholars who study compara­
tive legislatures do not attempt to identify separate 
parameters for bias and form, one must be careful to inter­
pret what they are measuring in order to find statistics 
that are analogous to the characteristics that are 
described by King and Browning. Nonetheless, it is possi­
ble to discuss in separate sections findings pertaining to 
representational form and partisan bias for elections other 
than those occurring in the United States. As such, this 
section deals with the results of research on representa­
tional form for non-U. S. national legislatures. Table 2.4 
summarizes the results of these findings.
Rae utilizes bivariate regression to identify patterns 
of deviation between seats and votes. In the aggregate, he 
finds that regressing seats on votes for 20 Western democ­
racies from 1945 to 1964 produces the equation (Rae 1967, 
70-71, 89):
Seats » -0.0238 + 1.13(Vote) (2.8)
For systems that use a plurality winner (or "first-past- 
the-postH system) or a majoritarian system (a "winner-take- 
all" format, which applies only to the Australian lower
67
Table 2.4. fluaury of Rcsulti for 
Representational Fora, Non-U. S. National Elections
Authors Political Range of Comment
System Scores
Rae (1967) 20 nations 1.13
(ca. 1945-ca. 1964)
Tufte (1973) Great Britain 
(1945-70)
New Zealand 
(1946-69)
2 . 83
2.27
Taagepera 
and Shugart 
(1989)
1 .01-2.86
King (1990)
Canada 
Japan 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Italy 
Finland 
Netherlands 
(ca. 1945-ca. 1977)
Great Britain 0.87-1.82
Canada
Austria
Japan
Italy
Netherlands 
Finland 
(ca. 1919-ca. 1987)
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel. 
Also finds that 
plurality winner 
systems have swing 
ratios of 1.20; 
proportional 
systems have swing 
ratios of 1.07.
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Most nations are 
in the 1.05 to 
1.30 range.
Most nations are 
in the 1.09 to 
1.61 range.
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house and the first ballot vote for the French National 
Assembly), the comparable equation is:
Seats * -0.063 + 1.20(Vote) (2.9)
The same equation applied to proportional representation 
systems (or variants of proportional representation sys­
tems ) produces:
Seats - -.0084 + 1.07(Vote) (2.10)
Rae also illustrates that the average change of vote 
shares of 2.58% for all parties receiving greater than 2.0% 
of the vote in proportional representation formula coun­
tries equates to a 2.68% average change in seat shares.
The net average magnification of changing party strength is
0.10%. For plurality and majority formulae, the 3.24% 
average change in vote shares produces a 6.86% average 
change in seat shares; net average magnification of 
changing party strength is 3.62% (Rae 1967, 101).
Using longitudinal data on legislative elections from 
Great Britain (1945-70) and New Zealand (1946-69), Tufte 
(1973) finds that only elections in Great Britain produce 
representation coefficients (analogous to the exponent in 
the swing-ratio equation) that are close to the 3.00 speci­
fied by the cube law. In fact, the elections in Great 
Britain produce a swing ratio of 2.83. In New Zealand, the 
swing ratio is 2.27.
Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 193) report representa­
tional form coefficients for several Western democracies in
6 9
the post-War era. They find that Canada (1963-74) produces 
the rather large coefficient of 2.86. Other countries 
exhibit more proportional forms of representation: Japan
(1963-76) has a coefficient of 1.30; Austria's (1945-70) 
form parameter is 1.20; Switzerland (1947-75) produces a 
form value of 1.13; the form parameter for Italy (1958-76) 
is 1.05; Finland (1962-75) produces a coefficient of 1.07; 
and the Netherlands (1963-77) exhibits a form parameter of 
1.01.
King (1990) examines the electoral responsiveness of 
elections in a number of democracies. He discovers that 
election rules generally have an effect on form parameters. 
For example, in a nation such as Canada (1921-1984) that 
has electoral systems with single-member districts, repre­
sentational form values are relatively large. The repre­
sentational form parameter for Canada is 1.82. In Austria 
(1945-83) and Japan (1958-86), two countries with modified 
proportional representation rules, the representational 
form parameter values are 1.52 and 1.47, respectively. 
Nations having proportional rules produce expected results. 
Italy (1946-87) has a 1.11 representational form. The form 
parameter for the Netherlands (1946-86) is 1.09. Finland 
(1919-83) produces a form parameter of 0.92. Finally, the 
value of the form parameter in Switzerland (1919-83) is 
1.11.
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As one might expect, representational form values for 
national legislatures outside the United States vary 
between proportional representation and majoritarian pat­
terns. Another unsurprising finding is that election rules 
at the district level strongly affect the representational 
form coefficient. Specifically, plurality or majority 
winner rules in single-member districts and modified pro­
portionality plans produce elections with larger represen­
tational form coefficients than pure or nearly pure propor­
tional representation plans. In general, the findings 
suggest that single-member district election rules in Great 
Britain, Canada, and New Zealand result in representational 
form coefficients that are similar to the form values found
in U. S. congressional elections. By the same token, as
would be expected, the U. S. Congress exhibits representa­
tional form values that tend to be larger than those in
elections in nations that do not have single-member dis­
trict plurality or majority winners.
Non-U. S. National Elections: Partisan Bias
As is the case in U. S. congressional elections, 
another characteristic of national legislative elections 
outside the U. S. is the presence or absence of partisan 
bias in the election system. Partisan bias is important 
because it can affect partisan seat distribution in the 
legislature and can conceivably affect the legislature's 
ability to represent the public in the ways discussed in
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Chapter One. Though the literature on bias (as was true of
representational form) is less extensive in the non-U. S.
setting, there are still some research efforts that are 
relevant to the discussion. A summary of the results of 
the studies concerned with partisan bias in these elections 
is contained in Table 2.5.
Rae equates deviation from proportionality at 50% of 
the vote as bias. in his 20 nation study, he finds that in 
systems having plurality or majority winner rules, 50% of 
the vote equates to 53.7% of the seats. In the cases in
which proportional winner rules prevail, 50% of the vote
corresponds to 52.7% of the seats (Rae 1967, 90).
Tufte finds that party bias does exist for Great 
Britain in 1945 to 1970 and for New Zealand in 1946 to 1969 
(See Tufte 1973, 543, Table 1). In the former, the Labour 
Party requires 50.2% of the votes to win a majority of the 
seats. Thus, Tufte concludes that the bias in Great Bri­
tain is 0.2% in favor of the Conservative Party. In New 
Zealand, since the Labour Party needs 51.4% of the votes to 
gain a legislative majority, the National Party is the 
beneficiary of a 1.4% bias.
As noted earlier, the closest thing to bias that 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989) estimate is deviation from 
proportionality. For the 48 countries they study, they use 
data from 1945-85. The smallest deviation from proportion­
ality occurs in Greenland (0.2%). The country with the
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Table 2.5. Suaatry of Results for 
Partisan Bias, Non-U. 8. National Blaetiona
Authors Political
System
Range of 
Scores
Comment
Rae (1967) 20 nations 2.7%-3.7% 
(ca. 1945-ca. 1964)
Tufte (1973) Great Britain
(1945-70)
0 .2%
New Zealand 
(1946-69)
1.4%
King (1990) Great Britain 0.00-1.60
Canada
Austria
Japan
Italy
Netherlands 
Finland 
(ca. 1919-ca. 1987)
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel. 
These f igures 
represent what the 
typical party 
would receive at 
50% of the vote in 
proportional and 
majority/plurality 
systems, 
respectively.
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel. 
Bias is in favor 
of the
Conservative
Party.
Assumes a linear 
seats-vote rel. 
bias is in favor 
of the National 
Party.
Interpreted as in 
King and Browning
1987. The 
largest bias is 
the Conservative 
Party bias vis-a- 
vis the Liberal 
and Alliance 
Parties in Great 
Britain. Host 
values range 
between 0 and 0.10 
(very little 
bias).
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largest deviation from proportionality is Sri Lanka (36.7%) 
(1989, 106-107). To use Sri Lanka as an example, the 
authors explain that deviation from proportionality can be 
interpreted to mean that "compared to perfect [proportional 
representation, 36.7%] of the seats are shifted from some 
parties to some other parties (1989, 105)." The median 
value of deviation from proportionality in their study is 
7.6%.
King (1990, 171-74) calculates bias in multiparty 
democracies by first estimating the seats-votes relation­
ship for one party assuming an absence of bias and then 
applying the same representational form parameter to other 
party's seats-votes curves. If a numerical value is pro­
duced for the other parties, then it can be said that bias 
exists in the relationships between each pair of parties 
(i.e., the original party and each other individual party). 
In Great Britain, he finds that the Conservative-Labour 
party contest produces a 0.05 bias in favor of the Conser­
vatives. The Conservative Party also enjoys a very large 
1.60 bias when pitted against the Liberal and Alliance 
Parties. In Canada, the Conservative Party benefits from a 
very small bias against the Liberal Party (0.01) but a 
rather large bias against the National Democratic Party and 
other parties. In proportional and modified proportional 
election rule systems, bias between the reference party and 
other parties is insignificant. There are small biases
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against the Socialist Party in Austria, the Liberal Demo­
cratic Party in Japan, the Christian Democratic Appeal 
Party in the Netherlands (when matched with the other major 
parties) and the Social Democrats in Finland (when pitted 
against other major parties). In Italy, there is a small 
bias in favor of the Christian Democrats. Finally, in 
Switzerland, the Social Democrats benefit from a small bias 
vis-a-vis the People's Party and other parties but are hurt 
by a small bias when matched against the Radical Democrats 
and the Catholic Conservatives. In general, King's work 
reveals that nations with single-member districts have 
larger biases and biases that work more to the advantage of 
the major parties than do modified proportional representa­
tion and proportional representation systems.
The general concensus seems to be that bias is more 
prevalent in single-member district elections than in 
modified proportional representation or pure (or nearly 
pure proportional representation systems. Bias in Great 
Britain, Canada, and New Zealand seem to be comparable to 
the levels of bias found in U. S. congressional elections 
(in particular, see King 1990, Tufte 1973). Thus, it seems 
that election rules rather than other idiosyncratic, 
country-specific variables have a strong effect on both 
representational form and partisan bias in national legis­
lative elections.
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u. S. State Legislative Elections:
Representational Form
Huch of the research on the relationship between 
partisan votes and partisan seats, as has been noted, has 
been conducted on the U. S. Congress. However, the exis­
tence of new data now allows for similar research to be 
conducted for state legislative elections in almost all the 
states. Due to this new data, a substantial body of liter­
ature has arisen in the past few years in which U. S. state 
legislative elections have been analyzed. As is the case 
with national elections, it is possible to identify mea­
sures of representational form and partisan bias in legis­
lative elections in the U. S. states. In this sections, I 
will discuss the findings on representational form in state 
legislative elections. A summary of these results is 
provided in Table 2.6
Tufte (1973) estimates the responsiveness of the 
election systems of three state legislatures. Michigan 
(1950-68) had a responsiveness coefficient of 2.06. New 
York (1934-66) had a responsiveness coefficient of 1.28.
New Jersey is found to have had two different patterns.
From 1926-47, the responsiveness coefficient for New Jersey 
was 2.10. In the later period, 1947-69, the responsiveness 
coefficient in New Jersey was 3.65.
Two sets of researchers examine legislatures in indi­
vidual states. Scarrow (1982, 232-33) estimates the aver­
age swing ratio in the New York State Assembly to be 1.90
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Table 2.6. Suaury of Raaulti for 
Representational Form, u. a. state Elootion*
Authors Political
System
Range of 
Scores
Comment
Tufte (1973)
Scarrow (1982)
Browning and 
King (1987)
King (1989)
Gryski, Reed, 
Elliott (1990)
Niemi and 
Jackman (1990)
Campagna and 
Grofman (1990a)
Michigan
(1950-68)
New York 
(1934-66)
New Jersey 
(1926-47)
New Jersey 
(1947-69)
New York 
Assembly 
(1952-64)
New York 
Assembly 
(1966-78)
Indiana
House
(1972-84)
2.06 Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.
1.28 Assumes a linear
seats-votes rel.
2.10
3.65
1.90
1. 50
2 . 05
Indiana 0.35-2.84
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Iowa
Washington
(1968-80)
42 states 0.89-9.36 
(1976-84)
46 states 1.13-2.28 
(1970-86)
15 states 0.52-4.62
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Average swing 
ratio over time 
period
Average swing 
ratio over time 
period
Most values for 
indiv. elections 
range from 0.50 to 
1.20
All states agg. 
produce 3.22
Results are 
reported in agg., 
controlling for 
party control of 
redistricting and 
by decade.
Most values for 
indiv. elections 
range from 0.85 to 
2.69.
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from 1952-64 and 1.50 from 1966-78. For the New York State 
Senate, the comparable figures for the same years are 2.10 
and 1.40, respectively. Browning and King (1987) find that 
the Indiana House of Representatives (from 1972-84) had a 
representational parameter of 2.05 (between proportional 
and majoritarian). The Indiana Senate over the same time 
period basically operated as a majoritartian system 
(responsiveness parameter of 3.26).
King (1989) examines representational form in six 
state legislatures from 1968 to 1980. He utilizes a ver­
sion of the King and Browning equation which he upgrades to 
"control" for partisan swing and incumbency voting. He 
finds that bipartisan redistricting in Pennsylvania and 
Wisconsin resulted in a decrease in responsiveness in the 
middle range of the distribution (i.e., the system became 
more proportional); this finding is consistent with the 
widely-held notion that bipartisan redistricting is used to 
protect the incumbents of both parties. Nonpartisan redis­
tricting in Iowa and Washington caused the representation 
coefficient to rise dramatically in the election subsequent 
to redistricting, meaning that vote swings toward either of 
the parties resulted in larger shifts in seat changes than 
before redistricting in relatively competitive districts. 
King also discovers, however, that the immediate effects of 
partisan and nonpartisan redistricting diminished in elec­
tions from 1974 to 1980 (King 1989, 813-20).
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Gryski, Reed, and Elliott (1990) estimate the repre­
sentational form in general elections to the lower houses 
of 42 state legislatures from 1976 to 1984:
In (S / 1 - S) = a + n In (V / 1 - V) + e (2.11) 
They test the null hypothesis that the representation 
coefficient did not differ significantly from 3.0. In only 
five states can the null hypothesis for representation be 
rejected at the .05 level of statistical significance. The 
five states that deviate from the "majoritarian" pattern 
tend toward proportionality (the highest coefficient in 
these states was 2.09). However, in the aggregate, the 42 
states had an average representation coefficient of 3.22, 
almost mirroring the cube law value of 3.00. Twenty-three 
states produced representation coefficients greater than
2.50, and only three states had coefficients greater than
4.50. Thus, while the average representational coefficient 
was greater than 3.00, most states exhibited a coefficient 
very close to what one would expect in a roajoritarian 
system.
Niemi and Jackman (1991) are concerned with the 
effects of redistricting on the swing ratio in state lower 
house elections. For the purpose this dissertation, it 
should be noted that they measure responsiveness for the 
1970s, the 1980s, and 1970 to 1986. In one set of equa­
tions, they control for party control of state government 
and in another they control for partisan control of the
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redistricting process. They find that only in states in 
which Republicans dominated state government in 1982-86 and 
the redistricting process in 1970-80 did the responsiveness 
parameter exceed 2.00. It is discovered that states exhi­
bited representational systems that were more proportional 
than had been revealed in studies having shorter time 
series.
Finally, Campagna and Grofman (1990a) and Campagna 
(1991) measure partisan bias and responsiveness for each 
election to the upper and lower houses of California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Utah, and Wisconsin from 1972 to 1986. Since the 
present study involves lower house elections, only the 
findings for these houses in the Campagna and Grofman study 
are noted here. The median swing ratios for the 15 states 
ranged from 0.85 in Kentucky to 2.69 in Connecticut.
The evidence seems to indicate that, on average, the 
representational form coefficients for state legislative 
election systems are closer to proportionality than are the 
representational coefficients for U.S. congressional elec­
tions. However, comparisons from two studies indicate that 
median values from congressional and U. S. state legisla­
tive elections do not appear to differ as much as mean 
values (See Gryski, Reed, and Elliot 1990, 141, 148-50;
King and Browning 1987, 1269). The winner-take-all values
80
for five states in federal elections most likely inflate 
the average representational coefficient values in congres­
sional elections.
U. S. State Legislative Elections: Partisan Bias
U. S. state legislative elections, like all other 
elections, contains certain levels of partisan bias. The 
research pertaining to partisan bias in these elections is 
discussed in the following paragraphs. In addition, a 
summary of the results from this literature is found in 
Table 2.7
Tufte identifies partisan bias in a number of state 
legislative election systems. He finds that Michigan 
(1950-1968) had a partisan bias toward the Republicans of 
2.1%. The election system in New York had a Republican 
bias of 4.3% from 1934 to 1966. New Jersey exhibited a 
Republican bias of 11.3% from 1926 to 1947, but the Repub­
lican bias had declined to 2.0% in the 1947-1969 period.
Using the uniform partisan swing approach between 40% 
and 60% of the two-party vote, Scarrow (1982, 1983) mea­
sures partisan bias as the difference in the seats won by 
the two major parties given the same percentage of the 
vote. Rather than applying regression to the data, he 
simply reports the partisan differences in the seats won 
given the raw hypothetical vote at 5% increments. He 
reports findings for the New York State Assembly and the 
New York State Senate for 1952-64 and for 1966-78. He
81
Tiblt 2.7. Suuary 
Partisan Bias, O. 8.
of Results for 
state Elections
Authors Political
System
Range of 
Scores
Comment
Tufte (1973) Michigan
(1950-68)
2.1% 
(Rep.)
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
New York 
(1934-66)
4.3%
(Rep.)
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
New Jersey 
(1926-47)
11.3% 
(Rep.)
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
New Jersey 
(1947-69)
2.0% 
(Rep.)
Assumes a linear 
seats-votes rel.
Scarrow (1982) New York 0.
Assembly
(1952-64)
6%—12.6% Range of bias at 
various % of vote. 
Bias for Repubs.
New York 5. 
Assembly 
(1966-78)
3%-l1.3% Range of bias at 
various % of vote. 
Bias for Dems.
Browning and 
King (1987)
Indiana
House
(1972-84)
-0.2 5 Interpreted as in 
King and Browning. 
Small Rep. bias.
King (1989) Indiana
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Iowa
Washington
(1968-80)
70- + 1.10 Interpreted as in 
King and Browning 
1987. Most values 
range from -.10 to 
+ . 35.
Gryski, Reed, 
Elliott (1990)
42 states - 
(1976-84)
. 37-+.33 Interpreted as in 
King and Browning 
1987. All states 
agg. produce .02.
Niemi and 
Jackman (1990)
46 states -5. 
(1970-86) (Rep
5%-+4.8%
.) (Dem.)
Results in agg., 
control. for party 
control of redist. 
by decade. Most 
values, -3.5% to 0
Campagna and 
Grofman (1990a)
15 states -30.8%-+28.1% Bias at 50% vote. 
Most values, -.4 3 
to +.43.
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finds that Republicans in the Assembly benefitted from a 
bias in the earlier period that ranged from 0.6% at 40% of 
the vote to 12.6% at 50% of the vote. In the Senate in the 
earlier period, Republicans were recipients of a large bias 
in the 45% to 55% range, but at 40% of the vote and at 60% 
of the vote Democrats received a small bias in seats won.
In the 1966-78 period, Scarrow finds that the direc­
tion of bias was changed for the Assembly but remained the 
same for the Senate when compared with results in the 
earlier period. The bias in favor of the Democrats in the 
Assembly in the latter period ranged from 5.3% to 11.3%.
At 45% to 55% of the vote the Republican bias in the Senate 
ranged from 0.7% to 4.6% while the Senate Democratic bias 
at the 40% and 60% points was 10%. (See Scarrow 1982, 
232-33). In a later replication of his work, Scarrow finds 
that the Democrats benefit from a bias ranging from 12.6% 
to 18.6% in the Assembly in 1980. In the Senate in 1980, 
there is no bias in the 45% to 55% vote range but there is 
bias towards the Democrats of 11.7% at the 40% and 60% 
points (Scarrow 1983, 107).
Browning and King (1987) also report bias findings in 
their study of the Indiana state houses. They find parti­
san bias in elections to both the upper and lower houses of 
the Indiana state legislature from 1972 to 1984. The 
Indiana House of Representatives had a slight Republican 
bias parameter (not percentage of the vote) of -0.25. The
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Indiana Senate also was slightly biased toward the Republi­
cans (parameter of -0.11).
King (1989) measures partisan bias in state legisla­
tive elections that followed the 1970 redistricting effort 
in six states. He finds that Republican-controlled 
redistricting favored the Republicans in the election 
immediately following the 1970 redistricting efforts in 
Indiana and Connecticut. Bipartisan redistricting in 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin resulted in a decrease in parti­
san bias. Nonpartisan redistricting did produce an immedi­
ate reduction in the already small Republican bias in Iowa, 
but the small Democratic bias in Washington was increased 
slightly. In five of the six states, however, the imme­
diate effects of redistricting on partisan bias were dimi­
nished as partisan bias fluctuated in elections from 1974 
to 1980 (King 1989, 813-20).
Gryski, Reed, and Elliott (1990) discover partisan 
bias in a number of states in general elections to the 
lower houses of 42 state legislatures from 1976 to 1984. 
They find that eight states had levels of partisan bias 
that exceed the .05 statistical level. In addition, there 
appears to be more partisan bias in state legislative 
elections than in congressional elections when one disag­
gregates for the states (with six of the eight state legis­
lative election systems being biased toward the Democrats).
Niemi and Jackman (1991) study state legislative 
elections in 47 states (in the aggregate) in the 1970s, 
from 1982 to 1986, and from 1970 to 1986 to determine the 
effect of redistricting on bias and representation. Bias 
parameters were significant and in the expected direction 
(i.e., partisan redistricting produces a bias in favor of 
the party in control and other forms of redistricting 
restrict bias) in all the equations in the 1970s and for 
the 1970-86 data set. States with divided control of state 
government and bipartisan control of redistricting tended 
to have slight biases in favor of the Republicans. Party 
biases at 50% of the vote ranged from 5.5% in favor of the 
Republicans in the states in which Republicans controlled 
redistricting in the 1970s to almost zero in five of the 
six equations dealing with the 1982-86 period. In the 
latter period, curiously enough, only in states in which 
control of government was divided did significant bias 
exist (2.2% in favor of Republicans).
Campagna (1991) and Campagna and Grofman (1990a) 
measure partisan bias in individual state legislative 
elections in 15 states from 1972 to 1986. Significant bias 
was found in at least half the elections for 13 of the 15 
states. In the states having bias, both parties benefitted 
almost equally in four states, Democrats received the 
advantage in five states, and Republicans were the benefi­
ciaries in four states.4
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Obviously, there are a plethora of results concerning 
partisan bias in the research conducted on U. S. state 
legislative elections. Many of the findings seem to be 
contingent on the methods employed, the states used, and 
the years of the study. The only general statements that
can be supported by the literature are that elections in
Kentucky and California have been biased toward the Demo­
crats, elections in New York from 1934 to 1964 have been
biased in favor of the Republicans, elections in New York 
from 1964 to 1986 have seen a Democratic bias, and partisan 
control of redistricting seems to produce an increase in 
bias toward the controlling party in the election immedi­
ately subsequent to redistricting.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has consisted of a summary of the litera­
ture on the seats-votes relationship. In this chapter, I 
have described the various methodological approaches and 
techniques of using data that have emerged in this line of 
research. I have also attempted to deal with potential 
problems that one must face in performing an analysis on 
the relationship between partisan votes and party seat 
allocation in legislative elections.
Furthermore, this chapter has included a summary of 
the results of research conducted on representational form 
and partisan bias in U. S. national elections, non-U. S. 
national elections, and U. S. state legislative elections.
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In general, the results concerning representational form 
suggest that In the United States, the electoral college 
system of electing the president has the highest value for 
representational form. Winner-take-all presidential prima­
ries also exhibit a highly majoritarian representational 
form. Congressional elections and U. S. state legislative 
elections tend to be slightly majoritarian. Proportional 
or nearly proportional winner rules in U. S. presidential 
primaries produce representational form values that are the 
most nearly proportional of the U. S. election systems. In 
examining the cross-national results, it was found that 
single-member district elections at the national level tend 
to produce higher representational form parameters and 
higher swing ratios than do national level elections in 
countries having proportional representational allocation 
of seats at the district level.
The findings for bias are quite eclectic. The general 
consensus is that the Democrats benefit from a bias in 
congressional elections and in presidential elections. The 
comparative national election literature suggests that bias 
is more likely to occur in elections with single-member 
districts than in multimember district elections. At the 
U. S. state level, the findings vary from study to study 
and from election to election. Democratic biases are 
prevalent in Kentucky and California and in New York from 
1934 to 1966. Republicans receive a bias in New York after
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1966. In addition, in both state and congressional elec­
tions in the u. s., party control of redistricting tends to 
strengthen the bias toward the party that controls redis­
tricting (though this tendency in stronger in state legis­
lative elections in the 1970s than in the 1980s).
The differences in findings for the sketchy attempts 
to measure bias and representational form in U. S. state 
legislative elections call for further research. Data on 
state legislative general elections now exist for 49 states 
from 1968 to 1986. An attempt to measure bias and respon­
siveness in each election and for the entire time series 
(including the 1968 election) should, therefore, be under­
taken.
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NOTES
1. In two other similar studies by Scarrow <1982, 1983) 
based on data from both houses in New York State, the 
author uses hypothetical data from 40% of the vote to 60% 
of the vote to calculate partisan bias.
2. The usual method of employing the uniform partisan 
swing approach, particularly in strong two-party systems, 
is to measure the seats-votes relationship using a certain 
number of points surrounding the 50% mark (such as the 
55%—45% and the 60%-40% utilized by Scarrow). However, as 
Grofman (1983) hints, one can measure bias at any number of 
points on the seats-votes curve. One could argue that it 
is a more realistic assessment of the election system if 
all elections are included and bias is measured at each 
point (i.e., from 0% to 100% of a party's vote) on the 
seats-votes graph. This would certainly be the case for 
elections in southern states, for example. In the latter 
example, the uncontested elections would certainly have an 
effect on the calculation of seats-votes curves via regres­
sion; however, this may be a better way to measure the 
seats-votes relationship than using only those districts in 
which Republicans contest an election (which would cer­
tainly overestimate Republican strength in a state).
3. For a thorough treatment of how use of different meth­
ods of aggregating election results could affect seats- 
votes calculations see Campbell 1991.
4. It should be noted that Backstrom, Robins, and Eller 
(1973) measure partisan bias without using techniques of 
formal modelling. Their method involves using one or more 
previous election(s) to develop a standard for "normal 
partisan vote" and then subtracting the winning party's 
vote from the normal vote in each precinct. If the majo­
rity party is dominant in exactly 50% of the districts 
after the subtraction is made, then the redistricting plan 
is judged to be fair. If the majority party is overrepre­
sented or underrepresented but the redistricting formula 
met judicially-accepted criteria in regard to compactness 
of districts, deviation from population equality, adherence 
to subdivision lines, and size of the assembly vis-a-vis 
the population, then "gerrymandering" does not exist. If 
the majority party is overrepresented or underrepresented 
and there is room for reducing the partisan advantage under 
the criteria cited above, then a gerrymander does not 
exist. Using this method, they find that in the 1972 
Minnesota Senate election, the dominant Democrats con­
trolled only 32 of 67 districts after their totals were 
subtracted from their normal vote. Since the Democrats 
"controlled" 48% rather than 50% of the districts, they
received 48/50 or 96% of their "fair representation."
Thus, the Democrats were underrepresented by 4% even though 
they won 66% of the seats with only 54.27% of the vote 
{1973 1135-38).
CHAPTER THREE: PARTISAN BIAS AND REPRESENTATIONAL
FORM IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the last chapter, the discussion centered on the 
various ways in which the seats-votes relationship has been 
defined by researchers and on the methods used to measure 
characteristics of the seats-votes relationship. One of 
the approaches that was described was the King and Browning 
formulation of representational form and partisan bias. In 
this chapter, I explore in more detail the theoretical 
foundations of the two characteristics of the seats-votes 
relationship studied by King and Browning.
I begin this chapter with two sections containing a 
discussion of the theory behind the concepts of representa­
tional form and partisan bias, respectively. Illustrations 
are included so that the reader may draw a visual image of 
the distinction between form and bias. I then describe the 
general relationship between seat allocation and partisan 
votes in an electoral system and the equations that are 
used to measure this relationship.
In the fourth section of the chapter, I describe the 
concepts that may explain why certain patterns of represen­
tational form occur in particular election systems. These 
concepts can be categorized as district-level partisan 
competition variables and election rule variables. The 
fifth section of this chapter consists of a discussion of 
partisan gerrymandering and other variables that are
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thought to explain partisan bias in an electoral system. 
Finally, I conclude the chapter with a brief summary.
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
The relationship between partisan votes and partisan 
seat allocation to legislatures is a crucial element in the 
democratic political process. Because there is such a 
practical importance attached to the seats-votes relation­
ship, the relationship should be of concern to those who 
are interested in democratic theory and the theoretical 
underpinnings of representation. Two characteristics of 
the seats-votes relationship have been cited in the politi­
cal science literature as being important to an understand­
ing of the issue in question: representational form and
partisan bias.
Representational form has not only been defined by 
political scientists in a number of ways, but different 
terms have even been used to identify this concept. Repre­
sentational form, a term made popular by King and Browning 
(1987), has been called the "swing ratio" (when it was used 
to specify a linear relationship between seats and votes) 
and "responsiveness" as well (Tufte 1973). Regardless of 
the name used to describe the phenomenon in question, the 
idea refers to the functional relationship between partisan 
votes and partisan legislative seats (King and Browning 
1987, 1253; Garand and Parent 1991, 2).
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As was noted above, the functional form of the 
seats-votes relationship can take on an almost endless 
number of patterns. However, one can visualize the concept 
of representational form by examining three ideal types of 
seats-votes curves. Figure 3.1 illustrates these three 
different ideal types.
First, the diagonal line is indicative of a propor­
tional representational form. In proportional representa­
tion, a particular percentage of votes won by a party will 
result in the party winning the exact same percentage of 
legislative seats. Second, a winner-take-all system is 
illustrated by the curve that resembles a "straightened Z." 
In this case when one party wins 50% plus 1 vote, the party 
wins all the seats in the legislature. Finally, the S- 
shaped curve in Figure 3.1 represents the "cube law" type 
of majoritarian representational form system. Technically, 
any system that has a representational form value greater 
than one and less than infinity is majoritarian; a repre­
sentational form parameter value of three is only one of an 
almost infinite number of possible majoritarian forms. In 
general, however, a majoritarian form is characterized by a 
party winning few seats until it wins close to 50% of the 
vote. When the party approaches the 50% mark, it begins to 
win a larger than 1% increase in seats for each additional 
1% of the votes it garners. Likewise, as a party wins more
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Three Examples of Representational Form, 
No Partisan Bias
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than a majority of votes, the greater the number of votes 
won the fewer additional seats it wins.
King and Browning (1987) suggest that each type of 
representation is "fair,” although each type presents a 
unique contribution to representation and to governance.
On the one hand, proportional representation best reflects 
underlying voter preferences. Because the percentage of a 
party's votes equals the percentage of legislative seats 
won by the party, each party is guaranteed representation 
in the legislature. Minority viewpoints are more likely to 
be aired since minority parties will hold relatively large 
numbers of legislative seats in proportional representation 
systems. On the other hand, a winner-take-all system 
allows the winning party to govern more easily since there 
will be no opposition party in the legislature. The major­
itarian system perhaps moderates between the other two 
ideal types. In a majoritarian system, voter preferences 
are mirrored relatively closely but the winning party does 
receive an inflated majority of seats. While proportional 
representation might hamper the ability of a winning party 
to govern and a winner-take-all system grossly inflates 
voter preferences, the majoritarian system encourages 
majorities while protecting minority views to some degree 
(King and Browning X987, 1255).
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THE CONCEPT OF PARTISAN BIAS
In addition to representational form, King and 
Browning (1987) argue that there is another important 
characteristic of any electoral system. This second cha­
racteristic they dub partisan bias, which they define as 
(1987, 1251) "[the introduction of] asymmetry into the 
seats-votes relationship, resulting in an unfair partisan 
differential in the ability to win legislative seats: the
advantaged party will be able to receive a larger number of 
seats for a fixed number of votes than will the disadvan­
taged party." Although Tufte (1973, 542) defines bias as 
the difference between 50% and the percentage of the vote 
needed by a particular party to win 50% of the legislative 
seats, King and Browning (1987), Garand and Parent (1991), 
and King (1990) reach the conclusion that bias can be 
calculated at any vote percentage if one has a measure of 
representational form for the system. The point, made 
clear by King and Browning, is that "the precise effect of 
partisan bias depends on the specific form of democratic 
representation (1987, 1252)."
While the effect (but not the value) of bias is depen­
dent on the measure of representational form, King and 
Browning illustrate that the two concepts are empirically 
distinct. They note that many earlier practitioners failed 
to draw a distinction between bias and form. In addition,
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they suggest that some researchers assumed that more 
majoritarian systems were inherently biased.
As was the case with representational form, partisan 
bias can be depicted in graphic detail. One can illustrate 
bias by charting a party's observed seat-votes curve and 
comparing the observed curve with a curve representing the 
seats-votes relationship in which no bias is assumed to 
exist. Figure 3.2(a) illustrates partisan bias in a pro­
portional system, and Figure 3.2(b) represents bias in a 
majoritarian election system.
In Figure 3.2(a), one can identify the "no bias" curve 
as the perfectly diagonal line that is equivalent to the 
proportional representation curve in Figure 3.1. The 
convex and concave curves surrounding the no bias curve 
represent election systems having certain specified levels 
of partisan bias. The top curve, in which the natural log 
of bias equals l, is indicative of a system that is biased 
in favor of the Republicans. At 50% of the votes, Republi­
cans win almost 80% of the seats. The bottom curve illus­
trates a bias in favor of Democrats, with Republicans 
gaining slightly more than 20% of the seats despite winning 
50% of the votes. Figure 3.2(b) is comparable to Figure 
3.2(a) except that the former represents a majoritarian 
election system. One can use this technique to visualize 
the percentage of the seats that a party would win given 
any particular percentage of the vote won by that party.
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Thus, King and Browning suggest that there are two 
important characteristics to the seats-votes relationship. 
Representational form refers to the general pattern by 
which seats change from one party's control to the other 
party's control given shifts in the partisan percentage of 
the vote. Partisan bias pertains to assymetry in the 
representational form pattern. In the literature on the 
seats-votes relationship, a number of researchers have 
advanced hypotheses concerning why certain patterns of 
representational form exist and why partisan bias may be 
present in an election system.
SEATS AND VOTES AND THE EQUATIONS THAT MEASURE THEM
In early studies (Dahl 1954; Tufte 1973) it was 
assumed that the relationship between seats and votes was 
linear. That is to say, it was believed that a one percent 
change in partisan percent of the vote would correspond 
with a fixed percentage change in seat allocation and that 
this relationship would be uniform over the entire range of 
partisan vote and seat allocation possibilities. For 
example, if a shift in Democratic vote from 50% to 51% of 
the vote would cause a 3% increase in Democratic seats, it 
was assumed that a shift in Democratic vote from 75% to 76% 
of the vote would also result in a 3% increase in Demo­
cratic seats. The regression equation that denotes this 
relationship is:
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S = b,V + e, (3.1)
where S Is the percentage of seats for a certain party , V 
is the percentage of votes for the same political party, b, 
is the regression coefficient for the vote variable, and e 
is the error term.
However, Tufte (1973) notes that nonlinear specifica- 
tiona may better describe the relationship between partisan 
vote changes and seat changes, particularly as one moves 
away from the 50% point on a seats-votes graph. As noted 
in the last chapter, Kendall and Stuart (1950) popularized 
a particular nonlinear specification of the seats-votes 
relationship. Their equation, which denotes the purported 
cube law of single-member plurality elections is:
(S / 1 — S) * (V / 1 - V)3, (3.2)
where S = number of seats won by a party, V = number of 
votes won by the same party.
Again, Tufte (1973) (as well as Grofman 1983; King and 
Browning 1987; Garand and Parent 1991) points out that the 
cube law does not apply universally to election outcomes in 
majority or plurality winner single-member districts. 
Additionally, the seats-votes curve suggested by the cube 
law is not always characterized by a lack of bias (i.e., at 
the 50% vote mark, a party might not necessarily win 50% of 
the seats). Finally, Tufte (1973, 545-46) criticizes the 
cube law as being atheoretical and deterministic; thus, 
reliance on it tends to hide important political issues.
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A different and perhaps better way to specify a non­
linear relationship between seats and votes is to formulate 
an equation similar to Equation 3.2 but allow the exponent 
on the right-hand side of the equation to remain unspeci­
fied. The exponent will then receive a value based on 
empirical configurations of seat changes and vote changes 
rather than the atheoretical whims of the researcher. 
Equation 3.2 can be transformed to:
where S and V are defined as in Equation 3.3, b is a para­
meter that measures partisan bias, and c is parameter that 
measures representational form.
Tufte (1973, 546-47) describes a futher transformation 
of Equation 3.3 thusly;
[A] logit model . . i s  fully as effective as
the linear model and statistically more graceful. 
Define the odds in favor of a party's winning a 
seat as S / (1-S) and the vote odds as V / (1-V). 
The logit model is the regression of the loga­
rithm of seat odds against the logarithm of vote 
odds . . . .  Since both variables are logged, 
the estimate of the slope, b,, is the estimated 
elasticity of seat odds with respect to vote 
odds; that is, a change of one per cent in the 
vote odds is associated with a change of b| per­
cent in seat odds . . . .  The logit model also 
provides a direct test of the hypothesis that an 
electoral system is unbiased, since [a,] =* 0 in 
an unbiased system.
The equation to which Tufte addresses his comments is:
(S / [1 - S ]) - b( V / [1 - V] )c, (3.3)
S V
log* - loga, + bilog. (3.4)
1-S 1-V
where S and V are defined as in Equation 3.1.
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"Borrowing liberally from King and Browning [1987]," 
Garand and Parent (1991, 4) note that ai is the bias para­
meter and b, is the representational form parameter. 
Assuming an absence of bias in a particular electoral 
system (i.e, loga, = 0), one can still test to see if the 
election system is proportional. If b, ™ 1, then the 
relationship between seats and votes is proportional.
Since b, can take on any value, it is possible that b, can 
be greater than one. In the latter case, the representa­
tional system would be majoritarian; a one percent change 
in partisan votes would equate to a larger than one percent 
change in partisan seats in the middle of the distribution.
It should be noticed that if b, «= 3, then the cube law
specification of majoritarian representation is in effect. 
It is possible (but unlikely) that b, will take on an 
infinitely large value and thus identify a winner-take-all 
electoral system. In addition, the value of loga, can be
greater than 0 and indicate a bias toward one party or less
than 0 and illustrate a bias toward the other party.
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
Why are some electoral systems proportional, majori­
tarian, or winner-take-all? In general, scholars have 
suggested two categories of explanations for the represen­
tational form of an electoral system. First, party compe­
tition at the district level has been identified as a
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variable that affects representational form; competitive 
systems have been found to have more responsiveness than 
noncompetitive systems. Second, election rule variables 
have been believed to have an impact on representational 
form. Examples of the latter include effective magnitude 
of the election system and the number of voters per dis­
trict. In addition, the number of seats in an election 
system may have an effect on representational form.
Some scholars have suggested that the seats-votes 
relationship is heavily affected by the level of partisan 
competition that is found in electoral districts and the 
distribution of competition across districts (Tufte 1973; 
Garand, Parent and Teague 1991). This explanation is 
especially applicable to representational form. Assuming 
that all the districts in a given state can be placed on a 
dimension representing a particular party's percent of the 
two-party vote in a given election, each district could 
range from Ot to 100%. Interparty competition would be 
highest in districts in which the two-party vote for the 
party was 50%. The further one moves from 50%, the more 
interparty competition would decrease.
When competition in the two-party vote is at its 
highest, the sensitivity of legislative seats to the popu­
lar vote should be high as well. In a state in which a 
large number of districts are competitive, a small shift in
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partisan vote will cause a large number of districts (and 
thus, seats) to change hands from one party to the other. 
However, if many districts in a state are noncompetitive, 
even partisan shifts of relatively large magnitude could 
have little effect on seat change.
As an example, suppose that a state had only two 
election districts. In one district, the Democratic candi­
date won the previous election with 75% of the vote; in the 
second district, the Republican candidate won with the same 
vote percentage. In order for either party to control both 
seats in the state, there must be a vote swing of at least 
2 5% toward one of the parties; a shift in the partisan vote 
toward either of the parties of only one percent would 
obviously result in a zero percent change in seats. If the 
same candidates had won with only 51% of the vote in the 
two districts, a one percent swing in the vote would pro­
vide a partisan sweep of the two seats. Clearly, in the 
latter case seat changes are more responsive to vote 
swings. Therefore, if one measured mean level of district 
competition by the mean district margin, such a measure 
should have a negative effect on representational form 
coefficients. If one were to create an index of mean 
district competition such that states with the most compe­
titive districts possible were coded "1" and states with 
the least possible competitive districts were coded "0," 
then the index of competition would be positively related
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to the representational form coefficient. In other words, 
if all districts were perfectly competitive in a given 
election, then any shifts in votes would result in massive 
seats shifts.
However, there are other characteristics of the popu­
lar vote distribution that will have an effect on the 
number of districts in the competitive range. These dis­
tributional characteristics should have an effect on repre­
sentational form. As Garand, Parent, and Teague explain 
(1989, 11-12):
As long as there is some variation in [the par­
ty's] vote proportions across [districts], the 
distribution on [representational form] will have 
a nonzero variance, as well as a measurable 
skewness (i.e., measure of the symmetry or asym­
metry of the distribution) and kurtosis (i.e., 
measure of the normality of the distribution, or 
the degree to which cases are distributed in the 
middle of the distribution or in its tails).
Each of these 'moments' of the distribution 
should have a theoretical impact on the repre­
sentational form of the [state's electoral sys­
tem] .
The dispersion of the distribution (measured by the 
standard deviation) is important when it is considered with 
the mean level of district competition. The standard 
deviation of the distribution should be negatively corre­
lated with the representational form coefficient if mean 
vote is close to 50%. A low standard deviation implies 
that the distribution of the districts is close to the 
mean; therefore, a shift in party vote should have a dra­
matic effect on partisan seat changes. When the mean vote
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Is competitive but the party's vote proportions do not fit 
closely around a mean party vote of close to 50%, the 
result will be that only a few seats will actually change 
hands.
Alternatively, if the mean level of district competi­
tion is low (i.e., if the mean party vote deviates from 
50%), the interaction between competition and the standard 
deviation will have a different relationship with represen­
tational form. This is to say that when competition is 
low, a high standard deviation means that some districts 
may fall in the competitive range and may experience seat 
changes. On the other hand, when the mean level of compe­
tition and the standard deviation are both low, then most 
districts will be uncompetitive and vote swings will not 
result in very many seat changes. The point is that the 
larger the number of seats in the competitive range, the 
larger will be the shift of seats given a relatively small 
shift in the partisan percentage of the vote; consequently, 
the higher will be the value for representational form.
The skewness of the vote distribution across districts 
should also affect representational form (Garand, Parent, 
and Teague 1989, 13). The relationship between skewness 
and party competition and between skewness and representa­
tional form depends on both the mean level of competition 
and the partisan direction of the party vote distribution. 
For example, in an electoral system in which there is no
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competition one of the parties has an average district vote 
of 100%. In this case, there is no variation around the 
mean district average. As competition increases (i.e., as 
the losing party's percentage of the vote approaches 50%), 
the value of the representational form coefficient should 
increase.
However, in a case in which the majority party 
receives, say, 75% of the average district vote, the effect 
of the skewness of the vote distribution on representa­
tional form depends on which party wins 75% and which party 
wins 25%. If it is the Republican Party that wins 75% of 
the average district vote, skewness will have a positive 
effect on the representational form coefficient only if it 
is in the direction of greater competition (in this 
example, negative skewness). If Republicans win only 25% 
of the mean district level vote (i.e., Democrats win 75%) 
then skewness will have a positive effect on the represen­
tational form coefficient only if the distribution of the 
proportion of the votes won by the Republican Party is 
positively skewed. Therefore, one must consider which 
party wins over 50% of the vote in specifying a relation­
ship between skewness and representational form.
Assuming a constant mean and standard deviation, the 
kurtosis or normality of the distribution of district 
competition should be negatively related to representa­
tional form. "Positive kurtosis indicates that a higher
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proportion of cases are found around the mean [of a distri­
bution], while a negative kurtosis indicates that the cases 
are more likely to be found in the tails of the distribu­
tion" (Garand, Parent, and Teague 1989, 14). However, the 
relationship between kurtosis and representational form is 
also dependent on the mean level of competition. If the 
mean level of competition is high and kurtosis is high, 
then a large number of districts are in the competitive 
range and are likely to be affected by a partisan vote 
swing. If the mean level of competition is low, a positive 
kurtosis would indicate that most districts are uncompeti­
tive and that there will be a negative relationship between 
kurtosis and the responsiveness parameter.1
This is not to say that other variables will not have 
an impact on the representational form coefficient. First, 
the number of seats per electoral district (called district 
magnitude at the district level and effective magnitude if 
averaged over all districts in the election system) should 
have an effect on the representational form coefficient 
(Rae 1967, 19, 114-25; Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 112-25). 
An extreme example can best illustrate this principle. 
Imagine a situation in which there are two states: one
state has 100 seats contested in 100 single-member dis­
tricts, and the other state has 100 seats contested in one 
huge multimember district. If the district winner rules 
are proportional, then the latter state will probably have
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a more proportional system in the aggregate since each 
party wins the same percentage of seats as votes. In the 
former state there will more than likely be a deviation 
from proportionality in the aggregate because the party 
that wins the most votes in a district will win the only 
district seat regardless of the exact percentage of the 
vote won in the district. The problem here is that "seats 
come in whole numbers while votes are a nearly continuous 
variable (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 19)." Thus, there 
should be a negative relationship between effective magni­
tude and deviation from proportionality for systems in 
which seats are allocated by proportionality in the elec­
tion districts (i.e., a negative relationship between 
effective magnitude and representational form).
Theoretically, however, if the district winner rules 
are plurality or majority in nature, one would expect that 
the relationship between seats per district and deviation 
from proportionality would be reversed. Using the same two 
states in the above example, a party winning 55% of the 
votes in the aggregate would likely lose in a number of 
district contests (i.e., win less than 50% of the vote in 
some districts) if the election system consisted of one 
hundred single-member districts. On the contrary, if the 
election system consisted of only one district, the party 
winning 55% of the votes would win all one hundred seats.
In the plurality or majority winner rule system, then, the
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state with the fewer seats per district would more likely 
produce more proportionality between seats and votes in the 
aggregate. U. S. state legislative elections do have 
variation in effective magnitude since most states have had 
multimember districts at some point in time over the past 
two decades. In addition, all states have used majority or 
plurality winner rules rather than proportional representa­
tion rules in allocating seats at the district level. 
Therefore, one should expect that there will be a positive 
relationship between effective magnitude and representa­
tional form in U. S. state legislative elections after 
controlling for district-level party competition (i.e., a 
positive relationship between effective magnitude and 
deviation from proportionality).
Incidentally, Jewell and Breaux (1991) have found that 
incumbents in southern state legislative multimember free- 
for-all districts tend to face opposition in primaries and 
in general elections more regularly than do incumbents who 
run in single-member districts. Similarly, in a multi­
variate analysis performed on 20 lower-house state 
legislatures, Weber, Tucker, and Brace (1991) find that 
multimember district elections tend to promote more mar­
ginal districts. Thus, aside from the effects noted previ­
ously concerning the translation of votes into seats in 
multimember plurality winner districts, multimember 
districts may promote more party competition and more
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challenges to incumbents. Of course, however, it is the 
relationship between district magnitude and representa­
tional form rather than the relationship between district 
magnitude and party competition that will be tested in this 
analysis.
Second, Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 161-67) suggest 
that the number of voters per district will have an effect 
on the representational form of an election system. In 
general, the more voters per district, the less propor­
tional the election system will be. Another example should 
suffice to explain this point. If there were only one 
voter per district, the election outcome would be perfectly 
proportional since each person's vote would translate 
directly into a seat. On the contrary, if there were 
10,000 voters per district the chances are much greater 
that there would be wasted votes (votes cast for losing 
candidates) and that these wasted votes would not be 
exactly equal for each party. Therefore, in the latter 
case, the election system will more likely be majoritarian 
than proportional. By analyzing elections in four nations 
(New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Canada), Taagepera and Shugart discover that the relation­
ship between voters per district and representational form 
is closer when they measure the log of voters divided by 
the log of the number of electoral districts.
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Third, and with all other things being equal, one 
might expect that the more seats found in an electoral 
system, the more seats will change hands given a particular 
vote shift. This hypothesis is simply a function of proba­
bility. In an election system in which there is only one 
seat, at some point on a seats-votes curve a one-unit shift 
in partisan vote will cause a change in partisan control of 
that seat. However, the odds are that the point at which a 
one-unit shift will cause the seat to swing will not be at 
the 50% point on the seats-votes curve. If another elec­
tion system has 100 seats, it is more likely that a one- 
unit shift at the 50% point will cause at least one seat 
(if not more) to change hands. This hypothesis is posited 
tentatively, however, since the number of districts could 
conceivably affect the level of party competition at the 
district level. Of course, the demographic distribution of 
voters by election districts will be important. Nonethe­
less, holding other factors (including district party 
competition) constant, a system with a large number of 
seats should exhibit a higher representational form coeffi­
cient than a system with a smaller number of seats.
Finally, King (1989, 814-19) notices that responsive­
ness declines over the course of the 1970s regardless of 
the immediate impact of redistricting in six state legisla­
tures. He speculates that this could be the result of a 
number of things, excepting redistricting: "incumbency,
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partisan swing, demographic movements, [and] candidate 
decisions'* (King 1989, 819). His findings also hold true 
for most of the 15 states in the Campagna and Grofman 
(1990) study. Thus, a trend toward more proportionality in 
the seats-votes relationship as a decade progresses should 
be expected. In addition, if the factors mentioned by King 
continue to have major impacts over time despite potential 
redistricting effects, one might observe a trend toward 
proportionality over a time series that is more lengthy 
than a decade. While a time counter should be included in 
this analysis, it may well be that inclusion of the above- 
mentioned variables will cause a trend variable to lose its 
statistical significance. Only after multiple regression 
is used to test the hypotheses will one be able to make 
definitive statements concerning the effects of the vari­
ables on representational form.
The literature suggests that party competition at the 
district level (which includes the effects of incumbency 
and other variables mentioned (but not tested] by King in 
the above paragraph), seats per district, and voters per 
district should have an impact on representational form.
In addition, controlling for these variables, the number of 
seats in the electoral system may affect representational 
form. As is the case with representational form, explana­
tions are also offered for the existence or lack of exis­
tence of partisan bias.
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THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF PARTISAN BIAS 
It is also possible to suggest explanations for parti­
san bias. Perhaps the most likely reason for the existence 
of partisan bias is the deliberate drawing of district 
lines so as to benefit a particular party. During redis­
tricting, it is possible that the party in control of the 
redistricting machinery will manipulate district boundaries 
to enhance the likelihood that the party will gain more 
seats in the legislature. Use of the redistricting machi­
nery need not be excessively aggregious to benefit a par­
ticular party. An example from Taagepera and Shugart 
(1989, 17-18) illustrates how reasonable people (in this 
case, the two major parties in the U. S.) could disagree 
over the best way to reapportion election districts:
Consider the following situation, with eight 
equal-sized city quarters to be combined into 
four single-seat districts. The numbers shown 
are thousands of potential voters known to have 
Democratic and Republican preferences, respec­
tively:
40-60 70-30 50-50 60-40
40-60 70-30 40-60 30-70
The total is an even 400:400, and one might 
expect each party to obtain two seats. However, 
if the Republicans can control the districting, 
they could join the areas vertically:
80-120 140-60 90-110 90-110
The Democrats would win overwhelmingly in the 
second district, but the Republicans would have a 
moderate but safe majority in the three others.
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If the Democrats are in control of the district­
ing, they would prefer to join the areas horizon­
tally:
110-90 110-90
110-90 70-130
Now the Republicans waste votes in an overkill in 
the lower-right district, leaving the three other 
districts to the Democrats.
By sacrificing some votes in relatively safe districts to
achieve marginal superiority in other districts or by
placing as many voters as possible from the other party in
a small number of districts, a party can possibly win more
legislative seats in the subsequent election.3
In fact, King (1989) finds that partisan redistricting 
results in partisan bias in 1972 in the election immedi­
ately following redistricting in two states. However, it 
is often the case that the effects of redistricting do not 
last more than one or two elections, similarly, Basehart 
and Comer (1991) find short-lived redistricting effects in 
15 single-member district lower house elections after the 
1980 redistricting. Gryski, Reed, and Elliott (1990) find 
that partisan bias exists in the election systems of eight 
states in a time series from 1976 to 1984. Niemi and 
Jackman (1991) also find significant bias in their 47-state 
study in the 1970s. However, partisan bias virtually 
disappeared in the 1980-86 period. Campagna and Grofman 
identify substantial partisan bias in 13 single-member 
district states in individual elections from 1972 to 1986. 
While it is not always the case that partisan redistricting
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results in bias for the party that controls redistricting, 
there is evidence that partisan bias exists in a number of 
states at various times over the past 20 years.
Interestingly enough, however, when states are compe­
titive and both parties have relatively strong party 
organizations, redistricting often does not result in 
substantial bias. Niemi and Jackman (1990, 16) offer the 
following assessment of this tendency:
[In competitive states), it may be that parties 
exercised self-restraint because of concern over 
what would happen were they later to find them­
selves in a minority position. It may [also] be 
that because of the close competition in these 
states the majority was more closely monitored, 
more vigorously challenged in and out of court, 
and in other ways prevented from exercising its 
nominally complete control.
Another explanation may have more to do with legisla­
tive member goals rather than checks from the minority 
party. Legislators from the dominant party may be willing 
to maintain the status quo rather than face the uncertainty 
of election outcomes that results from increasing the seats 
the party may win by cutting into the party strongholds in 
the districts already held by party incumbents. "Dominant 
parties . . appear willing to sacrifice some proba­
bility of a greater legislative majority for greater cer­
tainty of maintaining their current position" (Niemi and 
Jackman, 1990, 19).
Tufte posits that different levels of voter turnout 
for the parties may affect partisan bias. He notes that
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"if, in the aggregate of all districts, low turnout or 
small districts are aligned with a particular party, there 
will be a bias in the seats-votes curve since that party is 
winning seats with relatively small numbers of votes (1973, 
548)." He identifies the Democrats in the South as the 
prime example of a party that benefits from this type of 
bias. Because of low turnout in many districts and a rela­
tive lack of Republican opposition in the South, Democrats 
have won a large number of seats with a comparatively small 
number of votes.3
Finally, as was mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 
Tufte believes that different population sizes of election 
districts will have an impact on partisan bias. Before 
Baker y. Carr (1962), overrepresentation granted rural 
districts in the South worked to the advantage of the 
Democrats. Bias emerged in the aggregate because unequal 
population sizes of districts meant that it took more 
Republican votes to guarantee a Republican legislative seat 
than was the case for Democrats, Tufte provides evidence 
that even in 1970 the smaller, but still present, inequi­
ties in population sizes of districts works to the 
advantage of Democrats in U. S. congressional elections 
(1973, 548-49). Nonetheless, due to the fact that the 
federal courts have become increasingly involved in scruti­
nizing reapportionment plans because of perceived malappor­
tionment, the state elections held from 1968 to 1986 should
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be much more free of this type of manipulation than elec­
tions held before 1968 (Baker 1986, 269).
In summary, there are a number of possible explana­
tions for partisan bias. Gerrymandering, the drawing of 
district boundaries so as to benefit a particular party, is 
certainly a potential cause of partisan bias. Malappor­
tionment, the drawing of districts such that population 
sizes are unequal across districts, could cause partisan 
bias. However, since Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. 
Sims (1964), the threat of judicial involvement in reappor­
tionment and the fact of judicial involvement in (particu­
larly southern state) reapportionments has curtailed such 
inequities. Finally, if one were to use the total district 
votes for both parties as the operationalization of state 
partisan vote, it could be the case that turnout differ­
ences between voters from the two parties could affect 
partisan bias.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have examined the theories underly­
ing the two characteristics of electoral systems with which 
I am concerned. First, I defined the concept of represen­
tational form and discussed three classic patterns of 
representational form. I also provided an illustration of 
the seats-votes curves that are associated with these 
patterns of representational form. Second, I defined and 
illustrated the other characteristic of the seats-votes
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relationship, partisan bias. Third, I noted several pos­
sible explanations of representational form. 1 discussed 
district party competition, effective magnitude, the number 
of voters per district, and the number of seats in an 
electoral district as variables that might affect 
representational form. Fourth, I put forward some hypothe­
ses that might be used to explain partisan bias. Partisan 
gerrymandering, differences in turnout between voters who 
are members of the two major parties, and differences in 
district population sizes (if one party is affected more 
than the other party) could have an impact on partisan bias 
in an election system.
In the next chapter, I describe the data and the 
techniques I use to test my hypotheses. I explain the 
procedure for calculating representational form and parti­
san bias. Next, I describe the operationalizations of the 
concepts used in Chapter Three and the models used to test 
variation in representational form and partisan bias, 
respectively. Finally, I discuss the problems I encoun­
tered in my research and how those problems were solved.
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NOTES
1. While it might appear at first glance that a discrete 
measure of the percent of districts in the competitive 
range might provide a good indicator for the distributional 
characteristics cited above, there are two reasons why such 
a measure is echewed. First, how does one identify a 
competitive district? Two problems are present here, 
initially, the problem with such an indicator is that it is 
difficult to identify the exact percentage of the vote (or, 
in this case, district margin) by which one can say that 
one district is competitive but the next district with a 1% 
larger margin of victory is not competitive. Identifying 
the "competitive" district becomes arbitrary. In addition, 
the process is further complicated by the possibility that 
competitiveness varies over time. Previous research on the 
U. S. Congress suggests that any "objective" measure (such 
as 55% or 60%) of marginality of an election district is 
subject to change over time (Garand and Gross 1984; Gross 
and Garand 1984; Jacobson 1987; Bauer and Hibbing 1989; 
Garand, Wink, and Vincent 1989). That is to say that 
incumbents who win by a slim margin in 1980 are defeated 
less often in the next election (are "safer") than an 
incumbent who won by a slim margin in 1950. Thus, a com­
petitive district identified by a certain percentage of the 
vote in 1968 may not be considered competitive in 1986. 
Second, and most importantly, one loses information when 
one simply categorizes districts as competitive or uncom­
petitive. By charting out the results from all election 
districts and measuring the effects of competition, stan­
dard deviation of competition, skewness of competition, and 
kurtosis of competition on seat allocation, one gets a more 
precise picture of exactly what is happening at the dis­
trict level.
2. For another good explanation of the techniques a party 
can use during redistricting to enhance its probability of 
winning more seats, see Dresang and Gosling 1984, 100-102.
3. As noted by Campbell (1991, 3-4), findings concerning 
the effect of voter turnout on partisan bias may hinge on 
how one operationalizes partisan votes. Tufte's opera­
tionalization of partisan votes as actual votes rather than 
as aggregated district vote percentages allows him to test 
the effects of turnout on partisan bias in U. S. House 
elections. However, U. S. House elections are all single- 
member district contests and there are fewer uncontested 
elections here than in U. S. state legislative elections.
In U. S. state legislative elections, the existence of 
floterial districts (districts composed of a number of 
smaller single-member districts) and a relatively large
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number of uncontested elections calls Into question the 
relevance of using total district votes as opposed to 
average district votes. For an example of the uncontested 
election problem, in a state (such as Arkansas) where 
Democrats may win 50% of their seats uncontested a Demo­
cratic "bias” may emerge if one examines total statewide 
partisan vote. This Democratic bias may simply be a result 
of the fact that Democratic turnout will be low in those 
districts in which a Democrat runs uncontested. Another 
practical reason for choosing to measure partisan votes by 
district averages is because four states (Arkansas, Flori­
da, Kentucky, and Oklahoma) do not report district election 
results in uncontested elections for a number of election 
years.
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHODS
The last chapter was devoted to the theory underlying 
the concepts of representational form and partisan bias.
In this chapter, discussion will revolve around the empiri­
cal definitions (i.e., the measurement) of representational 
form and partisan bias. Additionally, I will describe the 
models that I use to test the hypotheses presented in 
Chapter Three.
In this chapter, I first describe the data I use in 
this study. In the second section of the chapter, I go 
into detail about the steps I have taken to manipulate the 
data in such a way as to answer the questions posed in the 
preceding chapter. Third, I describe the model I used to 
explain variation in representational form. In the fourth 
section, I present my model for explaining variation in 
partisan bias. In the fifth part of the chapter, I discuss 
special problems presented by my study and the techniques I 
used to solve these problems. In this fifth section, I 
touch upon the problems of uncontested elections, multi­
member districts, and third-party candidacies.
THE DATA
The data that are employed here are the district-level 
data on state legislative elections that have recently been 
collected and coded in machine readable format by the 
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social
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Research (ICPSR). The data extend from 1968 to 1986 and 
Include elections from 49 states for both legislative 
houses. Data are unavailable for Vermont for the entire 
time series and for North Carolina for the elections of 
1968 and 1986.
These district-level data permit one to study all the 
state legislative elections for 48 states with relative 
ease. The district-level nature of the data and the length 
of the time series also allow one to include four states 
that are excluded by Gryski, Reed, and Elliot (1990) 
because the representatives of these states served four- 
year terms. Because they can be used to provide inter­
pretable coefficients for individual elections, the 
district-level data may also provide the opportunity to 
include calculations from Georgia, a state that has often 
been excluded because of its "blend of district and county 
at-large elections" (Gryski, Reed, and Elliot 1990, 146). 
Finally, these data will facilitate the measurement of 
representation and partisan bias for each state over the 
entire time series and for individual elections.
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
Estimation of Partisan Bias and Representational 
Form Parameters
As noted above, I employ district-level data for 
individual state legislative elections. However, to mea­
sure seats-votes relationships, aggregate data must be
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employed. The historical method of measuring seat-votes 
relationships involves the use of aggregate election 
returns for partisan seats and votes for a number of elec­
tions. If one uses this approach and plots the data, each 
point on the seats-votes graph identifies a particular 
party's seats and votes for one specific election. Using 
these points for a number of elections over time, regres­
sion analysis is employed to fit a seats-votes curve.
The other approach to measuring seats-votes relation­
ships, and the one used in this dissertation, is the uni­
form partisan swing method. This technique has been 
accepted in the literature as one of the best ways of esti­
mating bias and representational form. It is also the 
choice of many of those who have done current research in 
this area (Campagna 1991; Campagna and Grofman 1990a; 
Campagna and Grofman 1990b; Garand and Parent 1991; Gelman 
and King 1990; King 1989).
Just as with the historical approach, the uniform 
partisan swing method generates a number of data points in 
order to draw a regression line to measure the fit of the 
data points to the seats-votes curve. Unlike the histori­
cal approach, however, the uniform partisan swing approach 
uses actual aggregate election results from only one elec­
tion. The other data points are hypothetical election 
results generated through simulations based on the uniform 
partisan swing method.
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How are hypothetical election results obtained using 
the uniform partisan swing approach? One begins with the 
actual partisan district vote percentages or average parti­
san district vote percentages and the partisan seat totals 
or percentages for each election. For each election, one 
creates a number of hypothetical vote and seat proportions 
by adding and subtracting increments of one percent from 
the actual vote percentages. As the partisan vote percen­
tages change across all districts at one percent incre­
ments, party control of a certain number of seats will 
change. These new "hypothetical" election results serve as 
the data points in the regression model of the uniform 
partisan swing approach.
Perhaps an example from the Iowa state lower house 
election of 1968 will better illustrate exactly how this 
method works. Table 4.1 shows actual election results and 
hypothetical election results that are generated by adding 
and subtracting, respectively, one percent and two percent 
of the mean district Republican vote from the actual dis­
trict mean Republican vote. Columns 1 and 2 provide actual 
election results for Republican candidates in 10 state 
representative districts in Iowa in 1968. Here, Republi­
cans win 53.6% of the average district vote and 50% of the 
seats. The uniform partisan swing technique will generate 
Republican percentages of seats won at 54.6%, 55.6%,
56.6%, . . . 100% of the vote.
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Table 4.1. uniform Partisan Swing Approach Applied to 
Republican Candidates in Iowa state House 
of Representatives Districts/ 196S
Rep. Vote +1% vote +2% vote -1% vote -2% vote
Seat% Seat% Seat% Seat% Seat%
617 1.00 .627 1.00 .637 1.00 .607 1.00 .597 1.00
657 1.00 . 667 1.00 .677 1. 00 .647 1.00 .637 1.00
715 1.00 . 725 1.00 .735 1. 00 .705 1.00 .695 1.00
545 1.00 . 555 1.00 . 565 1. 00 . 535 1.00 .525 1.00
391 0.00 . 401 0.00 .411 0. 00 . 381 0.00 . 371 0.00
511 1.00 . 521 1.00 .531 1,00 .501 1.00 .491 0.00
498 0. 00 . 508 1.00 .518 1. 00 .488 0. 00 .478 0.00
498 0.00 . 508 1.00 .518 1.00 .488 0.00 .478 0.00
462 0. 00 . 472 0.00 . 482 0. 00 .452 0. 00 .442 0.00
463 0. 00 .473 0.00 . 483 0. 00 .453 0. 00 .443 0.00
Mean District Republican Vote % 
and Aggregate Republican Seat %
.536 0.50 .546 0.70 .556 0.70 .526 0.50 .516 0.40
Likewise, one can determine how ninny seats Republicans 
would win if the uniform swing was in the other direction: 
52.6%, 51.6%, . . . 0%. As Table 4.1 illustrates, at
54.6% of the vote Republicans win 70% of the seats (Columns 
3 and 4). At 55.6% of the vote, Republicans still win 70% 
of the seats in these districts (Columns 5 and 6). Alter­
natively, as the Republican mean district vote declines to 
52.6%, Republicans seat percentages decline to 50% (Columns 
7 and 8). An additional one percent decline in mean Repub­
lican district vote to 51.6% results in another seat loss; 
thus, Republicans win only 40% of the seats at this point 
(Columns 9 and 10). Each of these hypothetical results are 
treated as actual election results for purposes of charting 
the seats-votes curve for the 1968 Iowa election.
In particular, this technique is clearly superior to 
the historical approach for measuring partisan bias and 
representational form for an individual election. One does 
not have to make a decision about which election years to 
include or exclude and the immediate effects of redis­
tricting can be analyzed best using uniform partisan swing. 
This approach also presents the benefit of estimating 
seats-votes curves using hypothetical election results that 
are not bound by historical results. Finally, the use of a 
large number of data points helps insure the stability of 
the estimates and gives the researcher confidence in the 
accuracy of the findings. As is illustrated by the example
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from the Iowa election, hypothetical results can be 
calculated across the entire spectrum of partisan vote 
possibilities (i.e., from 0% to 100% of the mean district 
Republican vote) or from a smaller subset of points. In 
this dissertation, seats-votes curves are calculated from 
3 5% to 65% of mean district Republican vote. Thus, the 
regression equation in which partisan bias and representa­
tional form are estimated utilizes 31 data points. If 
actual election results had been used in this project, only 
10 data points (elections every two years from 1968 to 
1986) could be used for most states (Gryski, Reed, and 
Elliot 1990).
The model that is utilized to measure partisan bias 
and representation in the present study is the logit model 
that has been used to study state legislatures (Browning 
and King 1987; Campagna 1991; Campagna and Grofman 1990a; 
Gryski, Reed, and Elliott 1990; Niemi and Jackman 1991), 
the electoral college (Garand and Parent 1991), presiden­
tial primaries (Ansolabehere and King 1991; Geer 1986) and 
Congress (Campagna and Grofman 1990b; King 1990; King and 
Browning 1987; Tufte 1973):
loge (S / l - S) - loga, + b,log. (V / l - V) , (4.1)
where the variables are defined as in Equation 3.1. King 
and Browning (1987, 1256) stress the reason why a logit 
model is superior to Tufte's original attempt to produce an 
equation that contains both parameters:
128
[Tufte's equation] was a linear approximation of 
[ (S / l - S)- (V / l -V)]. We believe [a) non­
linear model is a more realistic version than 
Tufte's in that [it allows] for every possible 
degree of partisan bias and every possible form 
of democratic representation. Unlike the linear 
model, even systems with widely varying and quite 
extreme values of S and V can be incorporated in 
this model . . . . [It is] a more realistic
model of both bias and representation [because it 
allows] for the exact form of the bias to depend 
upon the specific type of electoral representa­
tion.
This quotation highlights two important advantages of 
using a logit model rather than a linear model to measure 
the representational form and partisan bias parameters. 
First, not all seats-votes relationships take on a linear 
pattern (Garand and Parent 1991; King and Browning 1987; 
Tufte 197 3). From the point of view of previous empirical 
findings, then, it is necessary to use a logit equation to 
find the most accurate values for representational form and 
partisan bias in cases in which the seats-votes relation­
ship is not linear.
Second, the logit equation allows the researcher to 
specify all possible relationships between seats and votes. 
In other words, whereas the linear equation assumes that 
the seats-votes relationship is linear, with the logit 
equation both linear and nonlinear patterns can be identi­
fied. In fact, the logit equation allows the researcher to 
identify the entire range of values for both partisan bias 
and representational form, while the linear equation 
specifies that the representational form parameter is one.
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The bias parameter will indicate, in a relative sense, 
which states have systems that benefit one of the two 
parties and which states have systems that provide both 
parties with nearly equal seat totals at a particular 
percentage of the vote won. The representational form 
parameter illustrates the general functional relationship 
between seats and votes. The representational form para­
meter will range from 0 to infinity, with 1.0 equating to 
proportional representation, a figure between 1.0 and 
infinity approximating majoritarian representation, and 
[eC ] representing a winner-take-all system.1
The Use of Pooled Data
In this analysis, I use pooled data. Comparative data 
on U. S. states can be analyzed in a number of ways. 
Typically, researchers using state data use either a cross- 
sectional research design or a time-series research design. 
The cross-sectional research design involves data collected 
for all or most of the states from only one time period.
The researcher using such a design is concerned with iden­
tifying the relationship among independent and dependent 
variables for the states at one point in time.
The time-series analysis research design involves 
analysis of only one state over time. Researchers 
employing a time-series analysis are concerned with the 
effects of independent variables on a dependent variable 
over time. Comparisons between or among states are not the
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focus of this type of analysis; rather, the researcher 
desires to know how dependent and independent variables 
collected in a single state covary from one time period to 
another.
A third type of research design, the pooled cross- 
sectional time-series analysis, employs elements of the 
other two research designs and thereby avoids the pitfalls 
of using only one or the other. The major criticism of 
cross-sectional research designs is that they are static 
and therefore unable to model processes. One can only use 
such a design to make generalizations about phenomena at 
one point in time. Two criticisms of the time-series 
analysis are: (a) generalizations can be offered only for
the state used in the design; (b) some variables may not 
change over time and cannot, therefore, be included in such 
a design.
The pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis 
includes data from a number of states at a number of points 
of time. This research design allows one to make general­
izations both across states and across time. Thus, the 
pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis contains the 
advantages of the other two approaches while avoiding the 
disadvantages. Essentially, one takes advantage of all of 
the covariation among dependent and independent variables. 
In addition, a pooled data set using the same number of 
states as a cross-sectional analysis and the same number of
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years as a time-series analysis includes many more cases 
than will either of the other two types of designs. This 
latter advantage should lead to more stable estimates and 
should strengthen the researcher's ability to engage in 
hypothesis testing (Holbrook 1991, 93-94, Sayrs 1989,
7-14) .
PLAN OF THE ANALYSIS 
The analysis conducted for this dissertation requires 
four steps, some of which will be explained in greater 
detail in a later section of this chapter. First, the data 
for each state are printed out and recoded so that partisan 
vote variables can be created. This first step is neces­
sary because the data were coded originally such that 
individual candidates served as the cases. For example, in 
Iowa in 1968, one line of data is devoted to Republican 
candidate Dennis L. Freeman. The next line of data per­
tains to the Republican candidate from the next district, 
Charles E. Grassley. However, since Grassley ran uncon­
tested and there was no third party candidate in Freeman's 
district, a line for the Democratic Party candidate and a 
third party candidate must be added to Grassley's district 
and a third party line must be added to Freeman's dis­
tricts. Only in this way can party votes in these 
districts be properly registered. Each district contains 
three lines of information: The first line contains infor­
mation on Democratic candidates, the second line pertains
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to candidates from the Republican Party, and the third 
line is devoted to third party candidacies. Each electoral 
district, then, becomes the case.
In addition, multimember districts are recoded as 
quasi single-member districts in the first step. The 
highest vote winners from the Democratic Party are paired 
with the lowest vote winners from the Republican Party, and 
so on. Next, the third-party candidate acquiring the most 
votes is placed in the district containing the major party 
candidate who outpaced his or her major party opposition 
but won the fewest votes in doing so. The procedure 
involving the third-party candidate ensures that the third- 
party candidate who actually wins a seat is placed in a 
district such that his vote total is the largest of the 
three candidates in the quasi single-member district. At 
this juncture it is also necessary to convert raw vote 
totals to percentages of the two-party vote.2
After the average partisan district vote and seats won 
by both parties are calculated, it is possible to begin the 
second step in the process. This is the step in which the 
uniform partisan swing is applied to the actual election 
results. As noted in the reference to the 1968 Iowa elec­
tion in Table 4.1, the average partisan district vote is 
manipulated by increments of one percent and the changing 
seat totals that correspond to the respective one percent 
shifts are noted. In this way, one can create up to 100
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hypothetical elections results that are generated for each 
individual election year.
At this stage, however, I have decided to truncate the 
data so that only the mean Republican votes in the 35% to 
65% range are included in the calculation of the seats- 
votes curves. Truncating the data limits the number of 
districts in which it is actually impossible to add or to 
subtract an incremental percentage of the Republican vote. 
For example, at the point in which Republicans win 80% of 
the mean district vote there may be many districts in which 
Republicans have already won 100% of the vote. Adding 
additional percentages of Republican votes to all districts 
would push Republican vote percentages over 100%. While it 
might be possible to reallocate Republican vote percentages 
to districts in which Republican candidates have not won 
100% of the votes, such an undertaking would be difficult 
and time consuming. The most frequently used method is to 
limit the data points to some figures close to the 50% 
point (usually 40% to 60%). utilizing the points from 35% 
to 65% minimizes the problem of allocating votes to Repub­
licans who have already won 100% of the district vote and 
at the same time allows one to use more of the data from 
the hypothetical elections than one would use if the 40% to 
60% range were chosen.
The third step is the calculation of the partisan bias 
and representation coefficients using the logit equation
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described previously. For each state, one partisan bias 
coefficient and one representational form coefficient are 
produced in each election year. As noted above, these 
coefficients are estimated by applying the seats-votes 
model in Equation 4.1 to the hypothetical data derived from 
the uniform partisan swing method rather than from histori­
cal seats-votes data.
The fourth and final step is the estimation of the 
models used to explain variations in representational form 
and partisan bias. The dependent variables in each of 
these models are the coefficients produced in the third 
step of the procedure. The specification of the models 
will be explained in a later section of the present chap­
ter.
ESTIMATING MODELS EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PARTISAN 
BIAS AND REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
A Model of Representational Form
The electoral college study of Garand, Parent, and 
Teague (1989) provides evidence that the mean level of 
party competition in the states has a strong, positive 
effect on the representational form of the electoral col­
lege in presidential elections; that is, the electoral 
college is more responsive to shifts in voting as party 
competition increases in the states. The study highlights 
the effects of a number of aspects of the distribution of 
partisan votes on representational form. These aspects of
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partisan vote distribution include standard deviation, 
skewness, and kurtosis. The interaction of these distribu­
tional characteristics and the mean level of party competi­
tion and their effect on representational form will be 
described below.
Garand, Parent, and Teague (1989) illustrate that when 
the mean level of competition is zero, the magnitude of the 
standard deviation (or measure of dispersion) of the mean 
vote of the Republican party is positively related to 
representational form. This occurs because when competi­
tion is zero, that is, when the districts as a whole are 
very uncompetitive, a high standard deviation implies that 
some districts will have party competition that deviates 
from the mean and are therefore competitive. Thus, a 
change in votes should cause some of these competitive 
districts to change party hands.
However, specification of an interaction term between 
competition and the standard deviation of the Republican 
Party's votes across the states shows that, as competition 
increases, the effect of the standard deviation on repre­
sentational form is strongly negative (i.e., the system is 
far less responsive). This is the case because as competi­
tion increases, a large standard deviation illustrates that 
there are a number of districts that deviate substantially 
from the mean level of competition and are thus uncompeti­
tive. Likewise, in the present study, it is expected that
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the mean level of district competition and the standard 
deviation of party vote percentages will have a positive 
effect on the representational form of the state electoral 
system. It is also hypothesized that the interaction of 
mean district competition and the standard deviation of 
party vote percentages will have a negative impact on the 
state's representational form. Quite simply, the higher 
the level of party competition is across the districts, the 
larger will be the value of the representational form for 
the state (Garand, Parent, and Teague 1989, 14, Table 2).
The electoral college study also highlights the impor- 
tance of skewness (the "heaviness" of a distribution toward 
high or low values). As noted in Chapter Three, the rela­
tionship between skewness and representational form is 
dependent on which party wins roost of the vote in the 
election as well as the level of party competition in the 
state. In general, as party competition rises, the inter­
action between state competition and positive skewness 
(skewness toward the lower value, or heavy left tail skew­
ness) of a party's district vote percentage should have a 
positive effect on representational form if one party wins 
more than 50% of the vote and a negative effect on repre­
sentational form if the other party wins 50% of the vote 
(and the opposite is true if negative skewness, skewness 
toward the higher value of party vote, is used). The point 
is that a new variable must be created with values of plus
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one and negative one and multiplied with the skewness 
variable to control for the partisan direction of the 
relationship. Only in this way will there be consistency 
in the findings for skewness.
In the electoral college study, Garand, Parent, and 
Teague also suggest that the kurtosis of a party's state 
vote will affect representational form. Kurtosis measures 
"the normality of a distribution (Garand, Parent, and 
Teague 1989, 10)." Positive kurtosis (illustrating that 
more cases are found near the mean as opposed to the tails 
of the distribution) of Republican party vote distribution 
is negatively related to representational form when the 
mean level of competition is zero. However, as the mean 
level of competition takes on larger positive values, the 
interaction between mean level of competition and kurtosis 
has a positive impact on representational form (Garand, 
Parent, and Teague 1989, 14, Table 2). Even though the 
findings for kurtosis were only significant at the .10 
level using a one-tailed test in the Garand, Parent, and 
Teague study, the representational form model will include 
kurtosis of partisan district-level vote as an independent 
variable.
The effective magnitude of the state should have a 
positive effect on representational form. As noted in 
Chapter Three, this should be the case because the U. S. 
states have plurality winner rules. Since seats can only
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be partitioned In whole numbers, a state with more than one 
seat per district would be more likely to produce election 
results that were not proportional than would a state that 
had only one seat per district. This should particularly 
apply once one controls for the district partisan vote 
variables.
In addition, Taagepera's index should have a positive 
impact on representational form. This variable is usually 
specified as the log of voters divided by the log of the 
number of electoral districts. The more voters there are 
in a particular district, the less likely is the possibi­
lity that there will be a proportional relationship between 
seats and votes. Alternatively, and admittedly at the 
opposite extreme, if all districts contained only one 
voter, there would be a perfectly proportional system since 
a party's vote percentage would exactly equal that party's 
seat percentage. The larger the election district, the 
more unlikely it would be that election outcomes in majo­
rity or plurality winner districts could produce a propor­
tional relationship between partisan seats and votes in the 
aggregate.
It may also be the case that the more Beats there are 
to win, the more seats will change hands given a particular 
vote. This assumes that the effects of other variables are 
held constant. Because there are single-member seat dis­
tricts and multimember-seat districts in this election
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series, it might be useful to differentiate between seats 
and districts in determining whether there is an effect on 
representational form. Thus, in addition to including a 
variable for the number of seats, it might be useful to 
include a variable on the number of districts. Care will 
be taken to test for collinearity between the "number of 
districts" variable and other independent variables; should 
collinearity be a problem, a more parsimonious model of 
representational form will be specified.
Since it has been observed that representational form 
has been declining in congressional elections and may be 
declining for state legislative elections as well, a trend 
or counter variable will be included in the model. Of 
course, a trend variable is not a causal variable in and of 
itself. However, should the model be misspecified, it may 
be useful to discover if there is a trend in representa­
tional form to help in selecting variables for future 
research.
The representational form model will be specified as: 
RFORM - a, + bjMCOHP + bj (MCOMP) * (STANDEV) (4.2)
+ bj (MCOMP)*(SKEW)*(CONTROL) + b4 (MCOMP)*(KURT)
+ bjMAG + b6TAAG + t^N SEATS + b„NDIST 
+ b,COUNTER + e 
The dependent variable, RFORM, is the representational 
form coefficient that is generated from the logit model of 
the seats-votes ratio that was discussed in a previous
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section of the paper. RFORM can vary theoretically from 
0.00 to infinity, with 1.00 indicating a proportional 
system and larger numbers a system more responsive to vote 
shifts in the competitive or middle range of the vote 
distribution (i.e., majoritarian between 1.0 and infinity 
and winner-take-all at infinity). MCOMP is an index mea­
suring the mean level of district competition. MCOMP 
ranges from 0 (meaning that there is a low level of dis­
trict competition in the state) to 1 (meaning that there is 
a high degree of competition).3 As the level of competi­
tion increases, it is hypothesized that the electoral 
system will become more sensitive to vote shifts; thus, the 
representational form coefficient will increase. The b, 
coefficient, therefore, is expected to be positive.
STANDEV is the standard deviation of the Republican 
percentage of the vote across districts. The interaction 
variable (MCOMP)*(STANDEV) represents a situation in which 
the mean level of competition is rising at the same time 
the standard deviation of mean Republican district-level 
vote is rising. In this case, a high standard deviation 
indicates that some districts deviate from the high mean 
level of competition. Thus, the b^  coefficient is expected 
to be negatively correlated with representational form.
SKEW is the skewness of the distribution of Republican 
vote percentages in the state's districts. The variable 
(MCOMP)*(SKEW) represents the interaction between skewness
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and a rising level of district competition. As noted 
earlier in both Chapter Three and this chapter, however, 
one must specify which party is winning more than 50% of 
the vote in order for the impact of the interaction between 
skewness of Republican district vote and party competition 
on representational form to be consistent. If one used 
skewness of Democratic district vote percentages, the 
relationship between (MCOMP)*(SKEW) would be reversed. A 
dummy variable must be created to control for this rela­
tionship. This dummy variable is named CONTROL. The 
complete interaction variable, therefore, becomes 
(CONTROL)*(MCOMP)*(SKEW). Since skewness of Republican 
vote is used in this analysis, it makes sense to code 
CONTROL as plus one if the mean Republican vote exceeds 
mean Democratic vote in a state and negative one if the 
opposite is the case. In this way, one can assure the b3 
coefficient will be in the correct direction regardless of 
which party wins the most votes. It is expected that b, 
will be positive.
KURT is the kurtosis of Republican district vote 
percentages. Kurtosis measures the degree to which obser­
vations or cases in a distribution are found close to the 
mean or at the tails given a particular standard deviation. 
Positive kurtosis is found in situations in which more 
cases are distributed close to the mean; thus, negative 
kurtosis refers to a distribution with a high percentage of
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cases in the tails. The variable (MCOMP)* (KURT) is the 
interaction of partisan competition and the kurtosis of 
Republican district vote percentages. An increase in 
competition with a positive kurtosis means that more dis­
tricts are in the competitive range and that the represen­
tational form variable will be large. When competition is 
high and kurtosis is low, districts will mostly fall into 
the less competitive range and the representational form 
value will decline accordingly. Therefore, the coefficient 
for the interaction of competition and kurtosis, b4, is 
expected to be positive.
MAG is effective magnitude (the number of state seats 
per district). Because the U. S. states have plurality or 
majority winner rules in state legislative districts, it is 
believed that the more seats there are for each legislative 
district the more the state's electoral system will be 
responsive to partisan vote shifts. Controlling for the 
other variables in the study, one should expect that pro­
portionality would be enhanced if there were only single­
member districts rather than the multimember districts 
found in many state legislative elections. Effective 
magnitude, in other words, should correlate positively with 
representational form (Rae 1967 19, 114-25; Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989, 112-25). Thus, it is expected that bs should 
be positive.
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TAAG is the (Log Votes) / (Log Districts) variable 
suggested by Taagepera. When this variable is positive, 
this indicates that the election districts are fairly large 
in terns of population. In a plurality system like that of 
the United States, when there are a great number of people 
per district the election system should deviate from pro­
portionality. Because of votes wasted on district losers, 
this variable should be positively correlated with repre­
sentational form. Thus, bA should be positive.
NSEATS is the number of seats in the legislature and 
NDIST is the number of districts in a state election sys­
tem. Controlling for other variables, one might expect 
both of these to contribute to a rise in representational 
form because of the greater likelihood that at least some 
seats or districts in a state will change party hands the 
more seats or districts there are to contest. However 
since NSEATS and NDIST are the same in single-member dis­
trict election states, one should be careful in specifying 
a model with both of these variables. In addition, it may 
be that Taagepera's index taps into the same process as the 
NDIST variable. The hypotheses are that both bj and b, will 
be positive, but checks for multicollinearity may result in 
the need to exclude one or more of these two variables from 
the model.
Finally, a COUNTER variable measuring time is included 
in the model. The values for this variable are constructed
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by subtracting 1968, the first year in the time series, 
from every other year in the time series. Thus, 1968 
elections are coded 0, 1969 elections are coded l, etc., up 
to the handful of 1987 elections that are coded 19. Since 
previous research on legislative elections suggests that 
swing ratios are definitely declining in congressional 
elections and may be declining in state legislative elec­
tions, it is believed that the trend will be in the direc­
tion of lower representational form values. Thus, b, is 
expected to be negative.
A Model of Partisan Bias
In the present study, the emphasis in explaining 
partisan bias is placed on redistricting. That is to say, 
it is expected that gerrymandering will be the cause of 
partisan bias in U. S. state legislative elections. There­
fore, the model of partisan bias will be specified as:
RBIAS - a, + b, (PART)*(REDIST) (4.3)
In this model, RBIAS is the natural log of partisan 
bias toward the Republicans exhibited by the election 
system. This variable is the constant generated in the 
equation:
In (s / 1 - s) « In a + b In (v / 1 - v) + e (4.4) 
In most cases it is expected that RBIAS, will vary from 
1.00 to -1.00.4 If no bias exists, then this coefficient 
will equal 0. A system biased toward the Republicans will
145
be represented by a positive number, while negative numbers 
indicate bias toward the Democrats. Only in cases of 
extremely large degrees of bias should RBIAS be greater 
then 1.0 or less than -1.0.
PART is a variable that accounts for partisan control 
of redistricting as formulated by King (1989). In general, 
PART is coded 1 if Republicans control the redistricting 
machinery, 0 if the redistricting is performed by a bipar­
tisan or nonpartisan commission, the courts (assuming the 
courts are not stacked in favor of a particular party), or 
if evidence indicates that a bipartisan plan was passed by 
the legislature, and -1 if the Democrats control redis­
tricting. A party is assumed to be able to control redis­
tricting in cases in which the party controls enough of the 
redistricting machinery (at least a majority of the three 
branches of government —  the two houses of the legislature 
and the governorship) and there is evidence that an attempt 
was made to gerrymander. King (1989) has coded redis- 
trictings as being controlled by a party if allegations of 
partisan bias were raised and these allegations appeared to 
be justified. King accumulated the data for his coding 
scheme from records of the redistricting process given in 
state "Blue Books" that were provided by the state govern­
ments. Since the evidence indicates that partisan control 
of redistricting is more apt to result in bias than is a 
nonpartisan or bipartisan plan, this variable should have a
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positive effect on the dependent variable. In other words, 
for example, Republican bias should be more likely to occur 
when the redistricting is controlled by the state Republi­
can Party (Campagna and Grofman 1991; King 1989; Niemi and 
Jackman 1991).
Party control of redistricting is hypothesized to have 
an effect on all the elections succeeding redistricting. A 
dummy variable, REDIST, is created to identify each elec­
tion year in which a redistricing occurred. This variable 
is created for each year and coded one if there was a 
redistricting and zero otherwise. When PART is multiplied 
by REDIST, the interaction term, INTER, measures the effect 
of each redistricting on elections that follow redis­
tricting. Each independent variable in the bias model is 
coded with a suffix to differentiate it from the other 
variables with the same name (e.g., 1970 election year 
variables contain the suffix "70"). Therefore, b, in 
Equation 4.3 should be positive.5
It is expected that bias will decrease over time as 
legislatures become more hesitant to produce plans that are 
obviously biased. This could be expected from the threat 
of intervention by the courts. It should also be noted 
that as redistricting becomes more sophisticated and incum­
bent legislators are better able through the use of tech­
nology to foresee the results of their actions, they may 
opt to protect themselves via a "bipartisan" or
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"sweetheart" gerrymander rather than attempt to maximize 
partisan seat gains by weakening existing incumbents. It 
may be expected, then, that even when one party controls 
all the relevant machinery of government that highly parti­
san redistrictings are less likely to occur in the latter 
years of the time series. Since it may be believed that 
bias is decreasing over time, the hypothesis is that the 
absolute value of b2, the coefficient associated with the 
yearly dummy variables, will decline over time. Table 4.2 
contains a summary of the definitions of the variables used 
in the representational form model. Table 4.3 provides a 
summary of the independent variables in the partisan bias 
model.
ESTIMATION USING A POOLED MODEL
One can often employ ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression to test hypotheses using pooled models. How­
ever, there are potential problems posed by the use of 
pooled data. One problem is autocorrelation and the other 
problem is heteroscedacticity.
Autocorrelation occurs in OLS when "individual distur­
bance terms are not independent but instead are related to 
each other in a systematic fashion (Ostrom 1990, 8)." This 
is a danger in time-series analysis; since pooling contains 
elements of time-series analyses, it is also a danger in 
using pooled data. If positive autocorrelation exists (the
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t a b l e 4.2. Description of independent 
▼«riabl«s for Model of Rapraiaatitioul fora
Variable
MCOMP
(MCOMP) * (STANDEV)
(MCOMP) * (SKEW) 
* (CONTROL)
(MCOMP) * (KURT)
MAG
TAAG
NSEATS
NDIST
Description
Mean level of district party 
competition: Continuous
variable ranging from 0 (no 
party competition to 1 (perfect 
party competition)
Interaction term created by 
multiplying mean level of 
district party competition with 
standard deviation of distri­
bution of Repub. district 
vote %
Interaction term created by 
multiplying mean level of 
district party competition with 
skewness of distribution of 
Repub. district vote % and with 
dummy variable coded 1 if 
Repubs, win higher % of dis­
trict votes in state than Dems. 
and coded -l if the opposite 
occurs
interaction term created by 
multiplying mean level of 
district competition with 
kurtosis of distribution of 
Repub. district vote %
Effective Magnitude: Number of
seats in state divided by 
number of legislative districts
Taagepera's Index: Log of
number of voters divided by log 
of number of legislative dis­
tricts
Number of legislative seats 
Number of legislative districts
COUNTER Number of years minus 1968, 
ranging from 1 (1969) to 19 
(1987)
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Variable
(REDIST)
INTER
COUNTER
TABLE 4.3. Description of Independent 
Variables for Model of Partisan Bias
Description
(PART) = Interaction tern created by
multiplying dummy variable 
coded 1 for elections immedi­
ately following redistricting 
and 0 otherwise with dummy 
variable coded 1 if Repubs, 
controlled redistricting and 
attempted to gerrymander, 0 if 
there was no evidence of 
gerrymandering, and -1 if 
Dems. controlled redistricting 
and attempted to gerrymander
Number of years minus 1968, 
ranging from 1 (1969) to 19 
(1987)
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most common type of autocorrelation), hypothesis testing is 
more difficult because the error variance is underesti­
mated. The practical consequence of this problem is that 
the fit of the regression line to the data is more accurate 
than it should be; thus, estimated coefficients are artifi­
cially reliable even if they should really be unreliable. 
Coefficients used to test hypotheses appear to be signifi­
cant even when they may not be. In the case of negative 
autocorrelation, coefficients that are in actuality sta­
tistically significant appear to be insignificant (Ostrom 
1990, 16-26).
The Durbin-Watson statistic provides insight into 
whether the error terms of the regression equations are, in 
fact, correlated over time, or are randomly distributed 
around the regression line. The formula for this statistic 
is:
d «2f<e, - e,.,)2 /*fe,2, (4.5)
where the ets are the OLS regression residuals (Ostrom 
1990, 27). Positive autocorrelation produces small values 
for d and negative autocorrelation results in large values 
for d. One can use the Durbin-Watson statistic to test for 
the existence of first-order autocorrelation in the OLS 
regression estimates. While the results of the test for 
autocorrelation depend on the number of independent vari­
ables and the sample size, generally speaking, the further 
the Durbin-Watson statistic deviates from a value of 2.0,
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the higher the probability that autocorrelation is present 
(See Ostrom 1990, 28-29).
Should autocorrelation become a problem in this 
dissertation, I will employ the two-step Prais-Winsten 
technique to estimate the models. This is an estimated 
generalized least squares (EGLS) technique offered in the 
SAS statistical software package. This technique allows 
the researcher to obtain OLS estimates of the independent 
variable parameters and the residuals, to determine the 
effects of the autocorrelated residuals, and to use OLS to
reestimate the parameters of the independent variables
while subtracting from both sides of the transformed equa­
tion the value of the coefficient associated with the 
residuals (Ostrom 1990, 34-35). The two-step Prais-Winsten 
application thus allows a more realistic estimate of the 
effect of the independent variables on the dependent vari­
able. In this study, therefore, GLS regression results
will always be reported when autocorrelation is found to be
in existence.
The second potential problem is the possibility of 
heteroscedacticity. Heteroscedacticity is a problem that 
may occur in cross-sectional research designs as well as 
pooled research designs. In reference to a pooled research 
design, heteroscedacticity occurs when "the error term 
contains an unobserved variable that is constant within 
cross-sectional units but variable between cross-sectional
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units. In other words, each cross-sectional unit has its 
own peculiar intercept (Holbrook 1991, 101)." One way to 
test for this problem is to employ a dummy variable least 
squares (DVLS) model. The researcher simply adds dummy 
variables for each cross-sectional unit to the OLS model 
and conducts an F-test to determine if the sum of squared 
error of the OLS estimates is significantly different from 
the sum of squared error after the dummy variables are 
added. If heteroscedacticity does occur, one simply 
reports the DVLS estimates of the effects of the indepen­
dent variables on the dependent variable (See Holbrook 
1991; Sayrs 1989). Since one must control for heterosce­
dacticity before autocorrelation can be detected (Sayrs 
1989, 19), the DVLS models are compared with the OLS models 
first. Then, tests for autocorrelation are conducted.
SPECIAL SITUATIONS IN TREATING THE DATA 
This project requires that decisions be made con­
cerning how certain data will be treated. First of all, 
some decision criterion must be formulated for dealing with 
uncontested elections. Second, a rule concerning how 
multimember districts will be coded must be developed. 
Third, there must be a decision criterion for the treatment 
of third-party candidacies.
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Uncontested Elections
Uncontested elections must be dealt with in an analy­
sis of elections, and there are different views about how 
the researcher should treat them. Because the hypothetical 
approach allows for estimates of changes in seats given 
incremental shifts in the two-party vote, the representa­
tion parameters will not be affected until the two-party 
vote is plotted to extreme positions that are virtually 
unattainable. However, since hypothetical elections are 
being plotted across the entire possibility of mean dis­
trict-level Republican votes, uncontested elections could 
affect the fit of the regression line and therefore might 
affect the calculation of representational form and parti­
san bias.
To examine how the decision rule for treating uncon­
tested elections influences the calculation of election 
results, it is necessary to illustrate how district elec­
tion results would be coded under various schemes.
Election totals for districts in a hypothetical state are 
provided in Table 4.4. The first column in Table 4.4 
specifies the various districts. The second and third 
columns give the raw votes for the Democratic and Republi­
can candidates, respectively. The fourth and fifth columns 
provide the percentage of the vote won by the Democratic 
partisans and the Republican candidates' percentage of the 
vote, respectively. Notice that winners in uncontested
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races are awarded 100% of the vote while losers receive 0% 
of the vote.
Awarding uncontested 11 losers” no votes. Ansolabehere, 
Brady, and Fiorina (1988), Holbrook and Tidinarch (1991), 
Niemi and Jackman (1991), and Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky 
(1990) suggest that the party that does not contest a seat 
should be awarded no votes. The results in Table 4.4, 
therefore, mirror election results using the procedure 
described by these three groups of researchers. The mean 
percentage of district votes for the Democrats is 49.36% 
and the comparable figure for the Republicans is 50.64%. 
Thus, the Democrats win five seats with a mean of less than 
50% of the votes. This example illustrates one weakness of 
including uncontested elections and averaging district 
percentages: one can exaggerate the actual electoral
strength of a state party if that party happens to do 
extremely well in a minority of districts. Nonetheless, 
this particular vote counting method is truer to the actual 
election results than are many of the other approaches that 
are suggested by scholars.
Excluding uncontested races. Gryski, Reed, and Elliott
(1990) exclude uncontested single-member district races and 
they apparently exclude races for uncontested members as 
well. Excluding uncontested elections is problematic since 
there are many multimember districts in which the
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Table 4.4. District Elsotion Results fro* a 
Hypothetical State Legislative Election
DISTRICT DEMO VOTE REPUB VOTE DEMO % REPUB %
1 139 92 60.17 39.83
2 36 0 100.00 0.00
3 0 30 0.00 100.00
4 122 52 70.11 29.89
5 0 61 0.00 100.00
6 46 135 25.41 74.59
7 128 69 64.97 35.03
8 124 43 74.25 25.75
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Republicans cannot produce enough viable candidates to 
contest for each seat (Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky 1990). 
Using the data from Table 4.4 and dropping the uncontested 
elections, the Democrats win five seats with 58.98% of the 
mean district vote and the Republicans win three seats with 
41.02% of the mean district vote. In this example, 
Democratic strength at the state level may be slightly 
overestimated since districts won by Republicans are dis­
proportionately uncontested. Another argument against 
using this method is the fact that a large amount of data 
that could add to our understanding of state legislative 
elections would have to be excluded from the analysis.
Averaging party percentages. Jewell (1982), Jewell and
Breaux (1989), and Weber, Tucker and Brace (1991) offer
slightly different techniques designed to present a "more
accurate" measure of party competition. Jewell's approach
is actually applied to party primary elections (Jewell
1982, 193, n. 2):
[With no uncontested elections] the percentage 
[is] found by dividing the vote of each winning 
candidate by the total vote for all candidates, 
and multiplying that by the number of seats in 
the district. If [there are uncontested elec­
tions], the average vote for all losing candi­
dates [is] calculated. This figure [is] added to 
the denominator as many times as there [are] 
missing candidates, before the percentage [is] 
calculated. The purpose of doing this is to 
provide an approximate measure of the closeness 
of each winner to the losers and avoid inflating 
the margin of winners.
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Of course, this approach is unacceptable on its face 
because it places winner and losers, rather than opposition 
party candidates, in the numerator and denominator. None­
theless, the averaging technique may have some beneficial 
qualities.
Jewell and Breaux (1989) and Weber, Tucker, and Brace
(1991), in reference to uncontested multimember districts, 
calculate partisan averages by taking a candidate's votes 
and dividing the votes by the number of candidates from the 
same party running in the district (1989, 6). "The purpose 
is to provide a more accurate measure of the party's voting 
strength in each district, and ultimately in the state. It 
assumes that, faced with less than a full slate of candi­
dates, many partisans will reduce the number of votes they 
cast rather than cross party lines (1989. 6)." The problem 
with this technique is that in some districts, when the 
average partisan vote for a loser is substituted for zero 
votes, there is the possibility that the "loser" will 
receive more votes than were actually won by a winner.
One can conceivably produce a new calculation tech­
nique by combining the approach of Jewell with the approach 
of Jewell and Breaux and Weber, Tucker, and Brace. For 
instance, one can substitute in place of zero votes for an 
"uncontested seat loser" and the actual votes won by an 
"uncontested seat winner" the average for the relevant 
party's contested seat losers and winners, respectively.
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To use the data from Table 4.4 as an example, the Demo­
cratic winner in District 2 can be given 128 votes (the 
mean for Democratic contested seat winners) and the Repub­
lican winners in Districts 3 and 5 can be said to have 
produced 135 votes (the mean for Republican contested seat 
winners). Likewise, the Democratic losers in Districts 3 
and 5 can be credited with 46 votes and the Republican 
loser in District 2 can be provided with 64 votes.
The hypothetical values in the above paragraph simu­
late what possibly would have happened if the races had 
been contested. Once again, the strengths of such an 
endeavor are that one does not have to exclude uncontested 
elections, winners' margins should be less inflated, and a 
more accurate picture of partisan voting strength in the 
state is (arguably) produced. The disadvantage of using 
such a method is that one is tampering with actual election 
returns to simulate what might have occurred if certain 
conditions had been met. The application of this approach 
to the data in Table 4.4 gives the Democrats five seats 
with a mean district vote of 51.55% and the Republicans 
three seats with a mean district vote of 48.45%. In this 
particular example, the technique disinflates the Demo­
cratic percent of the mean district vote as compared to the 
Democratic vote generated by excluding uncontested elec­
tions. Yet, at the same time, this method (unlike the 
approach in which one gives the uncontested winners 100% of
159
the vote and the losers 0% of the vote), does give the 
Democrats (who, after all, won a majority of the seats) a 
majority of the two-party mean district vote.
Using a normal vote. An approach that is similar in appli­
cation and in rationale to the modified Jewell and Breaux 
and Weber, Tucker, and Brace method is to substitute some 
estimate of a district "normal" partisan vote for the 
actual vote totals produced in uncontested elections 
(Gelman and King 1990). This technique is beneficial in 
that it controls somewhat for candidates who are elec­
toral ly strong because of factors that may be unrelated to 
party affiliation. Nonetheless, such an approach does have 
its weaknesses.
Presumably, one needs to rely on previous election 
results to arive at a normal vote figure for a district. 
Backstrom, Robins, and Eller (1978) search for a single 
recent election that typifies the state normal vote in 
their study of Minnesota. Such an approach is satisfactory 
if one is dealing with a very small number of states, 
particularly if one is intimately familiar with the history 
of the state(s). For purposes of the present effort, 
however, it would be more realistic to choose another 
method of dealing with uncontested elections. Gathering 
data on previous elections may be difficult, especially if 
redistricting has occurred in the recent past. One might 
resort to precinct-level data to avoid the redistricting
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dilemma, but precinct-level data would be difficult or even 
impossible to acquire for all the states (or even for a 
large number of states) in a reasonable length of time. 
Also, district-level data have only been gathered by the 
ICPSR since 1968; thus, an additional effort would have to 
be made to collect pre-1968 data to determine the normal 
partisan district vote in the early elections in the 1968- 
1986 time series. Finally , if a district has had one or 
more uncontested seats for a number of elections the prob­
lem of uncontested elections has not been solved. One must 
still come up with some method of dealing with such dis­
tricts .
Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus in the 
literature as to how uncontested elections should be 
treated. Any of the three or four methods discussed above 
can be justified so long as the decision criterion is 
applied to all uncontested races in the time series. 
However, the technique of using actual data and coding 
winners with 100% of the vote and losers with 0% of the 
vote appears to be the most satisfying approach to take.
It is the method that is used in the present study. Using 
the actual results is simple in that it alleviates the 
problem of calculating partisan averages for winners and 
losers and alleviates the problem of tampering with actual 
election returns. Furthermore, it is satisfying in that 
the researcher is permitted to use all the available
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election results as the basis from which uniform partisan 
swings will be calculated.
The consequence of including uncontested races is that 
some seats will change hands only after a 50% (or, for 
purposes of this study, a 51%) vote swing. During the 
estimation procedure, this could cause state representa­
tional form coefficients to behave in different ways 
depending on the number of uncontested elections in the 
state. In most states, using uncontested districts may 
cause the regression line to be more flat in the middle of 
the distribution than would be the case if only uncontested 
races were included because much of the change in seats 
will occur in the tails of the distribution. However, in a 
state in which there is an extremely large number of uncon­
tested elections, the representational form coefficient may 
be quite high because a large number of seats will change 
hands close to the 50% range of the minority party's vote 
percentage. The latter phenomenon is only prone to occur 
in the Deep South, however. The inflation of the 
representational form value due to what amounts to an 
artificial strengthening of party competition will be 
accounted for in the analysis. It can be argued, I think, 
that the representational form parameters in most states 
identify more closely the reality of the election system 
than would be the case if uncontested elections were 
excluded.
162
Multiroember Districts
An additional challenge is to determine how multi- 
member districts should be treated. One option, of course, 
would be to exclude multimember districts from the analysis 
(Basehart and Comer 1991; Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991). 
However, much data would be unused. Furthermore, there 
have been suggestions about how multimember districts could 
be treated.
The consensus seems to be that researchers pair the 
Democrat having the highest vote and the Republican having 
the lowest vote, etc. "The rationale is straightforward: 
the Democratic candidate with the highest vote would not be 
defeated until he or she received fewer votes than the 
weakest Republican candidate, the next-highest Democrat 
would not lose until he received fewer votes than the 
second-lowest Republican, and so on" (Nieroi and Jackman 
1991, 200, n. 3; also see Jewell 1982, 193, n. 2 and Niemi, 
Jackman, and Winsky 1990, 8-9). If there is no Republican 
candidate that can be paired with a Democrat (or vice 
versa), then an uncontested seat is created.
In essence, the researcher using the aforementioned 
approach creates "pseudo-pairs of individual candidates 
that can be analyzed just as if they were [single-member 
districts]" (Niemi, Jackman, and winsky 1990, 8). In 
multimember districts in which a number of pairs of candi­
dates run against each other ("post" multimember
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districts), the results already mirror single-member dis­
trict elections. It is in reference to "free-for-all" 
multimember districts and floterial districts (a district 
in which one or more represenative[s ] is [are] elected by 
voters from a number of smaller districts) that are awarded 
on a "free-for-all" basis that the creation of pseudo- 
single-member districts becomes necessary. For example 
consider the case in which three Democratic candidates win 
530, 520, and 470 votes, respectively, and three Republi­
cans respectively garner 510, 490, and 480 votes. Clearly, 
the Democrats would win two seats while the Republicans 
would win one seat. This election would be coded as three 
single-member districts as follows:
Dem. votes: 470 520 530
Rep. votes: 510 490 480
Dem. % of two-party vote « 48.0, 51.5, 52.5 
This procedure is beneficial for a reason other than 
that it allows the researcher to match a candidate who won 
a seat with a vote percentage greater than 50%. The pro­
cess permits the researcher to weight the races equally by 
averaging all the race percentages to calculate the party 
vote in the state. Such an averaging approach alleviates 
the problem of having districts with large turnout unduly 
affect the results of any given election. In essence,
variables that affect turnout in one district and not in
others (i.e., idiosyncratically) are controlled
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(Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991, Niemi and Jackman 1991, and 
Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky 1990).
Third-Party Candidacies
Another problem that may be manifested is the possible 
existence of candidates from third parties. Because this 
project consists of data from only 1968 to 1986, there 
certainly are fewer cases in which minor party candidates 
and other groups that splintered from the two major parties 
(or were antecedents of the latter) are contenders. How­
ever, given the strength of minor parties in certain 
states, third-party candidacies must be faced.
King and Browning (1987) address this problem in their 
study on the U.S. Congress. They "delete the very few 
representatives who had won seats under the independent- 
party label and subtract the votes received by their Demo­
cratic and Republican opponent from the statewide total 
(1987, 1260)." Niemi, Jackman, and Winsky (1990, 6, n. 5) 
suggest that three equally appropriate possibilities exist 
at the state level. According to the latter, minor party 
votes can be eliminated if they make up a small percentage 
of all votes, they can be counted as major party votes if 
the minor party serves as a local version of a major party 
(as with the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota), 
or they can be combined with major party votes in states 
such as New York where established minor parties endorse 
candidates from the major parties.
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Garand, Parent, and Teague (1989) include third-party 
votes and utilize them in a unique way in their electoral 
college study. Since they use the uniform partisan swing 
approach, their technique is particularly well suited to 
the present study. They hold the minor party vote constant 
when they apply the uniform partisan swing to the major 
party candidates across states. As they point out, "in 
most years, the third party electoral vote remained con­
stant across all hypothetical configurations of the popular 
vote." However, in the cases in which a decrease in the 
vote for a major party candidate winning the state allowed 
the third party candidate to win the state, they "adjusted 
the electoral vote total to reflect the minor party victory 
in that state (1989, 20, n. 5). " In other words, a minor 
party candidate running a close second can be declared the 
"winner" in a hypothetical election should the actual win­
ner's vote percentage decline below that of the third party 
candidate during a hypothetical vote swing.
Following the theory that as little data as possible 
should be excluded, it seems best to include third-party 
candidacies. The Garand, Parent, and Teague approach 
appears to be particularly relevant to the data application 
technique adopted in this study. While it is more the 
exception than the rule, third-party candidates do occa­
sionally garner more than minimal votes and run first or 
second in state legislative elections. However, in cases
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where third-party candidates present a clear pattern of 
running as members of a major party but decide for some 
reason to deviate from their normal party affiliation for 
one election, one could argue that such a person should be 
coded as a member of the major party on whose ticket he or 
she usually runs. It seems reasonable that voters who are 
accustomed to voting for a major party candidate who runs 
as an independent or a third party candidate still see 
themselves as voting for the candidate as a member of his 
or her normal party. In addition, one should expect that a 
candidate who wins election as a minor party candidate but 
who is regularly affiliated with a major party will vote 
with rather than against the major party in roll-call 
voting in the legislature.
Therefore, in cases where the minor party candidate 
runs first or second and recieves more than 10% of the 
district vote, the author examines the preceding and subse­
quent elections. In the three-election series formulated 
by preceding, present, and subsequent elections, the candi­
date is coded as a major party candidate if he or she runs 
as a major party candidate twice or if he or she runs only 
twice and runs once as a major party candidate. The person 
will be coded as a third-party candidate if he or she only 
runs once (and runs as a third-party candidate) or if he or 
she runs at least twice and runs as a minor-party candidate 
two times. In the cases of elections in 1968 and 1986, the
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presumption is taken toward coding the candidate as a 
member of a major party unless the person only runs once 
(and runs as a minor-party candidate) or if he or she runs 
twice as a minor party candidate.
Two states present unique problems in the area of 
third-party candidacies. Minnesota has no candidates from 
the Republican Party or the Democratic Party in elections 
from 1968 to 1974. However, the Minnesota House races do 
have two "minor" parties that contest almost every seat 
during this time period. These two parties are the Demo­
cratic Farmer Labor Party and the Independent Republican 
Party. Neither of these parties are tied to the national 
Democratic or Republican parties, yet candidates from these 
two parties win almost every seat in the state legislature 
during the 1968-74 time period. Despite the fact that 
these parties are statewide parties only, it seems obvious 
that the two parties serve the same general constituencies 
and have the same relative ideological positions as the two 
traditional American parties. Therefore, candidates from 
the Democratic Farmer Labor Party will be coded as Demo­
crats and candidates from the Independent Republican Party 
will be coded as Republicans.
The State of New York also presents some difficulties. 
In New York, individual candidates are often endorsed by 
more than one party. This fact alone is not troubling.
What is problematic is the fact that election returns are
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reported separately for each party's candidate. This means 
that a person who receives more than one party's nomination 
is listed more than once along with his or her vote totals 
from each party ballot. The problem is that a person can 
win the most total votes (and be declared the winner) but 
recieve less than a majority of the major party votes.
For example, if Joe Smith won 15,000 votes from Repub­
lican ballots and 5,000 votes from Conservative Party 
ballots, he would win a total of 20,000 votes. If John 
Brown won 18,000 Democratic ballot votes and 1,000 Liberal 
Party ballot votes, John Brown would have a total of 19,000 
votes. Joe Smith would win the election, but the Democrats 
would have outpolled the Republicans 19,000 to 18,000. 
Perhaps it would be wise to add all votes won by each major 
party candidate and consider them to be major party votes. 
However, this technique would be quite time consuming and 
presents philosophical problems about the intentions of 
voters from the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party. 
There would also be the question of what to do with Conser­
vative and Liberal candidates who run against major party 
opposition from their respective ideological ends of the 
spectrum. For these reasons, it seems most appropriate to 
exclude elections from New York State from the analysis.
Other problems with parties also force the researcher 
to drop Louisiana and Nebraska from the analysis. In the 
case of the former, the advent of open primaries has
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resulted In primary elections that serve as general elec­
tions in most cases. This is not problematic except for 
the fact that the ICPSR has decided to report Louisiana 
general election results in the primary election section of 
the large state legislative data set. For the latter, 
nonpartisan elections make it impossible to measure parti­
san bias and representational form.
Finally, the state of New Hampshire presents the 
researcher with a unique dilemma. In this state, particu­
larly in the early part of the time series, it is common 
for a person to receive the endorsements of, and actually 
run in the general election under the banner of, both major 
parties. In the ICPSR data set, the winning party in such 
a district (despite the fact that the winning and losing 
candidates are the same person) is the party that received 
the most votes. Therefore, if candidate A wins 3,000 votes 
as a Democrat and 5,000 votes as a Republican, the seat is 
considered to be Republican. The decision on how to treat 
these vote percentages is to drop the votes for the losing 
party and keep the votes for the winning party, thus making 
this an uncontested seat. The thinking is that despite the 
fact that the candidate ran under the banner of both par­
ties, he or she was identified by the voters primarily as a 
member of one party. The assumption is that this person 
would behave in the legislature more closely as a member of 
the party from which he or she got the most votes.
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Furthermore, since the person ran only against himself 
or herself, it seems reasonable to treat the district as 
uncontested by the "losing party." The treatment of these 
districts seems valid because when one follows the legisla­
tive election careers of these candidates they always 
either receive the most votes from the same party or 
receive opposition from other candidates endorsed by the 
"losing party" in subsequent elections.
In summary, there are some decisions that have been 
made on how best to treat the data in this dissertation. 
First, uncontested elections are included in the analysis. 
Winners are credited with 100% of the vote and losers are 
given 0% of the vote. This approach to uncontested races 
is simple in application and is satisfying in the sense 
that the researcher can make use of all the available data 
in testing his or her hypotheses. The result of using this 
technique is that election systems may be found to be less 
responsive to partisan vote shifts than would be the case 
if uncontested elections were excluded from the analysis. 
Second, multimember districts are used in this disserta­
tion. The technique is to pair the highest vote winners 
from one party with the lowest vote getters from the oppo­
sition party to create pseudo-single member districts that 
can be analyzed identically to single member districts. 
Finally, third-party candidates are included in this study. 
In cases where individuals who can be identified as major
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party candidates run as third-party candidates as a devia­
tion to their common pattern, they will be recoded as 
candidates of the party from which they typically run.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have discussed the data and the 
methods I use to test the hypotheses concerning representa­
tional form and partisan bias that were explained in Chap­
ter Three. I have described the district-level data on 
state legislative elections from 1968 to 1987 that were 
placed in machine readable format by the ICPSR and that are 
used in this dissertation. Explanation was provided of the 
technique by which a logit model is used to identify repre­
sentational form and partisan bias parameters for 441 state 
legislative elections. Furthermore, I provided a descrip­
tion of the steps that were taken to manipulate the data 
and a brief explanation of how pooled data is employed in 
this study.
In addition, I presented my models that are used to 
explain variation in representational form and partisan 
bias. Representational form is believed to be a function 
of the distribution of partisan votes at the district level 
and election rule variables such as the size of districts 
(by population) and the number of seats in the state. 
Partisan bias is expected to be a function of one party's 
ability to control the redistricting machinery and willing­
ness to redraw district lines to benefit their candidates.
Finally, I detailed the other dilemmas in treating the 
data in this study and the steps that were taken to solve 
these dilemmas. Specifically, I have decided to:
(a) include uncontested elections, awarding the winners 
100% and the losers 0% of the district vote; (b) include 
multimember districts, pairing the highest vote winner from 
one party with the lowest vote winner in the other party to 
create quasi single-member districts; (c) include third- 
party candidates, yet coding third party candidates that 
typically run as major party candidates as members of the 
major party with which they usually affiliate. I also 
discussed the decisions in dealing with party affiliation 
in a handful of states that offered idiosyncracies that 
were relevant to the coding process.
In Chapter Five, I describe the findings concerning 
the parameter values for representational form and partisan 
bias. I provide figures and descriptive comments about the 
frequency of particular values for representational form 
and partisan bias in the aggregate. In addition, I provide 
a detailed analysis of representational form and bias 
values for each election year. I also highlight trends for 
bias and representational form over the time series as a 
whole. I identify the states that produce extremely large 
and extremely small values of representational form and 
partisan bias. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of 
how my findings compare with other studies that have been
173
made uelng the same approach to studying the seats-votes 
relationship.
174
NOTES
1. While it might be noted that the King and Browning 
equation is slightly different from the equation used by 
the majority of practitioners, it should be pointed out 
that the more commonly used log transformation of the Tufte 
linear equation is algebraically equivalent to the equation 
used by King and Browning (Campagna and Grofman 1990, 1244; 
Gryski, Reed, and Elliot 1990, 144-45, 156, n. 3).
2. In order to quantify the average partisan district 
vote, the data must be recoded such that each district is a 
case. A computer program is created which allows the 
researcher to print out the election results by state, by 
year, by district, and by party, respectively, and place 
these data in a file. Next, another program is created 
that reads each district as a three-line set of information 
and converts vote totals to percentages; each line contains 
information on the candidate's name, party, vote total, and 
a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate won or 
lost. The first line of each district contains information 
on Democratic candidates, the second line provides the same 
information on Republican candidates, and the third line 
has information pertaining to third-party candidates, where 
appropriate. In cases in which there are uncontested 
seats, a line must be manually included for each party that 
does not have a candidate running (in which case the pro­
gram reads the relevant candidate's percentage of the vote 
as 0). In addition, for multimember districts this is the 
step in which the largest vote winner from one party is 
paired with the smallest vote winner from the other party 
to create quasi-single member districts. In the multi­
member district cases, the highest third-party vote winner 
is placed in the same quasi-single member district as the 
winner with the lowest vote total. In the rare instances 
in which there are more candidates from a single party 
running in a district than there are seats in the district 
(e.g., two Democrats running in a single-member district), 
the smallest vote winner from the relevant party is deleted 
from the analysis.
3. This index is computed in this study as 1 - (2 * : 
Republican % of two-party vote - .5;). This is the folded 
Ranney index used by Bibby, Cotter, Gibson, and Huckshorn
(1990) and Holbrook and Tidmarch (1991). In this study, of 
course, the index is applied only to mean district-level 
partisan vote in the lower house state legislative elec­
tions in the analysis.
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4. It is because the natural log of bias measures bias as 
deviation from zero that this measure, rather than the 
antilog of the natural log of bias, is used to measure 
partisan bias. Since the hypotheses related to partisan 
bias are tested with the assumption that bias is measured 
as some deviation from zero (i.e., as being positive or 
negative), one must employ the natural log of bias as the 
measure of bias. The antilog of the natural log of bias is 
less acceptable since bias is measured as a deviation from 
one.
5. As noted by Niemi and Jackman (1989, 10), there is a 
bit of circularity in the King approach in that party 
control of the redistricting machinery is determined after 
a content analysis of records of the redistricting has been 
made. Nonetheless, a mechanical coding of the redistrict­
ing by which a party controls two (or three) institutions 
of state government combined with the assumption that all 
court plans will not be biased may miss the nuances of a 
particular redistricting. For the record, Niemi and 
Jackman perform an analysis using the party control of 
government method and the party control of redistricting 
method formulated by King and find very little difference 
in results. In a majority of cases, the redistrictings in 
the states are coded the same regardless of the coding 
approach that is used. In fact, 24 of the 39 (62%) redis­
trictings in the 1970s and 35 of the 49 (71%) redis­
trictings in the 1980s were coded the same (Niemi and 
Jackman, 1989, Tables 1 and 3).
CHAPTER FIVE: A DESCRIPTION OF THE
SEATS-VOTES CURVES
in this chapter, I describe the findings pertaining to 
the values of the representational form and partisan bias 
coefficients for the U. S. state legislative elections in 
this analysis. On one hand, then, this chapter presents 
the results for the first goal of the dissertation. On the 
other hand, this chapter serves as an introduction to the 
next chapter in which the results of the models used to 
explain variation in bias and representational form are 
reported.
At the beginning of the chapter, I display graphically 
a variety of patterns of representational form and partisan 
bias that are found in state legislative elections from 
1968 to 1986. Because the findings concerning representa­
tional form values are especially provacative, I provide 
tables listing the values of representational form parame­
ters by state for each election in the time series. In the 
second section of the chapter, I focus more on the results 
pertaining to representational form. Comparisons are drawn 
between my findings and the findings of other scholars 
studying the seats-votes relationship. I then provide a 
descriptive account of the patterns of representational 
form in each election year. Figures are provided to illus­
trate the trends in representational form (and bias, as 
well) over time.
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In the third section of the chapter, I compare my 
findings related to partisan bias with those of other 
researchers who are concerned with U. s. state legislative 
elections. In addition to discussing these findings, I 
also report the descriptive statistics associated with 
elections in each year. I also discuss the state-by-state 
trends in partisan bias and refer to figures to illustrate 
these trends. Finally, I note the mean levels of represen­
tational form and partisan bias in each state for the time 
series as a whole.
FINDINGS CONCERNING SEATS-VOTES CURVES
As noted earlier, the uniform partisan swing approach 
for studying seats-votes relationships, in conjunction with 
a log-odds model, produces two parameters that are of 
interest in the present research. In addition, one can use 
these approaches and other techniques to visualize this 
relationship between votes and seat allocation. Using the 
uniform partisan swing approach allows the researcher to 
obtain 31 data points. These data points permit one to 
apply a regression model to estimate partisan bias and 
representational form for an election system in a particu­
lar year. One can utilize the parameter estimates to chart 
a new "best fit" seats-votes curve.
In theory, seats-votes relationships can take on an 
infinite number of forms, stated simply, there are a 
number of patterns by which legislative seats change hands
178
from one party to the other in association with changes in 
partisan percent of the vote. Likewise, there is a wide 
range of values that partisan bias can take. Application 
of the techniques previously explained results in a number 
of patterns of partisan bias and representational form in 
U. S. state legislative elections.
Figures 5.1(a) through 5.1(d) show observed and no 
bias seats-votes curves for four elections. These figures 
present actual results taken from the U. S. states and are 
intended to typify the various values for bias and repre­
sentational form that are found in the U. S. states.
Before these seats-votes curves are described, an explana­
tion of how these figures are produced is offered.
To produce a seats-votes curve in a particular state
legislative election, I calculated the percentage of seats
Republicans would win if they win from 35% to 65% of the
vote (inclusive). Applying Equation 4.4 to these data, I 
produce the representational form parameter and the parti­
san bias parameter for the election. I next used the mean 
Republican percentage of the district vote in the election 
to calculate a log-odds ratio:
OREPPCT - REPPCT / (1 - REPPCT) (5.1)
Then, I substituted the representational form value, the 
partisan bias value, and the log-odds ratio into an equa­
tion to produce a predicted value for Republican percentage
Figure 5.1(a):
Seats-Votes Cum. North Dakota 
Houao of Rapresentatives. 1968
Figure 5.1(c):
Soata-Votaa Cum. Utah 
Houaa of Rapraaantativaa, 1984
OWNftMkiifViM
Figure 5.1(b):
Soata-Votaa Curve, Georgia 
House of Representatives. 1984
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i
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Figure 5.1(d):
Seata-Votea Curve, Georgia 
Houae of Representatives, 1980
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of seats for each percentage of the vote won by Republicans 
from 0% to 100%:
STATE1968 - (BIAS) * OREPPCT * FORM (5.2)
A seats-votes curve that Is devoid of partisan bias can be 
produced in a similar manner, except that a value of 1.0 is 
substituted for the bias coefficient in Equation 5.2.
These values for both the "observed" and "no bias" curves 
are then plotted on an x- and y- axis.
As Figures 5.1(a) through 5.1(d) make clear, there is 
a wide variety of levels of representational form and 
partisan bias present in U. S. state legislative elections. 
However, closer scrutiny of the elections allows one to 
make generalizations about the patterns that are revealed 
by the data. Figure 5.1(a) illustrates the results from 
the 1968 election to the North Dakota House of Representa­
tives, Figure 5.1(b) presents results from the Georgia 
House of Representatives election of 1984, Figure 5.1(c) 
shows the seats-votes curves for the 1984 Utah House of 
Representatives election, and Figure 5.1(d) depicts the 
curves for the Georgia House of Representatives election of 
1980. Each of these figures is intended to emphasize a 
different value among the range of values for bias and 
representational form that were discovered to exist among 
the states.
The North Dakota House election in 1968, plotted in 
Figure 5.1(a), is characterized by the largest
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representational form coefficient of any state in the time 
series. The form coefficient of 5.337 indicates that this 
particular election system was very responsive to vote 
changes at the middle range of the distribution. The 
seats-votes curve in this election is even more steep than 
what would be generated in an election conforming to the 
cube law standard of representational form. For example, 
at 40% of the votes. Republicans win only about 13% of the 
seats. However, Republican seat gains rise dramatically 
between the 40% and 60% vote marks. In fact, at 55% of the 
votes Republicans win a whopping 79% of the seats. Inci­
dentally, there is a moderately large bias toward the 
Republicans in this election. Republicans win 56% of the 
seats at 50% of the vote.1
Figure 5.1(b) is used to emphasize an unresponsive 
representational pattern of seats-votes relationship. The 
Georgia House election of 1984 exhibits a representational 
form coefficient, 0.098, that is much lower than the 1.00 
produced by a proportional representation system. The 
extreme lack of responsiveness at most points on the dis­
tribution can be visualized by noting that Republicans gain 
very few seats by moving from 40% of the vote (30% of the 
seats) to 60% of the vote (32% of the seats). In fact, the 
no bias curve in Figure 5.1(b), which charts the respon­
siveness of seat change to vote change assuming the absence 
of partisan bias, is virtually flat except at the points at
182
which Republicans get 0% and 100% of the votes. Of course, 
the difference between the observed curve and the no bias 
curve in Figure 5.1(b) does reveal a large Democratic bias 
in the system. For example, at 50% of the votes the Repub­
licans actually win only 31% of the seats.
Figure 5.1(c) provides a graphic illustration of an 
election bereft of partisan bias. The 1984 Utah House 
election had a representational form that was majoritarian, 
but there was no partisan bias in the system. That is to 
say, the best fit curve of the observed values for seats 
and votes reveals that Republicans receive 50% of the 
legislative seats when they win 50% of the mean district- 
level votes. At some points along the distribution Repub­
licans win more or fewer percentage of seats than votes, 
but any differences are due to the majoritarian nature of 
the seats-votes relationship rather than to partisan bias.
The Georgia House election of 1980 provides a classic 
case of high levels of partisan bias. As one can see from 
examining Figure 5.1(d), there is a large deviation between 
the no bias curve and the observed values curve. This 
election, like the Georgia election of 1984, is interesting 
from the standpoint that the representational form coeffi­
cient is less than 1.0. Though seat changes are very 
unresponsive to vote shifts over much of the distribution 
(including the area near the 50% mark), it is the extremely 
large Democratic bias that makes this election stand out.
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While almost all elections have some degree of bias, the 
graph for the Georgia election of 1980 reveals a tremendous 
level of bias. At 50% of the votes, Republicans win only 
26% of the seats. In fact, to win a majority of seats 
Republicans have to win 96% of the votes. Such a remar­
kable level of bias can perhaps be at least partly attri­
buted to the existence of a large number of victories by 
Democrats who ran uncontested.
When one looks at the mean values of representational 
form for each state reported in Table 5.1, one is struck by 
the proliferation of values that are smaller than 3.0. In 
fact, only four states exhibit coefficients that exceed the 
3.0 value of the classic majoritarian scheme. There are 
three additional states, all in the south, that produce the 
kind of artificially large form coefficient described in 
Chapter Four. It is a testimony to the lack of responsive­
ness to vote changes at much of the seat-vote distribution 
in U. S. state legislative elections that the highest mean 
form parameter for non-southern states is 4.260.
In fact, a few states (11, if one counts the odd 
southern states) have representational form values below 
1.0. With a lack of partisan bias in such an election 
system, the graph of the seats-votes curve would resemble 
the no bias curve in Figure 5.1(b). Such an election 
system could be viewed in two ways.
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Table 5.1. Mean Rap. r o n  and Biti, by state 
State Representational Form Partisan
Alabama 4.209 (0.759)" 0.440 (-0.
Alaska 2.803 0.286
Arizona 1. 480 0.328
Arkansas 7.814 < — ) 0.628 ( —
California 1.725 0.019
Colorado 2 .190 0.169
Connecticut 2.799 0.097
Delaware 2 .287 0.031
Florida 0.862 0.011
Georgia 0.700 (0.202) -0.833 (-0
Hawaii 1. 308 -0.100
Idaho 2.227 0.026
Illinois 0.817 -0.025
Indiana 3.245 0.091
Iowa 2.795 -0.042
Kansas 1.959 0. 032
Kentucky 1.032 -0.134
Maine 1.946 0.192
Maryland 1.2 00 0. 044
Massachusetts 0.843 -0.314
Michigan 1.314 0. 095
Minnesota 2.379 0. 110
Mississippi 6.278 ( — ) 0.596 ( —
Missouri 1. 371 -0.039
Montana 2.488 0.250
Nevada 1.852 0. 006
New Hampshire 1.429 0.078
New Jersey 3.001 0. 117
New Mexico 1.952 0.108
North Carolina 0.904 0.099
North Dakota 4.260 0. 041
Ohio 1.871 0.071
Oklahoma 0. 607 -0.238
Oregon 2.448 0.015
Pennsylvania 1.654 0. 110
Rhode Island 1.911 0.003
South Carolina 1.536 (0.595) -0.215 (-0
South Dakota 3.477 -0.115
Tennessee 0.834 -0.028
Texas 0.553 -0.338
Utah 2.759 0.045
Virginia 0.890 -0.057
Washington 2 .169 0. 073
West Virginia 2.081 0. 281
Wisconsin 1.780 0.023
Wyoming 2.578 -0.208
"Mean form and bias after dropping 24 problem elections
Bias
341)
-)
. 875)
)
375)
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First, one could bemoan the lack of responsiveness in 
an election system that has a representational form value 
of less than 1.0. Such a system could perhaps be charac­
terized by incumbents who, because of a lack of party 
competition (particularly in the South) or beneficial 
reapportionment schemes, rarely receive a serious challenge 
in general elections. In fact, most states have coeffi­
cients in the 1.00 to 3.00 range. The majority of the 
states, therefore, do have election systems that are 
slightly majoritarian.
On the other hand, however, if the representational 
form coefficient is only slightly less than 1.0, an argu­
ment could be made that the election system is more clearly 
responsive to public opinion than is a highly majoritarian 
system. A system that is nearly proportional places in the 
legislature a ratio of partisans that more nearly reflects 
the partisan nature of the vote than does a majoritarian 
system. Nonetheless, extremely unresponsive systems like 
Texas (0.553), Oklahoma (0.607), South Carolina (0.595) and 
Georgia (0.202) call into question the utility of voters 
changing their voting patterns. For example, few demo­
cratic theorists would praise the Oklahoma system in 1980 
when Republicans would have won 30% of the seats at 3 5% of 
the vote and only 40% of the seats at 65% of the vote.
The figures in Appendix A illustrate the representa­
tional form values of each election in the 46 states from
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1968 to 1987. As one can see in Appendix A, most values 
clearly fall into the 1.00 to 3.00 range. On the whole, 
one could suggest that u. s. state election systems are 
slightly majoritarian in nature. That is to say, in most 
elections, seat changes are more responsive to partisan 
vote shifts in the competitive range than is the case in a 
proportional system. However, seat changes in the competi­
tive range in these elections are less responsive to vote 
shifts than would be the case in the classic "cube law" 
electoral system.
Of course, there are some elections that deviate from 
the general trend. On one hand, approximately half the 
states have at least one election in the time series in 
which the representational form value is larger than 3.00. 
On the other hand, however, 15 states have at least two 
elections where representational form values fall below 
1.00; in fact, most of these states have at least two 
elections where the values are lower than 0.67. Even the 
most ardent advocate of the concept of proportional repre­
sentation might be disturbed by the lack of responsiveness 
in the latter election systems.
A word should be added about a number of election 
systems in southern states. It was the case in 417 of the 
441 elections in this analysis that neither party would win 
100% of the seats when Republicans would win between 35% 
and 65% of the votes (inclusive). In 24 election systems
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in 5 southern states. Republicans would win 100% of the 
seats at some point in the 35% to 65% range of votes. The 
reason Republicans could have won all the seats within this 
range of votes is because so few Republicans ran in the 
actual elections that a 51% uniform vote swing gave Repub­
licans all the seats. This phenomenon creates the illusion 
that such election systems are extremely responsive to vote 
shifts, when in fact they are not. High representational 
forms in these election systems result from the fact that 
Republicans won 0% of the vote in the majority of dis­
tricts! An example of this phenomenon took place in the 
Arkansas election of 1972.
A look at the raw data from 1972 reveals that Arkansas 
Republicans actually won 0.8% of the votes and 1.0% of the 
seats. When one implements the uniform partisan vote swing 
(and this is before any regressions are run), one finds 
that Republicans win only 2% of the seats when they win 35% 
of the votes. However, by the time the vote swing toward 
Republicans gives the party 65% of the votes they win 100% 
of the seats. On closer inspection, one finds that Repub­
licans actually win 100% of the seats when they win only 
52% of the mean district level vote!
There are two relevant results of using uniform parti­
san swing on the 1972 Arkansas election system. First, an 
extremely large representational form coefficient (10.974) 
is produced simply because Republicans win 23% of the seats
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at 51% of the vote and 100% of the seats at 52% of the 
vote. As noted earlier, however, this extreme level of 
responsiveness is due to the fact that most Republicans had 
0% of the vote in the first place. Second, this election 
system and those that are similar to it produce high levels 
of Republican bias. It is true that Democrats win more 
seats (77%) at the 50% mark than do Republicans (23%). 
However, at most points on the graph Democrats are at a 
disadvantage. At the point in which each party wins 40% of 
the vote, Republicans win 12% of the seats while Democrats 
win no seats. In fact, while Republicans win all the seats 
when they win 52% of the votes, Democrats do not win all 
the seats at any point in the 50% to 65% range.
Because of the unique nature of election systems in 
which the minority party wins all the seats at a small 
percentage of the vote, these election systems will be 
reported in all the relevant tables but will be excluded 
from the discussion. These elections will also be excluded 
from the data analysis. However, the consequences of 
including the data in the data analysis will be discussed 
in relevant footnotes in Chapter Six.1 A more extensive 
discussion of the representational form values will be 
provided in the next section; a subsequent examination of 
the values for partisan bias will follow this discussion of 
representational form.
DISTRIBUTION OF BIAS AND FORM VALUES
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Distribution of Representational Form Values
Figure 5.2(a) illustrates the aggregate distribution 
of representational form values. Representational form 
ranges from 0.098 (Georgia, 1984) to 5.3 37 (North Dakota, 
1968). The mean for the form coefficient is 1.855. The 
median value for representational form is 1.751. Over 50% 
of the values for representational form fall between 1.00 
and 2.50, with 20% of the values ranging from 1.50 to 2.00. 
The standard deviation of the aggregate distribution of 
mean form values is 1.022. Surprisingly, 22% of the elec­
tions exhibit form coefficients that are less than 1.0. 
These figures are indicative of the fact that U. S. state 
legislative election systems as a whole are slightly majo­
ritarian in the manner in which seats are allocated on the 
basis of votes.
This finding is somewhat surprising. Considering the 
fact that plurality winner rules are in effect in U. S. 
state legislative election districts, one might expect that 
representational form values would be larger. One explana­
tion for these low representatational form values is the 
fact that uncontested elections are included in the analy­
sis. The presence of a large number of uncontested elec­
tions means that only vote shifts of 50% plus one vote 
would cause the relevant seats to change from one party to 
the other; this is why responsiveness in many of these
Figure 5.2(a):
Representational Form, 
1968-1987
100
Mn h  -  1.855 Mad. -  1.751 S. 0. = 1.022 
Mm . -  5.337 (North Dakota, 19681 
Mki. -  0.096 (Goorgte. 1984)
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elections is enhanced at the extremes or "tails" of the 
distribution rather than in the middle.
The representational form values for these state 
legislative elections are similar to findings pertaining to 
representational form patterns in previous research on 
state legislative elections. The results, on the whole, 
exhibit values that are close to the values produced by 
Campagna and Grofman (1990a) and Niemi and Jackman (1991) 
in their studies of state legislative elections. The 
representational form values are smaller than the 42 state 
study of Gryski, Reed, and Elliot (1990), however.
The representational form values in my study tend to 
be comparable to, or slightly smaller than the form values 
produced in studies of Congress. Dahl (1956), Tufte 
(1973), and Taagepera and Shugart (1989) find larger 
representational form parameter values in congressional 
elections. However, recent studies that deal with congres­
sional elections over time (King 1990, King and Gelman 
1991) and individual congressional elections (Campagna and 
Grofman 1990b) produce representational form values similar 
to those found in my study.
There are additional comparisons that can be made with 
other studies. Garand and Parent (1991) find a highly 
majoritarian pattern of representation operating in the 
U. S. electoral college system. Ansolabahere and King
(1991) report representational form parameters in
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presidential primary selection processes that are more 
majoritarian than the patterns found in this dissertation. 
However, Geer's (1986) study of presidential primaries 
revealed patterns that resemble the state legislative 
election results reported in this study.
While the representational form values in my study are 
comparable to those of other work on U. S. state legisla­
tures, there are some differences. What accounts for the 
differences in findings between my study and the works of 
previous researchers? Methodological differences and 
different cases used in previous analyses account for 
discrepancies in findings. Niemi and Jackman (1991) use 
the multiyear historical data collection approach in their 
study of 47 state legislatures. Campagna (1991) and Cam­
pagna and Grofman (1990a) study 15 states that had only 
single-member district elections throughout the time series 
(thereby excluding all 11 former Confederate states). In 
addition, Campagna and Campagna and Grofman use the uniform 
partisan swing method but only examine data points from 40% 
to 60% of the Democratic vote rather than examining the 
seats-votes curve between 35% and 65% of one of the party's 
votes. Gryski, Reed, and Elliott (1990) use the multiyear 
historical method of data collection, study elections from 
1976 to 1984, and exclude uncontested races from their 
analysis.
193
Figures 5.2(b) to 5.2(k) illustrate the distribution 
of representational form in the respective even-numbered 
election years. An examination of the distribution of 
representational form coefficients in each of these even- 
numbered election years reveals certain patterns and 
trends. There is a nearly linear trend toward lower repre­
sentational form values over time. In fact, the correla­
tion between the mean value of representational form and a 
trend variable is -0.275 (p < .001). The median value of 
form registers a similar decline. The largest median 
representational form value, 2.471, occurs in 1972. After 
1972, each successive two-year cycle produces a decline in 
median form (except for 1982) until the median value falls 
to 1.281 in 1986. Furthermore, though the pattern is 
irregular, the standard deviation of the mean value of 
representational form declines over time. Thus, there is a 
pattern of decreasing representational form values that is 
becoming more uniform over time.
The distribution of representational form in 1968 is 
somewhat different from the aggregate distribution of form. 
Figure 5.2(b) depicts this pattern. The mean of the form 
coefficient in 1968, 2.319, is the largest mean value found 
in the time series. The median form value is 2.237 for 
this year. In addition, the standard deviation of the form 
values across states is the largest for all elections 
(1.279). While almost 20% of the form values fall between
Figure 5.2(b):
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Figure 5.2(d):
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Figure 5.2(j):
Representational Form, 1984
Figure 5.2(k):
Representational Form, 1986
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1.0 and 1.50, there are a number of elections that exhibit 
relatively large representational form values. A majority 
(61%) of the election systems produce form values between
1.0 and 3.0. The highest representational form parameter, 
5.337, is found in North Dakota. The North Dakota election 
for 1968 exhibits the highest representational form parame­
ter of all the elections in this study. Furthermore, North 
Dakota produces the largest representational form value in 
each even-numbered election year except 1970 and 1976. The 
lowest coefficient for this election year occurs in Texas 
(0.365).3
Figure 5.2(c) shows a more narrow dispersion of repre­
sentational form values in 1970 (standard deviation of 
1.111) than in 1968. In addition, the mean value for form 
in 1970 declines to 2.079. The median value also drops to 
2.219. The decline in standard deviation as the mean value 
for form declines means that there is a uniform shift to a 
more proportional seats-votes pattern in most state elec­
tions. Still, the overall decline in form values is small. 
In fact, over 50% of elections range from 1.50 to 3.50, 
with 20% categorized in the 3.0 to 3.50 range. However, 
the percentage of elections that have form values of 1.0 or 
lower increases from 13.9% in 1968 to 23.1% in 1970. The 
most majoritarian system in this year is experienced in 
Indiana (5.072). The lowest representational form parame­
ter value is once again found in Georgia (0.286).
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In Figure 5.2(d), one finds that values for represen­
tational form increase somewhat in 1972 and are more widely 
dispersed than in 1970. The mean value for form is 2.285; 
the median value, 2.471, is the largest for the time 
series. The standard deviation is 1.144. Exactly 50% of 
the form coefficients are between 2.0 and 3.50. The value 
in North Dakota is 5.063. Georgia again produces the lowest 
coefficient, 0.107.
In 1974, as illustrated in Figure 5.2(e), the mean 
(2.030) and median (1.898) of representational form 
decrease in what eventually becomes a precipitous decline. 
Thus, after 1974, the majoritarian nature of the aggrega­
tion of election systems becomes smaller (i.e., election 
systems are more proportional). As shown in the figure, 
over 56% of the values range between 1.0 and 2.50, with 
23.1% falling between 1.50 and 2.0. The standard deviation 
in this election year is 1.024. The highest representa­
tional form is 4.797. The lowest form coefficient is the 
0.565 value produced in Massachusetts.
Figure 5.2(f), depicting the form distribution in 
1976, is a peculiar election year. The mean value of the 
form coefficients is 1.975 and the median value is 1.891; 
57.9% of the elections exhibit form parameters of between 
1.50 and 3.0. However, the standard deviation of 1.151 is 
the second highest measure of dispersion found in the time 
series. The wide dispersion is evidenced by the fact that
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23.7% of states had values less than 1.0 (with North Caro­
lina exhibiting a coeffient of 0.158), but 5.3% of the 
states had values larger than 5.0. The highest value in 
this election year was the 5.323 experienced by South 
Dakota.
As can be seen by examining Figure 5.2(g), the respon­
siveness of elections at the competitive range of the 
distribution declines again in 1978. The mean representa­
tional form value is only 1.716 and the median form coeffi­
cient is 1.749. As indicated in the figure, 26% of the 
form values fall between 1.50 and 2.0; 58% are between 1.0 
and 2.5. This election year produces the smallest standard 
deviation of any election year except for 1986, 0.816.
Thus, elections in this year almost universally exhibited a 
less majoritarian representational pattern than in prece­
ding years. The largest representational form coefficient 
is only 3.881. North Carolina is once again the state with 
the lowest representational form coefficient with a value 
of 0.238.
Figure 5.2(h) shows that representational form pat­
terns become more proportional with the coming of the 
1980s. The mean value for the form parameter in 1980 is 
slightly larger than what one would find in a proportional 
system: 1.680. The median form value, 1.692, is compar­
able. The pattern is similar to that for 1978, with fully 
two-thirds of the form values falling between 1.0 and 2.50.
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This distribution translates into a standard deviation of 
0.871. The 4.175 representational form coefficient found 
in North Dakota is the only value greater than 4.0. As is 
the case for the remainder of the time series, Georgia has 
the lowest representational form coefficient (0.143).
In 1982 , mean representational form rises to 1.736 and 
the median form coefficient increases to 1.703. Figure 
5.2(i) indicates that 44% of elections have form coeffi­
cients between 1.50 and 2.50; another 20% are between 1.0 
and 1.5. The standard deviation for this set of elections 
is 0.835. The highest value for the representational form 
coefficient is 3.952. The lowest value for representa­
tional form is 0.215.
In Figure 5.2(j), one can observe that 63% of elec­
tions in 1984 produce representational form coefficients in 
the 1.0 to 2.50 range. The mean form value for this elec­
tion year is 1.532, and the median value of form is 1.493. 
Almost one-fourth of these elections, however, have form 
coefficient values between 1.0 and 1.50; the standard 
deviation is 0.824. Amazingly, North Dakota is the only 
state that has an election in which the value for the form 
coefficient exceeds 3.5 (3.634). Once again, Georgia has 
the lowest value for a form coefficient in this election 
(0.098).
Figure 5.2(k) illustrates form coefficient values for 
the last election in the time series. As noted earlier,
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the mean value for representational form (1.403), the 
median form values (1.281), and the standard deviation of 
the mean (0.644) reach their lowest points in the time 
series in 1986. Over 50% of elections in this year (53.6% 
to be exact) have form coefficient values ranging between
1.0 and 2.0. The largest value for a form coefficient in 
this election year is only 3.164. The coefficient for 
Georgia is 0.199. These low representational form coeffi­
cients indicate that at most points on the seats-votes 
curve, a one percent change in district partisan vote will 
result in only slightly more than a one percent change in 
partisan seat allocation in the legislature.
In addition to the figures cited above, Figures B.l to 
B.41, displayed in Appendix B, provide graphic illustration 
of the trend toward lower representational form coefficient 
scores over time in each state. The vast majority of 
states exhibit clear declines in form over time. Only 
eight or nine states have rising form values. There does 
not seem to be strong regional patterns to these trends, 
although southern and border states (Oklahoma, Florida, 
Texas, and Virginia) may be overrepresented among the 
states in which representational form declines over time.
These findings generally corroborate the findings of 
Campagna and Grofman (1990a), King (1989), and Niemi and 
Jackman (1991). Some factor (or factors) is (are) causing 
elections to exhibit a less majoritarian pattern over time.
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In fact, as noted in the above paragraphs, representational 
form coefficients become so low that only North Dakota has 
an election system in which seat changes are as responsive 
in the competitive range as are election systems having a 
"cube law" majoritarian pattern. In the next chapter, part 
of the discussion will center on what variables are affect­
ing representational form in u. s. state legislative elec­
tions .
Distribution of Partisan Bias Values
As is the case with representational form values, it 
is possible to analyze the distribution of the partisan 
bias values in these state legislative elections. This 
section contains a description of the findings pertaining 
to partisan bias. A trend toward Democratic bias (or more 
precisely, away from Republican bias) is evident 
(r “ -0.12, p < .05), but the correlation between bias and 
the "trend" variable is much weaker than the correlation 
between representational form and the "trend" variable.
The trend for the median value of partisan bias closely 
follows the trend for the mean bias value.
Figure 5.3(a) shows the aggregate distribution of 
partisan bias for the years 1968 to 1987. As a whole, the 
findings for bias are similar to the direction of partisan 
bias found in Campagna and Grofman (1990) and Niemi and 
Jackman (1991). However, the findings are less similar to 
those of Gryski, Reed, and Elliott (1990) and King (1989).
Figure 5.3(a):
Partisan Bias, 1968-1987
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Interestingly enough, my results indicate that more states 
have Republican biases than do other studies, with the 
possible exception of Niemi and Jackman (1991).
It should be noted that the bias coefficient in the 
logit equation measures bias as a deviation from 1.0.
Thus, to put the bias coefficient in a format where Demo­
cratic bias is negative and Republican bias is positive 
(i.e, bias as deviation from 0), one must transform the 
bias coefficient produced from the estimate of Equation 3.4 
by taking its antilog (exponent). After performing this 
transformation, one finds in Figure 5.3(a) that the mean 
bias for all elections is 0.004, indicating a very small 
bias in favor of the Republicans. The median value for 
bias, 0.035, illustrates a slightly larger level of Repub­
lican bias. Approximately 57% of the bias coefficients 
are in the Republican direction. The standard deviation 
for this distribution is 0.247. The largest Democratic 
bias for the time series is -1.040, found in Georgia in 
1980. The largest bias in favor of Republicans is the 
0.615 found in Arizona in 1974. Republican biases exist in 
57% of the elections in the analysis and Democratic biases 
are found in 42% of the elections. These findings indicate 
that, even after controlling for representational form, 
Republicans tend to win more seats at any particular vote 
percentage than do Democrats at the same vote percentage.
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Figures 5.3(b) through 5.3(k) illustrate the distri­
bution of bias in elections in even-numbered years. The 
values can also be found in tabular form categorized by 
state and by year in Appendix C. Figure 5.3(b) shows that 
in the 1968 election, 61% of the elections have bias coef­
ficients in the Republican direction, with 36% falling 
between 0.0 and 0.15. The mean value for bias is -0.004 
and the median bias is 0.074. The standard deviation for 
the distribution in this year is 0.223. While over 61% of 
these elections have a Republican bias, the states with 
Democratic biases have biases of very large magnitude. The 
large magnitude of Democratic biases in this year and in 
almost every other election year accounts for the fact that 
mean biases are sometimes in the direction of the Democrats 
even though most elections have a Republican bias. For 
example, in 1968, Georgia produces the largest Democratic 
bias (-0.749); at the same time the largest Republican 
bias, only 0.305, occurs in Kansas.
The 1970 election is also biased toward the Republi­
cans in most states. The mean bias is 0.018, the median 
bias coefficient is 0.031, and the standard deviation is 
0.268. The standard deviation, the second largest in the 
time series, indicates that the bias toward the Republicans 
is not very uniform across states. As can be seen in 
Figure 5.3(c), two-thirds of elections in 1970 have bias 
parameters of between -0.15 and 0.30, but two elections
Figure 5.3(b):
Partisan Bias. 1968
Figure 5.3(d):
Partisan Bias. 1972
Figure 5.3(c):
Partisan Bias, 1970
Figure 5.3(e):
Partisan Bias, 1974
Figure 5.3(f):
Partisan Bias. 1976
Figure 5.3(h):
Partisan Bias. 1980
Figure 5.3(g):
Partisan Bias, 1978
Figure 5.3(i):
Partisan Bias, 1982
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Figure 5.3(j):
Partisan Bias. 1984
Figure 5.3(k):
Partisan Bias. 1986
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have Democratic biases that exceed -0.45. Another indica­
tion of the lack of uniformity of the biases in 1970 is the 
fact that the number of states having a Democratic bias 
rose from 39% in 1968 to 44% in 1970, yet the mean bias 
moved in the direction of the Republicans. There were four 
elections (as opposed to 1 in 1968) in which Republican 
bias exceeded 0.30; the largest of these biases —  0.555 —  
occurred in Montana. The largest Democratic bias is the 
-0.880 found in Georgia.
In 1972, the mean bias coefficient grows to 0.085, 
indicating the largest mean Republican bias found in the 
time series. The median bias, 0.103, is also quite large. 
The standard deviation is almost average, 0.241. Figure 
5.3(d) illustrates that over one-third of the elections in 
1972 have a bias of between 0.0 and 0.15, while another 29% 
have biases between 0.15 and 0.30. Overall, Republicans 
benefit from bias in an astounding 79% of elections in this 
year. There are five Republican bias values that exceed 
0.30, with the largest bias existing once again in Montana 
(0.474). The largest Democratic bias is the -1.038 value 
generated in Georgia.
Figure 5.3(e) reveals that the 1974 elections (judging 
from the mean bias values) begins a trend toward elections 
becoming more biased toward the Democrats. The high levels 
of Republican bias produced in the 1972 elections are only 
slightly lower in 1974, but the trend noted above has its
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genesis in this year. The mean value of bias declines to 
0.075 and the standard deviation decreases dramatically to 
0.218. While the median bias becomes even more biased 
toward the Republicans (0.108, the highest in the time 
series), this value will decline dramatically (as will the 
mean value) in 1976. Thus, this year includes elections 
that are uniformally biased toward the Republicans. As in 
1972, the majority of elections exhibit bias coefficients 
ranging from 0.0 to 0.30. Fully 69% of elections are 
biased in favor of the Republicans. Texas is the state 
with the highest levels of Democratic bias (-0.532). The 
state with the largest Republican bias in this election is 
Arizona (0.615).
Bias in the 1976 election swings dramatically toward 
the Democrats. In fact, the mean of the biases in this 
year is -0.011. As in 1970, however, approximately 55% of 
the elections were biased toward the Republicans. Again, 
the median bias value, 0.037, deviates from the mean bias 
value due to a few elections that have extremely large 
Democratic biases. The standard deviation, 0.244, is close 
to the mean standard deviation for the time series. As can 
be seen in Figure 5.3(f), the majority of elections exhibit 
bias coefficients that fall between -0.15 and 0.30. Texas 
again produces a large Democratic bias of -0.598; in con­
trast, the largest Republican bias is the 0.440 experienced 
in Colorado.
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In 1978, the mean bias parameter value is 0.021 and 
the median bias value is 0.024. The standard deviation, 
0.216 is tied for the smallest for any election year in the 
time series. This year, therefore, produces almost unifor­
mally high levels of Republican bias. Figure 5.4(g) shows 
that the Democrats receive a bias in 47% of these elections 
and the Republicans benefit from a bias in the other 53%.
In addition, fully 73.6% of all these elections produce a 
bias between -0.30 and 0.15. Incidentally, this is one of 
the few election years in which Republican biases seem to 
be larger than Democratic biases. No Democratic bias 
exceeds -0.45, but two Republican elections produce biases 
larger than 0.45. The largest of the two extreme Republi­
can biases occurs in Idaho. Texas again has the election 
most biased toward the Democrats (-0.405).
The 1980s are ushered in by a year of state legisla­
tive elections that resume the trend toward more mean bias 
in favor of the Democrats. The mean bias parameter value 
is -0.007 in 1980. However, this slight Democratic bias is 
certainly not uniform as is illustrated by the standard 
deviation of 0.324 (the largest in the time series). In 
addition, the median value of representation, 0.061, indi­
cates that most states actually produce a bias that is 
moving more strongly in the direction of the Republicans.
It can be seen in Figure 5.3(h) that 64% of elections have 
bias values ranging from -0.15 to 0.30, but there are a
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large number of extreme bias values in this election. As 
usual, the Democratic biases are larger in magnitude than 
the Republican biases. The large Democratic biases, led by 
the -1.040 in Georgia (the largest in the time series), 
accounts for the fact that there is a mean Democratic bias 
even though Republicans are the beneficiaries of bias in 
56.4% of these elections. Once again, the deviation 
between the mean bias and the median bias is great. The 
Republican bias of strongest magnitude, 0.521, is experi­
enced in Alaska.
Figure 5.3(i) reveals the distributional pattern of 
bias in the 1982 elections. The mean value of the bias 
coefficients, -0.016, again rises in favor of the Democrats 
in 1982. Furthermore, the median bias, 0.009 (the one 
closest to zero in the time series), also registers a shift 
toward the Democrats. The standard deviation for the bias 
distribution —  0.255 —  is still quite large. Over 60% of 
the elections in this year have bias parameters ranging 
from 0.15 to -0.15; in fact, Democrats actually benefit 
from bias in 49% of these elections. Once again, some 
Democratic values are extremely large, paticularly in 
Georgia (-0.886). The most biased Republican election is 
in Alaska; the coefficient in this election is 0.530.
In 1984, the trend toward more Democratic bias is 
again temporarily sidetracked. The mean value of the bias 
parameter is 0.002 and the median value is 0.050 in this
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election year. These elections produce the mean bias value 
that is closest to zero. The standard deviation is 0.232. 
Figure 5.3(j) illustrates the relative lack of bias by 
showing that 65% of the elections have bias values ranging 
from 0.15 to -0.15. In this election year, the partisan 
bias split in elections is 57.5% to 42.5% in favor of 
Republicans. While Georgia is still the state having the 
election most biased toward the Democrats, the coefficient 
in the Georgia election of 1984 is the lowest of the large 
Democratic biases since 1978: -0.809. In addition, the
Republican bias in Alaska, 0.402, is the third smallest of 
the large Republican biases.
Finally, by 1986, the pro-Democratic bias trend in 
these elections reaches its zenith. The mean of the party 
bias coefficient is -0.096 and the median bias value 
is -0.029. The standard deviation is also tied with the 
1978 standard deviation as the lowest in the time series,
0.216. As can be seen in Figure 5.3(k), 61% of 1986 elec­
tions have bias coefficients in the range of -0.15 to 0.15. 
Additionally, for the first time in any election year, 
Democrats benefit from bias in over 50% of the elections 
(63%, to be exact). The -0.726 produced in Georgia is the 
most biased toward the Democrats. The highest Republican 
bias, 0.312, is found in West Virginia.
Although there is a consistent Republican bias present 
in U. S. state legislative elections, this advantage varies
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from year to year and, of course, from state to state. As 
noted earlier, there is a trend in bias in this time series 
toward the Democrats. Two other tendencies should perhaps 
be noted.
First, in three of the four presidential election 
years from 1972 to 1984, the standard deviation of the 
distribution of bias values has been below the mean for the 
time series. In addition, in these same three years, party 
bias has moved toward the party winning the presidency. In 
1972 and 1984, two years in which Republican candidates won 
the presidency, there were relatively large, uniform shifts 
in partisan bias toward Republican state legislative candi­
dates. If one examines the median rather than the mean 
values for bias. Republicans also benefitted from a shift 
in bias in 1980. Similarly, in 1976, there was a large, 
fairly uniform shift in bias toward the Democrats. These 
observations may suggest that national forces operated to 
improve the fortunes of state legislative candidates apart 
from any redistricting effects.
Second, there may be tentative support for the hypo­
thesis that gerrymandering effects on partisan bias are 
present. The largest number of elections that immediately 
follow redistricting occur in 1972, 1974, 1982, and 1984. 
The standard deviation of the mean bias for these years is 
larger than average for 1970, 1980, and 1982. Furthermore, 
the standard deviations for elections between these
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important redistricting years (1974-1978 and 1984-1986) are 
much lower. Such a decline in standard deviations after 
redistricting could indicate that redistricting does bene­
fit the party controlling the redistricting process but 
that the bias benefit is short-lived. Thus, Democrats 
benefit from bias when they control redistricting and the 
opposite is true for Republican-controlled states. As the 
decade progresses, however, it may be that the redis­
tricting effects decrease, thus causing the bias values of 
each party and the standard deviation for these election 
years to decline.
Figures B.l to B.41, in Appendix B, illustrate the 
trends in partisan bias for each state. Approximately 60- 
65% of the states show clear trends in bias favoring the 
Democrats. Approximately 20% show trends in bias toward 
the Republicans. A number of states, perhaps 10-15, have 
irregular trends. Examples of the latter include Connecti­
cut, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Iowa, Kansas, and 
Wisconsin. The only regional patterns that emerge are that 
states in the Midwest seem to have the least clear trend 
pattern and states in the South seem to have trends toward 
even more Democratic bias in their elections. Standard 
deviations of these elections do decline in value over 
time, however, suggesting that extreme biases are becoming 
less commonplace (particularly for Democrats).
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Returning to Table 5.1, one finds the mean values of 
representational form and partisan bias for each state. 
Aside from the aforementioned southern states, North Dakota 
and South Dakota have the highest mean representational 
form coefficients, 4.260 and 3.477, respectively. Texas 
(0.553) and Oklahoma (0.607) produce elections with the 
lowest mean value of representational form. In the aggre­
gate (and excluding the five Deep South states), 17 of the 
41 states have mean values larger than 2.0. There are 16 
states in which the mean representational form value is 
between 1.00 and 2.00 and 8 states in which the mean repre­
sentational form value is less than 1.0. Once again, the 
slightly majoritarian nature of the seats-votes relation­
ship is clearly evident in these figures. However, two 
states other than North Dakota and South Dakota —  Indiana 
(3.245) and New Jersey (3.001) —  had mean representational 
form coefficient values that were higher than 3.00.
In general, the representational form values may well 
correspond to levels of district party competition. New 
Jersey and North Dakota, two states with high values of 
representational form, certainly are known as strong two- 
party states (Bibby, et al 1990, 92). The low values of 
representational form found in the southern states and in 
Massachusetts may well reflect the fact that Democrats tend 
to win by such large margins that a small shift in the
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partisan vote percentage would have very little effect on 
the aggregate partisan distribution of seats.
In Illinois, the only non-southern state other than 
Massachusetts that has low representational form values, 
the low values do not reflect a lack of partisan competi­
tion at the state level but do, perhaps, reflect a lack of 
party competition at the district level. In the case of 
Illinois from 1968 to 1980, for example, each district was 
a three-member multimember district in which each voter was 
given three votes. The voters could cast their three 
ballots for the same candidate, give one vote to three 
different candidates, or divide their three votes among two 
candidates (i.e., each of the two candidates would win 1.5 
votes). For tactical reasons, it was common for each party 
to nominate two candidates, thus ensuring that (in my 
transformation of multimember districts into quasi single­
member districts) many seats were uncontested (Inter­
university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
1989, 27).
As for partisan bias, 29 states (excluding Alabama, 
Arkansas, and Mississippi), have a mean partisan bias in 
the direction of the Republicans and 12 (excluding Georgia 
and South Carolina) have a mean partisan bias that favors 
Democrats. Arizona has the largest Republican bias, 0.328. 
The second highest level of Republican bias is found in 
Alaska (0.286). Of the states with a Democratic bias,
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Texas has the largest mean coefficient (-0.338) and Massa­
chusetts has the second largest mean parameter value 
(-0.314).
By and large, it seems that partisan bias exists in 
direction and magnitude roughly in proportion to the tradi­
tional electoral strength of the parties in the various 
states. For example, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, 
Texas, and Hawaii, which have long been Democratic strong­
holds, have high levels of partisan bias in favor of the 
Democrats. States in which Republican candidates for 
national, state, and local offices tend to do well —  
Colorado, Montana, Alaska, and Arizona —  are states with 
high levels of Republican bias.
There are some exceptions to the general rule that 
partisan bias tends to accompany party electoral strength 
in a state. West Virginia and Maryland, states generally 
thought to be Democratic bases, register party biases 
toward the Republicans (a large Republican bias in West 
Virginia). Likewise, Wyoming and South Dakota, two tradi­
tionally Republican states have large Democratic biases. 
While the reason for these four exceptions is not readily 
apparent, it could be the case that minority party voters 
waste fewer votes than voters from the majority party by 
electing a relatively large number of legislators in mino­
rity party districts while casting a relatively small 
number of votes across all districts. It may also be the
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case that state legislators in the majority party do not 
feel the need to engage in gerrymandering since they tend 
to overwhelm their minority party opponents without manipu­
lating district boundaries.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, a description of the values of repre­
sentational form and partisan bias in legislative elections 
in 46 U. S. states has been provided. After excluding 
elections from five southern states, the results indicate 
that when one includes uncontested elections and analyzes 
the seat-vote relationship between 35% and 65% of the mean 
Republican vote on the seats-votes curve, U. S. state 
legislative election systems are slightly majoritarian in 
nature. Host election systems are somewhat more responsive 
to vote changes in the middle of the seats-votes distribu­
tion than are proportional representation systems. Fur­
thermore, there is a clear trend toward less majoritarian 
election outcomes over time.
In general, election systems are more majoritarian in 
the Northeastern states and the upper Midwest and Great 
Plain states and less majoritarian in the South. However, 
Illinois and Massachusetts are examples of non-southern 
state having elections with extremely low values for repre­
sentational form. The findings for representational form 
do not deviate greatly from the results of other studies 
dealing with seats-votes relationships in the U. S. states.
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However, my findings do tend to produce slightly lower 
coefficients than one finds in other studies. This slight 
deviation in findings is probably due to my decision to 
include uncontested elections in the analysis.
The generation of bias coefficient values for the 
states also produces some interesting results. It was 
found that 57% of the elections were biased toward the 
Republicans and 42% of elections produced Democratic 
biases. Translating these election results to mean levels 
for each state over the time series, one finds that 29 
states have elections with Republican biases and 12 states 
have elections that are biased toward the Democrats. The 
magnitude of these biases varies greatly across states. 
Democratic biases are frequent in most southern states and 
are quite large in Oklahoma, Texas, and Kentucky. Large 
Republican biases are frequently found in western states, 
although West Virginia and Maine also tend to have elec­
tions with large Republican biases.
What can explain the variation in representational 
form and partisan bias across states and across time? Do 
election rules have an effect on representational form or 
can form patterns be explained by the partisan nature of 
the district-level votes? Does redistricting have an 
effect on the level of partisan bias or is there some other 
causal explanation for the patterns that are observed?
These questions will be explored in Chapter Six.
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NOTES
1. Partisan bias can occur at any point on the seats-votes 
curve. For instance, a system could be determined to be 
biased if Republicans won 60% of the vote and 70% of the 
seats while Democrats won 60% of the vote and 65% of the 
seats. Nonetheless, the discussion is centered on the 50% 
point since many researchers prefer to discuss bias at 50% 
of the vote distribution.
2. The 24 elections that are excluded are the Alabama 
elections of 1970, 1974, 1978, and 1982; all 10 elections 
in Arkansas; the Georgia elections of 1974, 1976, and 1978; 
all 5 elections in Mississippi; and the South Carolina 
elections of 1968 and 1978.
3. It should be noted that the descriptive statistics and 
discussions pertaining to individual election years exclude 
those elections that are held in odd-numbered years. To 
include these elections would have involved recoding the 
elections held in odd-numbered years in the relevant states 
to even-numbered years. The decision to exclude these 
elections in the discussion affects only four states: 
Alabama (only in 1984), Kentucky (until 1984), New Jersey, 
and Virginia (except in 1982). However, because the repre­
sentational form and partisan bias values found in elec­
tions in these five states span the spectrum of possible 
values, there should not be a substantial impact on the 
descriptive statistics due to the exclusion of these elec­
tions. Furthermore, and more importantly, the elections 
that were excluded from the analysis of individual election 
years in this chapter were included in the pooled analysis 
described in the next chapter and in the aggregate findings 
reported in this chapter.
CHAPTER SIX: EXPLANATIONS OF VARIATION IN
PARTISAN BIAS AND REPRESENTATIONAL FORM
In the last chapter, the discussion was centered 
around the distribution of representational form values and 
partisan bias values across states and across elections.
In this chapter, I identify variables that explain varia­
tion in representational form and partisan bias coeffi­
cients in these elections. The organization of this 
chapter is straightforward. First, I test the model of 
representational form described in detail in Chapter Four. 
The representational form model contains variables that 
operationalize district party competition and election rule 
variables. Second, I test the partisan bias model to see 
if partisan control of the redistricting machinery and 
intent to gerrymander translate into partisan bias in the 
election subsequent to redistricting. Third, I provide a 
summary of the results in the last section of the chapter.
EXPLAINING REPRESENTATIONAL FORM 
The first step in testing the representational form 
model is to report the simple correlations among the inde­
pendent variables and between each independent variable and 
the dependent variable. This process is important for two 
reasons. First, the simple correlations between the inde­
pendent and dependent variables describe the bivariate 
relationship between these variables. This gives the 
researcher a first glimpse as to whether the hypotheses he
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or she has presented will hold up under stricter scientific 
scrutiny. In addition, if the bivariate relationships 
between the dependent variable and one or a few independent 
variables are extremely strong, the researcher may be able 
to produce a more parsimonious model than the original 
model he or she specified. Second, the simple correlations 
between each pair of independent variables provide the 
first clue as to whether or not multicollinearity may exist 
in the model. The simple correlations also may help the 
researcher decide which variable or variables to drop 
should it be determined that multicollinearity is a prob­
lem.
The correlation matrix in Table 6.1 contains the 
simple correlation coefficient (the Pearson's r statistic) 
for each pair of variables in the representational form 
model. Table 6.1 provides preliminary confirmation of the 
accuracy of the hypotheses mentioned in Chapter Four. The 
variables related to competition show strong correlations 
with form and are in the correct direction. In fact, the 
Pearson's r value for the relationships between form and 
the district competition variables are all significant at 
the .001 level.
The election rule variables are also highly correlated 
with representational form, but not always in the direction 
suggested by the hypotheses. On one hand, Taagepera's 
index and representational form produce a Pearson's r
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Table 6.1. Correlation Matrix for the Variables 
in the Representational form Model
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Pearson's r) used to measure the simple correlation 
between the variables.
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cThis is the number of cases used to calculate the 
Pearson's r.
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of 0.242 (p < .001). Effective district magnitude is also 
highly correlated with representational form (0.124, 
p < .05). Additionally, the correlation between the coun­
ter variable and representational form follows the negative 
pattern (-0.275, p < .001) suggested by the literature. 
However, two other variables exhibit coefficients that 
indicate that the relationships between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable are in the opposite 
direction from what one might expect. Both the number of 
districts and the number of seats (-0.315 and -0.276, 
respectively) have correlations with representational form 
that are opposite of what one should expect.
Of course, simple correlations are not the final 
statistics of preference in measuring a relationship 
between variables. One must specify a model to control for 
the effects of other independent variables when attempting 
to define the precise nature of the relationships between 
an independent and dependent variable. Multivariate 
regression controls for the effects of other independent 
variables by providing regression coefficients to represent 
the covariation between each of the independent variables 
and the dependent variable. In other words, multivariate 
regression enables the researcher to measure the indepen­
dent effects of each independent variable on the dependent 
variable. Therefore, it is necessary to use multivariate 
regression to test properly the hypotheses that have been
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presented. Nonetheless, simple correlation coefficients do 
allow one to make preliminary judgments about research 
hypotheses.
Perhaps an even more important use for a correlation 
matrix is that it helps the researcher to test for colline- 
arity among pairs of independent variables. When colline­
arity exists between two or more independent variables, 
inclusion of the affected variables in a multivariate 
regression model can produce t-scores that misrepresent the 
strength of the relationship between one or more of the 
independent variables and the dependent variable.
This misrepresentation occurs because when independent 
variables that are highly correlated are used in the same 
regression equation, the standard errors of the variables 
tend to be inflated. Thus, the null hypotheses regarding 
collinear variables may be falsely accepted (i.e, the 
coefficients for these variables may not appear to be 
statistically significant) (See Lewis-Beck 1980, 58-63).
The correlation matrix of the independent variables 
(excluding the counter variable) illustrates that five 
pairs of independent variables exhibit correlations greater 
than 0.50. The 0.50 mark is a conservative figure, since 
multicollinearity is more commonly a problem when Pearson's 
r approaches 0.80. In fact, only one pair of variables has 
a correlation exceeding 0.80.
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One of these pairs, with r > .50, is party competition 
and the interaction variable derived from the standard 
deviation of the Republican district vote and mean level of 
party competition (0.509). since interaction terms often 
have high correlations with their component variables and 
because there are strong theoretical reasons for including 
the party competition interaction terms, however, the 
latter should not be excluded simply because they are 
highly correlated with another independent variable. Other 
independent variables are highly correlated. As expected, 
the number of legislative districts is highly correlated 
with a number of other variables. Number of districts and 
district magnitude produce a Pearson's r of -0.538, number 
of districts and Taagepera's index exhibit a simple corre­
lation of -0.818, and the correlation between number of 
districts and number of seats is 0.719. Another very high 
correlation is found to exist between district magnitude 
and Taagepera's index (0.763). These relationships should 
be taken into consideration when the model explaining 
representational form is created.1
In addition, one should be aware of the dangers of 
using pooled data to test hypotheses. As noted in Chapter 
Four, one must be aware of the possible existence of hete- 
roscedacticity and autocorrelation when pooled data are 
employed. Since one must control for heteroscedacticity 
before autocorrelation can be detected (Sayrs 1989, 19),
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the dummy variable least squares (DVLS) models are compared 
with the OLS models first. Then, tests for autocorrelation 
are conducted.
For the model of representational form, tests for 
heteroscedacticity resulted in the finding that unit ef­
fects were present (F of 4.53 > critical value of 1.39). 
Subsequent tests for autocorrelation using DVLS-OLS were 
inconclusive (DW = 1.74; dL < DW < dy) . To be on the safe 
side, it was decided to control for possible autocorrela­
tion by employing GLS. Therefore, Table 6.2 reports the 
results using DVLS-GLS. For the sake of space, only the 
coefficients associated with the independent variables (and 
not the dummy variables) are reported whenever DVLS is 
employed. In addition, because inconclusive tests for 
autocorrelation do not require use of GLS, I will note any 
differences between the findings for GLS and OLS. Finally, 
the significance levels in the following tables are pre­
sented as one-tailed tests if the coefficients are in the 
hypothesized direction and as two-tailed tests if they are 
in the "wrong" direction.
Table 6.2 provides the results obtained from esti­
mating the model of representational form using DVLS-GLS 
regression. The model as a whole explains a good bit of 
the variation in representational form. The adjusted R2 of 
0.914 is quite respectable, indicating that 91% of the 
variation in representational form across states and over
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Table 6.2. GLS Coefficient Batiaataa for 
Representational Tor* (full Modal), 1968-87
Variable* Coefficient seb t-score prob
MComp. 2 .647 0. 293 9.049 0.0001
MComp. *
Stan. Dev. -4.583 0.720 -6.363 0.0001
MComp *
Skew *
Control 0. 109 0. 043 2.504 0.0064
MComp. * 
Kurt. 0. 288 0. 024 12.008 0.0001
Mag. 0.246 0. 182 1. 356 0.0880
Taag. -0.226 0.219 -1.034 0.3017
NDist. 0.002 0. 002 0.839 0.2012
NSeats -0.003 0. 003 -1.241 0.2153
Counter -0.015 0. 004 -4.120 0.0001
Number of cases 398
R2 0. 914
Note: The dependent variable is the representational form 
coefficient of the legislative elections by state.
These estimates are generated using dummy-variable least 
squares (DVLS) regression. The variable list excludes 
dummies that were included for 44 states, in addition, 
DVLS does not require the inclusion of a constant term.
bXn this column, the standard errors of the coefficients 
are reported.
*p < .10, one-tailed test.
**p < .05, one-tailed test.
”*p < .01, one-tailed test.
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time can be explained by the model. Certainly, the high R2 
is in part due to the inclusion of the state dummy vari­
ables.
Host of the variables are in the hypothesized direc­
tion and achieve statistical significance. The coeffi­
cients associated with the variables related to the 
distribution of Republican votes across districts are 
especially strong. The mean level of district party compe­
tition variable and the variables formed by the interaction 
of competition and the standard deviation, skewness, and 
kurtosis of the Republican district vote are all in the 
expected direction and significant at the least at the .01 
level (one-tailed).2 The most intuitive hypotheses related 
to the effects of partisan competition on representational 
form are confirmed.
Rising partisan competition, particularly when accom­
panied by a low standard deviation among the districts in a 
state, results in an increase in the representational form 
coefficient (i.e., a more majoritarian system). Control­
ling for other variables, the results for the competition 
variable can be interpreted to mean that a change from a 
mean of no party competition to a mean of perfect party 
competition causes a 2.65 increase in the value of repre­
sentational form, considering that the largest representa­
tional form coefficient in the study was 5.38, this 
represents a large increase in the representational form
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coefficient. To illustrate further the importance of the 
two partisan vote distribution variables with the highest 
t-scores, assume that a state went from a .40 party compe­
tition score in one election to a .60 party competition 
score in the next election. Assume also that the kurtosis 
of the Republican vote moved from -0.9 (away from district 
party competition) in the first election to 1.6 (toward 
more competition) in the second election. Holding the 
other variables in the study constant and assuming that the 
representational form coefficient was 2.00 in the first 
election, the second election would produce a representa­
tional form coefficient of 2.91. If the values for kurto­
sis had been reversed in the elections but the change in 
competition had been the same, the representational form in 
the latter election would have increased only to 2.19.
Skewness is also significant at less than the .01 
level. As an example of the substantive significance of 
skewness, assume that Republicans were the partisans who 
recieved the highest percentage of the mean district-level 
vote in a state. Skewness in the direction of Republican 
votes at the district level would cause a .109 increase in 
the representational form of the election system. This 
increase in the majoritarian nature would occur because the 
majority party, the Republicans, would win more seats as 
the district-level vote became more favorable to them. If 
the Democrats were the beneficiaries of a skewed
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district-level vote, then (if they were the minority party) 
representational form would decline by .109. The decline 
would be the result of the fact that the district-level 
vote was skewed in favor of the party that received the 
lowest mean district-level vote; such a phenomenon should 
cause the election system to become more nearly propor­
tional in seat allocation.
The effective magnitude variable is significant at the 
.10 level (one-tailed). The findings suggest that if a 
state moved from a single-member district format to a 
multimember district arrangement with two members per 
district, representational form would increase by 0.24 6.
The effect of effective magnitude partly explains why 
Indiana, New Jersey, North Dakota, and south Dakota, all of 
which have multimember districts in every election in the 
time series (and the three latter states almost exclusively 
so), have the highest values for representational form. In 
addition, the counter variable confirms that for some 
reason other than party competition and the election rule 
variables in the model, there is a significant decline 
(p < .001, one-tailed) in representational form over time. 
From one election to the next (assuming a two-year election 
cycle), representational form values decline by 0.030.
Three variables do not behave as expected, however.
The coefficients for the Taagepera Index and for the number 
of seats are in the wrong direction (although the
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coefficients ere not significantly different than zero).
The relationship between the two independent variables and 
representational form could also be influenced by the 
specification of the full model since the simple correla­
tions between these variables and representational form 
reported in Table 6.1 are significant and in the hypothe­
sized direction. Finally, although the variable for the 
number of districts does exhibit a positive relationship 
with representational form, the coefficient for this vari­
able is not significantly different than zero.3
Certainly, there are theoretical reasons for specify­
ing any given model. Additionally, however, there are 
statistical reasons for making adjustments to the theoreti­
cal model. As noted earlier, it may be in the interest of 
the researcher to attempt to avoid multicollinearity and to 
specify a more parsimonious model by dropping one or more 
variables. Analyzing the correlation matrix in Table 6.1 
and applying regression-based tests for multicollinearity, 
it was decided that the magnitude variable and the number 
of districts variable would be excluded from the analysis.4 
It was believed that the number of districts might be 
having a detrimental effect on the Taagepera Index variable 
and the number of seats variable and that the effective 
magnitude variable was affecting the testing of the 
Taagepera Index variable.
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The parsimonious model was estimated using DVLS-GLS. 
The F-test for DVLS, 6.68, exceeded the critical value of
1.39; thus, unit effects were present. Additionally, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic, 1.75, was again in the range where 
the test for autocorrelation was indeterminate.
In Table 6.3, the results of a more parsimonious model 
(from which the counter variable is excluded) are reported. 
Dropping effective magnitude and the number of districts 
variables has little impact on the party vote distribution 
variables. The coefficients for mean level of district 
party competition and the standard deviation interaction 
term do become a bit larger, as do the associated t-ratios. 
The coefficients for the skewness and kurtosis interaction 
variables remain virtually identical. Thus, the four party 
competition variable coefficients do not change direction 
and the significance levels remain unchanged.5
As expected, the election rule variable coefficients 
and significance levels change somewhat when effective 
magnitude and the number of districts variables are 
excluded from the model. The coefficient associated with 
the number of seats variable, which had been negative in 
the full model, does take on a positive value in accordance 
with the hypothesis. However, the coefficient and the 
t-ratio of the number of seats variable remains small and 
the variable does not achieve statistical significance.
235
Table (.3. GL8 Coefficient Eatiutai for 
Representational Form (Farsiaonious Nodal), 19(3-07
Variable"
HComp.
HComp. *
Stan. Dev.
HComp *
Skew *
Control
HComp *
Kurt.
Taag
NSeats
Coefficient 
2.985 
-5.758
0.110
0.290 
0. 105 
0 . 001
86°
0. 283 
0.664
0. 044
0.024 
0. 071 
0. 002
t-score
10.564
-8.665
2.476
11.896
1.477 
0.683
prob 
0 . 0001*“ 
0 .0001"*
0. 0069***
0 . 0001*" 
0.0703* 
0.2474
Number of cases 398
0.909
Note; The dependent variable ia the representational form 
coefficient of the legislative elections by state.
"These estimates are generated using dummy-variable least 
squares (DVLS) regression. The variable list excludes 
dummies that were included for 44 states. In addition, 
DVLS does not require the inclusion of a constant term.
bIn this column, the standard errors of the coefficients 
are reported.
*p < .10, one-tailed test.
**p < .05, one-tailed test.
***p < .01, one-tailed test.
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It is the Taagepera Index variable that changes dra­
matically in the parsimonious model. The coefficient 
becomes positively related to representational form (as was 
hypothesized) and the standard error of the coefficient 
decreases to the point that the variable becomes signifi­
cant at the < .10 level, one-tailed. The substantive 
strength of the Taagepera Index shows that as the log of 
voters increases by one with respect to the log of dis­
tricts in a state, the representational form value will 
increase by 0.105.6 The effect of the Taagepera Index 
variable provides some explanation as to why Alaska, with 
approximately 300,000 voters in 19-27 districts (Taagepera 
Index of 3.8-4.5), has representational form values in the 
2.0-3.5 range while Kansas, with approximately 775,000 
voters in 125 districts (Taagepera Index of 2.8), has 
representational form values in the 1.5 to 2.5 range.
The adjusted R3 of the parsimonious model declines 
negligibly (from .914 to .909) when the three variables 
from the full model are excluded. Inclusion of the counter 
variable back into the model might provide some useful 
information, however. First, one could test to see if any 
of the independent variables are weakened by the addition 
of a counter variable. If not, then the independent vari­
ables do have a nonspurious correlation with the dependent 
variable. Second, if a counter variable still has an 
effect on the dependent variable, then the researcher may
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have a clue as to other variables that may be affecting the
dependent variable over time. If the counter variable
coefficient is negative, for example, the researcher can 
test the effects on the dependent variable of a variable
that is known to be declining over time.
Addition of the counter variable to the parsimonious 
model once again requires the use of DVLS-GLS. Heterosce- 
dacticity was present in the OLS estimates; the F, 7.39, 
once again exceeded the critical value of 1.39. The test 
for autocorrelation again proved to be inconclusive as the 
Durbin-Watson statistic, 1.75, fell between the upper and 
lower bound values. To be on the safe side, GLS was used 
to control for any possible autocorrelation.
The results for the parsimonious model with the coun­
ter variable are presented in Table 6.4. The adjusted R2 
for the model increases to .914. Such a small increase in 
adjusted R2 indicates that the variables in the model 
already account for a great deal of the variation in repre­
sentational form across states and over time.
To be sure, some of the variables in the model do 
experience declining coefficients after the counter vari­
able is added. However, only the coefficient for the 
Taagepera Index, which reached the .10 level of statistical 
significance in the equation in which the counter variable 
was dropped, loses statistical significance.7 Since there 
are only tenuous theoretical reasons for including a
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Table 6.4. GL8 Coefficient Bstimates for 
Representational Form (Parsimonious Model With
Counter), 1*68-87
Variable* Coefficient seb t-score prob
HComp. 2.604 0.290 8 .972 0.0001
HComp. *
Stan. Dev. -4.482 0.716 -6.261 0.0001
MComp. *
Skew *
Control
0. Ill 0.043 2.560 0.0055
HComp. * 
Kurt. 0.289 0.024 12.137 0.0001
Taag. 0 . 014 0. 073 0.197 0.4220
NSeats -0.001 0. 002 -0.534 0.5936
Counter -0.015 0. 004 -4.203 0.0001
Number of cases 398
R2 0.914
Note: The dependent variable is the representational form 
coefficient of the legislative elections by state.
These estimates are generated using dummy-variable least 
squares (DVLS) regression. The variable list excludes 
dummies that were included for 44 states. In addition, 
DVLS does not require the inclusion of a constant term.
bIn this column, the standard errors of the coefficients 
are reported.
*p < .10, one-tailed test.
**p < .05, one-tailed test.
*"p < .01, one-tailed test.
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counter variable in the model, the importance of the 
Taagepera Index as a theoretically meaningful (and statis­
tically significant) variable is not diminished by this 
finding. Finally, the counter variable coefficient,
-0.015, is significant at the .0001 level (one-tailed).8
An example using the range of values for the indepen­
dent variables may be helpful in demonstrating the substan­
tive strength of the explanatory variables. In turn, the 
minimum and maximum values for each independent variable 
will be substituted holding each of the other variables at 
their mean values. In this way, one can identify the range 
of representational form values given the range of values 
for each independent variable. Thus, the substantive 
impact of each explanatory variable can be assessed.
For this purpose, the counter variable is excluded 
since the concern is for a particular election at a point 
in time rather than as one election in a sequence of elec­
tions. The parsimonious equation without a counter vari­
able is:
FORM - a, + b,COMP + bj (COMP) * (STANDEV) (6.1)
+ b3 (COMP)*(SKEW)*(CONTROL)
+ b4(COMP) * (KURT) + bjTAAG + bsNSEATS + e 
As an example of this process, one can apply the coeffi­
cients in Table 6.3 to the values for the independent 
variables. Then, one substitutes the minimum (0.293) and 
maximum (1.00) values for COMP (in this case),
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respectively, and the mean values for the other independent 
variables into two equations:
FORM = 0.562 + (2.985)*{0.293) (6-2)
- (5.758)*(0.293)*(0.253)
+ (0.110)*(0.293)*(0.105)*(-1)
+ (0.290)*(0.293)*(0.307) + (0.105)*(3.338)
+ (0.001)*(110.664) - 
0.562 + 0.875 - 0.427 - 0.003 + 0.026 + 0.350 + 0.111 -
1.494.
FORM = 0.562 + (2.985)*(1.00) (6-3)
- (5.758)*(1.00)*(0.253)
+ (0.110)*(1.00)*(0.105)*(-1)
+ (0.290)*(1.00)*(0.307) + (0.105)*(3.338)
+ (0.001)*(110.664) - 
0.562 + 2.985 - 1.457 - 0.012 + 0.089 + 0.350 + 0.111 - 
2.628.
In this case the predicted value for party representa­
tional form at the maximum level of mean district party 
competition is 2.628. The predicted value for form given 
the minimum level of mean district party competition is
1.494. The difference in these two values, 1.134, repre­
sents the range of possible effects on representational 
form values of district level competition while holding 
constant the effects of the other independent variables.
Following the previously noted technique, I find the 
following range of effects on representational form of each
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independent variable: (a) mean district party competition,
1.134; (b) competition-standard deviation interaction term, 
1.600; (c) competition-skewness interaction term, 0.382;
(d) competition-kurtosis interaction term, 2.330;
(e) Taagepera's Index, 0.259; (f) Number of seats, 0.362.
As can be observed, the values for mean level of competi­
tion, the competition-standard deviation interaction term, 
and the competition-kurtosis interaction term are all quite 
strong in relation to the values produced by the other 
variables. The large values observed in this illustration 
combined with the extremely large values of the coeffi­
cients in Table 6.3 lead one to conclude that the mean 
level of district partisan competition, the competition- 
standard deviation interaction term, and the competition- 
kurtosis interaction term have strong substantive impacts 
on representational form.
The other three variables have much weaker effects on 
representational form. The competition-skewness interac­
tion term and Taagepera's Index, which reach statistical 
significance in Table 6.3, have a relatively trivial impact 
on representational form. The effect of the number of 
seats, 0.362, is even larger than the substantive impact of 
Taagepera#s Index and is only slightly smaller than the 
substantive effect of the competition-skewness interaction 
term.
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To summarize this section on representational form,
. -*
one can state that the variables associated with party 
competition have a strong effect on the dependent variable. 
Tables 6.2 through 6.4 show that the competition variables 
are significant and in the expected direction. Three of 
these variables, mean district party competition, the 
competition-standard deviation interaction term, and the 
competition-kurtosis interaction term have strong substan­
tive impacts on representational form, as well. It does 
seem to be the case that the higher the level of party 
competition at the district level and the more districts 
that fall into the competitive range, the more majoritarian 
is the election system.
Election rule variables are less effective in explain­
ing variation in representational form than are party 
competition variables. The Taagepera Index and the effec­
tive magnitude variables do achieve the most liberal level 
of statistical significance, suggesting that election 
systems that have a large number of voters per district and 
have multimember districts may be associated with slightly 
more majoritarian patterns than other systems. However, 
the findings for effective magnitude may be a statistical 
artifact, since effective magnitude is highly correlated 
with Taagepera's Index and the number of districts vari­
able. Finally, none of the election rule variables have
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the substantive impact on representational form that the 
party competition variables have.
As was noted at the beginning of the chapter, there is 
a definite trend toward less responsive elections over 
time. Inclusion of a counter variable in the above equa­
tions illustrates that a large trend toward less responsive 
elections still exists after controlling for the effects of 
all the other independent variables. In fact, the counter 
variable achieves statistical significance at the .0001 
level (one-tailed). Nonetheless, including the counter 
variable adds very little to the R2 of any equation in 
which it is added. Furthermore, the party competition 
variables are almost unaffected by the inclusion of the 
counter variable. Only Taagepera's Index seems to be 
greatly affected by the use of a counter variable.
The results as a whole suggest that representational 
form in state legislative elections is closely associated 
with the distribution of partisan votes across election 
districts. As party competition becomes more prevalent at 
the district-level, the state election system becomes more 
majoritarian in nature. This dissertation does not include 
an examination of the factors that might increase partisan 
competition. However, it is clear that whatever leads to 
greater party competition in a larger number of districts 
will cause state election systems to have a more majori­
tarian and less proportional form of democratic
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representation. Additionally, assuming a constant level of 
party competition across districts, the larger the size of 
the election districts in terms of population the more 
majoritarian will be the seats-votes pattern.
EXPLAINING PARTISAN BIAS 
In this section, the results of regression equations 
used to explain variation in partisan bias are examined.
As was noted in a previous chapter, X have hypothesized 
that party control of redistricting will determine partisan 
bias. To measure this phenomenon, a variable is created 
for each year, coded "1" if redistricting occurred in that 
year and "0" otherwise. Next, a variable is created which 
is coded "I" for a Republican-controlled redistricting,
"-1" for a Democratic-controlled redistricting, and "0" for 
all others. These two variables are then multiplied to 
produce an interaction term. Next, the natural log of bias 
is regressed on the interaction term for each election 
year. Since the natural log of bias is coded in such a way 
that positive values reflect a Republican bias, one may 
expect that there should be a positive relationship between 
bias and each party redistricting/election year interaction 
term. Of course, only those elections having variation in 
the interaction term variable (i.e., having at least two 
types of redistrictings in a single year) are included in 
the analysis. Finally, a dummy variable for each of the 
years in which redistrictings are analyzed is included in
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the equation so that the mean bias for the elections coded 
"0" vary with each election.
Table 6.5 shows the results of the analysis using OLS 
regression. As one can see, the coefficient for each 
election year except 1972 is in the correct direction. 
However, most of these coefficients are quite small. In 
only 1970, 1976, and 1982 do the party redistricting coef­
ficients reach statistical significance. In 1970, the 
coefficient is significant at the .10 level (one-tailed).
In 1976, the coefficient reaches the .01 level of statisti­
cal significance (one-tailed). In 1982, the coefficient is 
significant at < .05 (one-tailed). In 1978 and 1983, the 
coefficients are also quite large. However, probably due 
to the small numbers of redistrictings that occurred in 
these years, large standard errors associated with the 
coefficients prevent these variables from achieving statis­
tical significance.9
It is interesting to observe the effects of the 1972 
and 1982 redistrictings. These are the two election years 
in which the most redistrictings occurred. To be specific, 
in 1972 there were 33 elections held after redistrictings, 
and in 1982 there were 32 states that had elections immedi­
ately following redistrictings. The next highest number of 
elections held in a year after redistricting took place was 
16 in 1974. The results suggest that the 1972 redis­
tricting had virtually no effect on partisan bias. In
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Table 6.5. coefficient Eitiut«a for
Partisan Bias, 1970-64
Variable Coefficient se* t-score prok
Constant 0. 005 0. 012 0.379 0.7046
Inter70 0. 373 0.246 1.519 0.0648
Inter72 -0.032 0.061 -0.525 0.6000
Inter7 3 0. 037 0.174 0.212 0.4163
Inter74 0. 008 0. 093 0.085 0.4662
Inter76 0. 358 0. 142 2 . 531 0.0059
Inter78 0.237 0.246 0.964 0.1679
Inter82 0. 110 0.056 1.956 0.0256
Inter83 0. 126 0. 174 0.725 0.2345
Inters4 0. 003 0.082 0.035 0.4861
Number of cases 417
Note: The dependent variable is the partisan bias coeffi­
cient of the legislative elections by state.
'In this column, the standard errors of the coefficients 
are reported.
*p < .10, one-tailed test.
”p < .05, one-tailed test.
***p < .01, one-tailed test.
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fact, the coefficient is in the opposite direction from 
what was hypothesized. In 1982, however, there is a 
strong, positive redistricting effect that is significant 
at the .05 level (one-tailed).
Table 6.6 contains another illustration of the find­
ings pertaining to the redistrictings of 1976 and 1982.
The coefficients indicate what the predicted log of bias 
would be in the particular year given nonpartisan or bipar­
tisan redistricting, Democratic redistricting, and Republi­
can redistricting. For both election years, the predicted 
mean partisan bias in elections having a nonpartisan or 
bipartisan redistricting is 0.005 (indicating a very slight 
Republican bias). The predicted mean partisan bias in 
Republican-controlled elections in 1976 is 0.363; alterna­
tively, a Democratic redistricting produces a predicted 
bias value of -0.353. There is quite a large change in the 
predicted value of bias according to partisan control and 
intent to engage in gerrymandering in 1976. Partisan 
control of redistricting in 1982 produces substantive 
findings that are somewhat weaker than in 1976. In 1982, a 
movement of one unit in the Republican (Democratic) direc­
tion of control of redistricting increases (decreases) the 
log of partisan bias by .110
What accounts for the bias pattern found in these 
election years? Because most legislative redistrictings 
take place after the decennial census, it could well be the
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Table 6.6. Predicted Maan Valuaa of Log of 
Partisan Bias by Partisan Control of 
Radiatrioting, 1976 and 1992
Year
1976
Party Control of Redistricting
Democratic -0.353
Bipartisan/Nonpartisan 0.005
Republican 0.363
1982
-0.105 
0. 005 
0.115
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case that the dominant party can take advantage of the 
routine redistricting process to obtain a partisan advan­
tage in the drawing of district boundaries. It seems, 
however, that gerrymandering vas prevalent in 1982 but not 
in 1972.
On the contrary, reapportionment in years other than 
1972 and 1982 often occur because of legal challenges to 
redistricting plans that were drawn after the census (i.e., 
in 1972 and 1982). These other reapportionment plans are 
particularly likely to be scrutinized by the courts for 
racial discrimination or, in the 1980s, for obvious parti­
san bias. Certainly, if the nondecennial redistricting 
plans are ordered by the courts in the first place, it 
would seem that a party would be less able to participate 
in blatant gerrymandering. Generally, the results support 
this theory, although the elections of 1970 and 1976 are 
exceptions to the rule.
Another way to illustrate the effects of redistricting 
on partisan bias is presented in Tables 6.7 through 6.10 
using data from 1972, 1974, 1976, 1982, and 1984.10 Table 
6.7 shows actual (rather than predicted) mean bias for the 
given election year, mean bias in the previous election, 
and the mean change in party bias for four categories of 
states. The first set of figures are for states having 
Democratic control of redistricting. Table 6.8 provides 
the same figures for the states in which Republicans
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Table 6.7. Naan Changes in Partisan Bias, by Year 
and Democratic Control of Redistrioting
Year Mean Bias Mean Bias at t - 1 Mean Change
1972 0.1480 0.1031 0.0449
(10)" (10) (10)
1974 -0.0120 0.1515 -0.1635
(6) (6) (6)
1976 -0.5980 -0.5315 -0.0665
(1) (1) (1)
1982 -0.1218 -0.1298 0.0080
(12) (12) (12)
1984 0.0457 0.0085 0.0372
(7) (7) (7)
Tabla 6.8. Naan Changes in Partisan Bias, by Year 
and Republican Conrtol of Redistricting
Year Mean Bias Mean Bias at t - 1 Mean Change
1972 0.1577 0.0683 0.0894
(6) («) (6)
1974 -0.0400 0.0657 -0.1057
(1) (1) (1)
1976 0.2411 0.2874 -0.0464
(2) (2) (2)
1982 0.0870 0.0560 0.0310
(7) (7) (7)
1984 0.1614 0.3049 -0.1435
(2) (2) (2)
"The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of elections on 
which the mean bias figures are based.
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Tablt 6.9. M a n  Changaa In Partisan Bias, 
by Year and Bipartisan or Nonpartisan 
control of Redistrioting
Year Mean Bias Mean Bias at t - 1 Mean Change
1972 0.0059 -0.0837 0.0896
(15)* (15) (15)
1974 0.0970 0.1665 -0.0695
(8) (9) (8)
1976 0.1500 0.1330 0.0170
(1) (1) (1)
1982 0.0290 -0.0089 0.0379
(12) (12) (12)
1984 0.0490 -0.0616 0.1105
(4) (4) (4)
Table 6.10. Mean Changes in Partisan Bias, by Year
and with No Redistrioting
Year Mean Bias Mean Bias at t - 1 Mean Change
1972 0.0996 0.0320 0.0677
(7) (7) (7)
1974 0.0938 0.0930 0.0008
(24) (24) (24)
1976 -0.0129 0.0774 -0.0903
(34) (34) (34)
1982 -0.0158 0.1108 -0.1266
(10) (10) (10)
1984 -0.0284 -0.0494 0.0210
(27) (27) (27)
*The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of elections on 
which the mean bias figures are based.
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controlled redistricting. Tables 6.9 and 6.10, respec­
tively, are for states that were redistricted with 
bipartisan or nonpartisan plans and states that did not 
redistrict.
Column one of Table 6.7 through 6.10 illustrates that 
in most cases the mean bias is at levels and in the direc­
tion one should expect. This is particularly true in the 
election years after 1974. For example, the -0.1218 bias 
for Democratic states in 1982 is large and in the expected 
direction. The bias in Republican redistricted states is 
smaller (0.0870) but is in the hypothesized direction. The 
mean biases in 1982 are negligible in bipartisan and non­
partisan redistricted states and states that did not redis­
trict. Therefore, as expected, the biases in elections in 
states that had bipartisan/nonpartisan redistricting or no 
redistricting fall between the magnitude and direction of 
the biases in states that experienced partisan redis­
trictings in 1982. Except for states controlled by Repub­
licans in 1972, states that had bipartisan/nonpartisan 
redistrictings in 1974, and nonredistricted states in 1974, 
the mean biases for these election years occur with the 
strength and in the direction one would expect.
However, the most important tale is told in the third 
column of Tables 6.7 through 6.10. In this column, one can 
observe the mean change in partisan bias from the last 
election before redistricting to the election immediately
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following redistricting. The findings in column three 
suggest that, in the major redistricting years, strong 
changes in bias do not occur as one might expect.
In 1972, Democratic redistricting resulted in a slight 
increase in Republican bias. Furthermore, a bipartisan or 
nonpartisan redistricting resulted in a slightly larger 
increase in Republican bias than did Republican redis­
tricting. In 1974, Democratic redistricting did result in 
a large increase in the magnitude of Democratic bias, but 
Republican control of redistricting also resulted in a 
large increase in Democratic bias. In 1984, party redis­
tricting resulted in gains to the party that did not con­
trol redistricting.
Only in 1976 and 1982 were there effects of redis­
tricting on bias that were in line with the gerrymandering 
hypothesis. In 1976, states that did not experience redis­
tricting and states that were redistricted by the Democrats 
both had large increases in Democratic bias. In Republican 
redistricted states there were also increases in Democratic 
bias; however, the increases of Democratic bias in these 
states was much smaller than in states that did not redis­
trict or in which Democrats controlled redistricting. In 
1982, there were also redistricting effects on bias. 
Republican redistricting resulted in an increase in Repub­
lican bias, but Democratic redistricting had virtually no 
effect on bias. However, it might be noted that states
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that did not redistrict experienced an inexplicably large 
increase in Democratic bias while states that had biparti­
san or nonpartisan redistricting had an increase in Repub­
lican bias. In short, even in the years in which the 
hypothesis concerning gerrymandering seems to be supported 
one must mention caveats.
If one looks closer at the movement of the mean levels 
of bias after controlling for party control of redis­
tricting, there seems to be a pattern that suggests that 
national political forces could be dominating the model.
In all the years in Table 6.7 except 1982, the party that 
benefits from presidential coattails or from the lack of 
presidential coattails in off-year elections also receives 
the benefit of a gain in bias in state legislative elec­
tions. This pattern is true for all categories of states 
in 1972 (Republican national forces), for the 15 states 
that redistricted in 1974 (Democratic national forces), for 
all states except the one state that experienced a biparti­
san or nonpartisan redistricting in 1976 (Democratic 
national forces), and for all categories of states except 
Republican redistricted states in 1984. In addition, in 
1984, it may be that Republicans simply could not keep 
their previous bias of .3049; the Republican bias of 0.1614 
in 1984 is still one of the largest bias values in the time 
series.
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To summarize the findings concerning partisan bias, 
control of the redistricting machinery does result in an 
increase in partisan bias on most occasions (see Table 
6.5), but these increases are usually quite small. The 
evidence presented in Tables 6.5, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 
shows that any large redistricting effects on partisan bias 
seem to be sporadic. Some evidence of gerrymandering does 
exist for 1970, 1976, and 1982, but for other years there 
is little evidence of a correlation between partisan con­
trol of redistricting and partisan bias in the seats-votes 
relationship.
In general, these results deviate from the findings of 
Niemi and Jackman (1991, Table 4) that gerrymandering as a 
result of party control of redistricting is more prevalent 
in the 1970s than in the 1980s. However, the results of 
the present analysis may correspond more closely to the 
suggestion made by Niemi and Jackman that protection of 
incumbents has been the primary goal (or at least one of 
the major goals) of state legislators all along (1991,
199). After all, tampering with legislative district 
boundaries to gain partisan advantage yields more uncer­
tainty than ensuring the safety of all incumbents. "As in 
Congress, preservation [emphasis mine] of partisan advan­
tage by minimizing rates of responsiveness, rather than its 
creation via partisan gerrymandering, may now be the 
greater concern (Niemi and Jackman, 1990, 20)."
256
Furthermore, the data in Tables 6.7 to 6.10 suggest 
that if there were attempts to use the redistricting 
machinery to partisan advantage, forces that affected the 
fortunes of the national political party also had an impact 
on state legislative party candidates. It could be the 
case that attempts to gerrymander are thwarted as voters 
respond in state legislative elections to the appeal of 
candidates for president and/or Congress. The data from 
Tables 6.7 through 6.10 may indicate that gerrymandering 
and national political forces operate simultaneously.
For example, in 1972 Republican bias increased in both 
Democratic and Republican redistricted states, and the same 
thing happened to the Democrats in 1974 and 1976. However, 
in 1972, Republican gains in bias were larger in Republican 
redistricted states than in states in which the Democrats 
controlled redistricting. Democratic bias gains were 
larger in states in which Democrats controlled redistrict­
ing than in Republican controlled states in 1974 and 1976. 
Furthermore, Republicans benefitted from the Reagan land­
slide in 1984 in all states except states in which Republi­
cans controlled redistricting; however, the latter already 
had tremendous levels of Republican bias before 1984.
Thus, while redistricting does have a small effect on bias 
in many election years, these effects tend to be offset or 
enhanced by partisan tides in presidential and congres­
sional elections.
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have tested the models of represen­
tational form and partisan bias that were discussed in 
Chapter Four. The results of the analyses have led to the 
tentative acceptance and the rejection of some of the 
hypotheses that have been advanced in this dissertation.
The results for the two models can be briefly summarized.
Representational form in U. S. state election systems 
was found to be a function of the partisan distribution of 
votes at the district level. Though a number of character­
istics of the partisan vote distribution were found to be 
significantly correlated with representational form, three 
variables exhibited especially strong substantive effects 
on representational form. Party competition at the dis­
trict level was found to have a strong, positive impact on 
representational form. In addition, the interaction of 
party competition and the standard deviation of mean dis­
trict Republican vote had a strong, negative effect on 
representational form. The findings for the party competi­
tion variable and the standard deviation interaction term 
suggest that as party competition increases across a large 
number of districts the state election system takes on a 
more majoritarian (i.e., less proportional) pattern. In a 
state with a great deal of party competition across dis­
tricts, a small shift in the partisan percentages of the
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votes will result in a large shift in party control of 
legislative seats.
The skewness variable also has an impact on represen­
tational form. When competition is controlled and the mean 
district vote is skewed toward the party that already wins 
the most votes, the representational form coefficient 
increases in value. Alternatively, when mean district vote 
is skewed toward the losing party, the form coefficienct 
decreases.
Finally, the kurtosis variable has a strong, positive 
effect on representational form. When mean district party 
competition is growing and more districts fall toward the 
mean rather than into the tails of the distribution, repre­
sentational form will increase. When mean district party 
competition is increasing but a large number of districts 
fall into the tails of the distribution of the districts, a 
number of districts will not be in the competitive range 
and representational form will decline.
Election rule variables are less effective in explain­
ing the form of democratic representation in a state's 
election system. However, after controlling for the dis­
tribution of the partisan vote, some election rule vari­
ables do have a small effect on representational form. 
Depending on the exact specification of the model, elec­
tions with more seats per district (i.e., higher effective 
magnitude) and elections having large election districts by
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population produced higher values for representational form 
than did elections with fewer seats per district and elec­
tions with districts in which there was low voter turnout, 
respectively. The election rule findings suggest that, 
barring a change in the partisan distribution of the 
district-level vote, an increase in the size of districts 
or an increase in the number of seats per district would 
produce a less proportional (and more majoritarian) rela­
tionship between party vote and partisan seat allocation in 
the legislature.
The results for the party bias model indicated that 
redistricting does have a small impact on partisan bias.
The coefficients for the election variables suggest, how­
ever, that the effect of redistricting is sporadic and is 
not strong enough to warrant undue concern about partisan 
gerrymandering. Only in 1970, 1976, and 1982 is there 
evidence of the effects of gerrymandering. The findings 
seem to indicate that partisan bias may result from a 
natural dispersion of partisan identifiers across districts 
and from presidential and congressional coattails. By and 
large, Republican-dominated states tend to provide Republi­
cans with higher levels of partisan bias and Democratic- 
dominated states seem to have Democratic bias or small 
Republican bias. Parties in control of the redistricting 
machinery do not seem to use redistricting to their advan­
tage. It may well be that after the 1960s, concern about
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judicial intervention and concern about the safety of the 
districts of incumbents from the respective parties led to 
a more status-quo oriented or "sweetheart" arrangement 
where blatant attempts to achieve partisan advantage were 
eschewed.
In the next chapter, I will provide a conclusion to 
this dissertation. I will reiterate the importance of the 
topic, discuss the hypotheses and the models, and restate 
the basic findings. Finally, I will share what I believe 
to be the questions that remain unanswered by the disserta­
tion and the new questions that arise as a result of the 
dissertation.
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NOTES
1. Another test for multicollinearity is to regress one 
independent variable on all the others. This test is 
better than the correlational test because the regression 
test allows the researcher to identify an independent 
variable that is highly related to a combination of inde­
pendent variables. If the R2 of regression equation is 
high, then multicollinearity is a possibility. The cor­
relational test, of course, allows one to test exlusively 
bivariate relationships. A regression test is performed on 
the independent variables; the results are included later 
in the chapter.
2. Another way of testing the effect of an interaction 
term is to compare the sum of squared residuals of the 
regression equation with the sum of squared residuals of a 
regression equation in which the interaction term is 
dropped. One performs an F-test to determine if there is a 
significant decline in the sum of squared residuals after 
the interaction term is placed back in the model. After 
performing such a test on each of the party competition 
variables, it was discovered that the F's of each of these 
variables exceeded the critical F value (upper 5%) of 3.84.
3. There are some minor differences between two coeffi­
cients depending on whether one uses DVLS-GLS or DVLS-OLS 
regression. Using DVLS-GLS, the CONSKEW coefficient is 
0.109 with a significance at < .01, one-tailed. If one 
uses DVLS-OLS, the same coefficient is slightly weaker 
(0.103) and is significant only at < .05, one-tailed. Of 
even more significance is the difference between the 
coefficient for effective magnitude (NAG). The DVLS-GLS 
coefficient, 0.246, is significant at the .10 level, one­
tailed. The DVLS-OLS coefficient for HAG, 0.194, is not 
statistically significant. It should also be noted that 
while almost all the coefficients are slightly affected 
when the COUNTER variable is dropped from the model (most 
see a slight increase in the t-ratio), the significance 
levels are not greatly affected and the R1 is virtually the 
same.
4. The R2 for each regression equation in which each 
independent variable is regressed on all other independent 
variables represents the extent to which the variable that 
is regressed is a linear function of the other variables.
In essence, each independent variable becomes a dependent 
variable in this procedure. The R2 associated with each 
"dependent" variable is as follows: Party competition,
0.664; standard deviation of mean Republican district vote
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interaction term, 0.672; skewness of mean Republican 
district vote interaction term, 0.331; kurtosis of mean 
Republican district vote interaction term, 0.502; effective 
magnitude, 0.894; Taagepera's Index, 0.876; number of 
districts, 0.883; number of seats, 0.879; counter, 0.144. 
When the variables with the two highest R2's, effective 
magnitude and number of districts are dropped from the 
model, the new R2's for each variable are as follows:
Party competition, 0.627; standard deviation of mean Repub­
lican district vote interaction term, 0.642; skewness of 
mean Republican district vote interaction term, 0.323; 
kurtosis of mean Republican district vote interaction term, 
0.452; Taagepera's Index, 0.287; number of seats, 0.301; 
counter, 0.142.
5. F-tests on the interaction terms once again reveal that 
each of the party competition variables are statistically 
significant.
6. Using DVLS-OLS, the coefficient for CONSKEW, 0.104
(p < .05, one-tailed), was slightly weaker than when DVLS- 
GLS was used. No other variables exhibited any dramatic 
differences in the magnitude or significance levels of 
their coefficients.
7. All the F's for the interaction terms still exceed the 
critical value of 3.84. Thus, the statistical significance 
of the party competition variables are not artifacts of the 
fact that they are interaction terms.
8. For this particular model, there would have been virtu­
ally no difference in the value or the significance level 
of any of the coefficients if DVLS-OLS rather than DVLS-GLS 
would have been used as the estimation technique.
9. The coefficients and significance levels of the inde­
pendent variables change only minimally when a counter 
variable is added to this model. However, the coefficient 
for the counter variable, -0.005, is significant at the .05 
level (two-tailed). This variable suggests that there is a 
nontrivial trend toward Democratic bias in state legisla­
tive elections after controlling for partisan redis­
tricting.
10. Except for 1976, these years were chosen simply 
because they contain far more redistrictings than do other 
election years. The year 1976 was included because redis­
tricting seems to have a significant effect on partisan 
bias in elections for this year.
CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter Six, I used models to test my hypotheses 
pertaining to representational form and partisan bias. The 
results of these tests indicated that the distribution of 
partisan votes across districts is strongly related to the 
representational form of an election system. Some election 
rule variables were found to have small but nontrivial 
effects on representational form. It was also found that 
partisan bias is affected by partisan attempts to gerryman­
der in some election years; however, gerrymandering was 
only a significant determinant of partisan bias in three 
election years.
For purposes of practical politics, the findings 
suggest that there is a slightly majoritarian pattern 
present in U. S. state election systems. To increase the 
responsiveness of seat changes to vote changes, the most 
important change that must occur is that minority parties 
in each state must become more competitive at the district 
level. Minority parties in the states must attract 
stronger challengers in state legislative elections and 
increase the amount of money and campaign support that 
their candidates receive. A more responsive system in the 
competitive range of seat-vote distributions could also be 
produced if election districts were made larger in terms of 
population (or an increase in voter turnout) and/or if 
there were a move toward more multimember districts.
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However, as indicated in Table 6.1, the trend over the 
last 20 years has been toward less competition at the 
district level (note the correlations between the party 
competition interaction terms and the counter as well as 
the correlation between mean competition and the counter), 
more single-member districts, and fewer voters per election 
district. Consequently, we have seen the rise of state 
legislative election systems in which partisan seat changes 
are increasingly less responsive to partisan vote changes. 
The result of the latter phenomenon could be that state 
legislators have (or will) become insulated from electoral 
defeat and less inclined to respond to constituency needs 
or desires.
In this chapter, I will discuss the questions I sought 
to answer in this dissertation and why I feel the research 
design was a good one. I will briefly reiterate what I 
tried to do and what was accomplished in this study. I 
will also explain the contribution this dissertation makes 
to the literature on the relationship between seats and 
votes in legislative elections. This chapter will also 
include a discussion of the questions about the seats-votes 
relationship that remain unanswered and the new questions 
that have emerged as a result of this dissertation.
EXPLANATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN
In this dissertation I have been concerned with the 
relationship between partisan votes and partisan seats in
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legislative elections. Specifically, I have asked ques­
tions related to the causes of partisan representational 
form and partisan bias in legislative elections. Does 
partisan competition at the district level affect the 
representational form of the seats-votes relationship for 
the electoral system? Do election rule variables related 
to the size and number of districts affect an electoral 
system's representational form? Do a party's control of 
redistricting and willingness to manipulate district bound­
aries to gain an electoral advantage incorporate partisan 
bias into an election system?
I have sought to answer these questions by testing 
hypotheses on lower house legislative elections in 46 
states from 1968 to 1986. The questions I have raised and 
the electoral contexts I have chosen to study have provided 
a number of advantages to other possible research designs. 
First, the results from this study have been found to be 
generalizable to a relatively large number of election 
systems, each providing its own political, economic, and 
social context to the elections. Second, the large number 
of cases employed in this study generate more confidence in 
the findings because of the positive statistical qualities 
associated with large samples. Third, the results gene­
rated in studies of U. S. state legislative elections 
contribute to knowledge in the areas of legislative poli­
tics and in U. S. state politics. Fourth, such a study may
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raise new questions that are of interest to scholars of 
legislative elections and to scholars of U. S. state poli­
tics.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This dissertation makes at least three contributions 
to the state of knowledge pertaining to legislative elec­
tions and U. S. state politics. The first contribution 
made by this dissertation is the description of the seats- 
votes relationship in the U. S. states. The simple act of 
describing the representational form and partisan bias for 
the individual elections in the time series provides the 
democratic theorist a "plumb line" with which to judge the 
ability of each state to act in accordance with traditional 
normative concerns about democracy. The dissertation makes 
a second contribution to the literature about legislative 
elections. The study fleshes out the empirical 
relationship between the district vote and aggregate repre­
sentational form and election rule variables and represen­
tational form. Third, the dissertation contributes to our 
understanding of U. S. state politics by addressing the 
issue of how partisan bias may be introduced into a state 
election system.
Normative Concerns About Representation
While classical definitions of representation are hard 
to pin down, there have been a number of scholars who were
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concerned with the methods by which the will of the people 
is translated into concrete political realities. Eulau and 
Karps (1978) and Fenno (1978) suggest that the activities 
of representatives on behalf of the people (usually defined 
in terms of constituents) are the most important components 
of representation. A host of other scholars point out that 
the translation of partisan votes into legislative seats 
constitutes one of the most basic acts of representation.
Of course, in my study, I am more concerned with the repre­
sentative nature of election systems in the U. S. states 
than with the activities of representatives.
Obviously, the translation of partisan votes into 
partisan seats can take a variety of patterns. It is 
common for scholars to debate the virtues and vices of 
proportional patterns of representation and majoritarian 
patterns of representation (Garand and Parent 1991). Some 
theorists hail proportional representation systems as being 
more democratic because they allow for a more direct trans­
lation of public preferences into legislative seats. Other 
scholars stress the fact that majoritarian systems permit 
an inflated majority of seats to the party that receives 
the most votes, thus creating a legislature that is more 
likely to have clear majorities that (arguably) can pass 
legislation desired by a majority of the people.
In previous studies, the electoral systems of U. S. 
states had been determined to be majoritarian in nature.
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although the exact degree of the seat inflation given a 
certain percent of the vote had varied from study to study. 
However, in earlier works scholars had examined seats and 
votes in the aggregate or studied district-level voting 
returns but excluded uncontested seats. In this disserta­
tion, I have controlled for turnout across districts by 
reporting partisan district vote percentages and I also 
have included uncontested election districts. The justifi­
cations for my methodology are twofold.
First, much knowledge is lost when uncontested elec­
tions are excluded from election analyses. For example, 
use of only contested elections in Arkansas means that 
inferences about the election system must be made on the 
basis of only ten percent of the elections in the time 
series, similar problems would occur in other states 
(particularly in the South) if uncontested elections were 
excluded from the analysis.
Second, while partisan turnout differences are impor­
tant in explaining seats and votes in the aggregate, it 
must be remembered that results in each district determine 
how the seats are to be distributed. One can examine the 
percentage of the district votes won by each party and 
still make valid and reliable inferences about partisan 
representational form and partisan bias. In fact, if 
uncontested elections are to be included in a study, use of 
the aggregate vote in the state might create a false
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impression of the seats-votes relationship since voter 
turnout tends to be much smaller in uncontested elections. 
Thus, the seats-votes relationship is measured as the 
percentage of mean district votes won by Republicans and 
the percentage of legislative seats won by Republicans.
When I used mean percentage of district party votes 
and did not exclude uncontested elections, I found that the 
form of the relationship between seats and votes is 
slightly majoritarian but less majoritarian than the "cube 
law" standard. At most points above the 50% vote mark, 
Republicans receive a percentage of the seats that is 
inflated when compared with the percentage of the vote they 
win. The reverse, an inflated seat loss, occurs at points 
in which Republican vote falls below the 50% mark. Small, 
uniform hypothetical changes in the partisan percentage of 
the district votes tend to result in very few seat changes 
at the extremes of the seats-votes curves but do produce 
larger seat changes in the competitive range of the distri­
butions.
The U. S. state legislative election systems are 
balanced in that they are more responsive to vote changes 
in the competitive range of the distribution than is the 
case in a proportional system, yet there is not a gross 
exaggeration of seat changes given any particular vote 
swing. Normative theorists who advocate a more 
proportional form of representation than that provided in
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many single-member district election systems should be 
pleased by these findings. The findings suggest that voter 
preferences are fairly closely translated into legislative 
seats in U. S. state legislative elections when one treats 
the partisan votes in all districts as equally affecting 
election outcomes. However, some normative theorists may 
prefer even a more majoritarian system. In light of the 
results reported in this dissertation, proponents of a more 
majoritarian seats-votes relationship might consider it a 
weakness that U. S. state election systems are not even 
more responsive to vote changes when partisan competition 
is high.
Empirical-Theoretical Contributions Pertaining to 
Partisan Representational Form
Obviously, the finding that U. S. state legislative 
elections produce lower representational form parameters 
than one might expect has empirical ramifications that 
extend beyond the concerns about representation held by 
normative theorists. These results, at most, call into 
question previous methodologies discussed in the previous 
section. At the least, the use of uniform partisan swing, 
district vote percentages, and uncontested races offer an 
alternative to other techniques designed to measure the 
relationship between seats and votes.
In addition to simply describing the seats-votes 
relationship in lower house elections in the U. S. states,
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I have attempted in this dissertation to answer questions 
about the causes of partisan bias and representational form 
in U. S. state legislative elections. In the process of 
answering these questions, I have hoped to generate find­
ings that can be generalized to elections in other contexts 
and to increase knowledge about subnational units of gov­
ernment in the U. S. I believe that the results of my 
study have lived up to my aspirations.
As Tufte suggested as early as 1973, variation in 
representational form parameters was found to be a function 
of the distribution of partisan votes across election 
districts. I found that party competition and the interac­
tion between party competition and the standard deviation 
and kurtosis of the distribution of Republican votes across 
districts to be particularly important determinants of 
representational form. The higher the level of partisan 
competition and the more districts there were in the com­
petitive range, the larger were the values for representa­
tional form. In other words, in states where there was a 
great deal of party competition at the district level, more 
seats would change party hands given a particular vote 
swing than in states in which there was very little dis­
trict-level competition. These results correspond to the 
findings of Garand, Parent, and Teague (1989) concerning 
the translation of popular votes to electoral college votes 
in u. S. presidential elections.
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It has also been discovered that, after controlling 
for the distribution of the partisan district-level votes, 
the log of the number of voters per district in the elec­
tion system affected representational form. As the parsi­
monious model in Table 6.3 suggests, the larger the 
district size, ceteris paribus, the more majoritarian is 
the pattern of the seats-votes relationship. Taagepera's 
observation that larger districts (in terms of population) 
produce higher representational form parameters was con­
firmed in this dissertation.
The findings suggest that, to a large extent, repre­
sentational form is dependent on the level of party compe­
tition at the district level and (to a smaller degree) on 
the size of election districts. This suggests that 
attempts to manipulate the election system by changing the 
rules to produce more majoritarian or more proportional 
seats-votes relationships may meet with only moderate 
success. It seems that, holding everything else constant, 
the creation of larger districts (on the basis of popula­
tion) is likely to make U. S. state election systems some­
what more majoritarian.
However, partisan competition, the strongest determi­
nant of representational form, is not so easily manipu­
lated. In order for party competition to increase at the 
district level, the weaker party in the state must run 
stronger candidates. Perhaps weak parties can benefit from
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the coattails of strong gubernatorial or presidential 
candidates, but these coattails probably will not exist for 
long. It is likewise improbable that weak parties will be 
strengthened by redistricting. More likely is a scenario 
in which the party that controls redistricting receives 
electoral benefits or incumbents from both parties run in 
districts that have been made safer from a successful 
challenge. Thus, it seems that until losing parties are 
willing to contest elections that have long gone uncon­
tested and to run better candidates across the board, the 
states are likely to be saddled with electoral systems that 
are less responsive to slight or moderate changes in parti­
san voting than many observers would like to see.
Empirical-Theoretical Contributions Pertaining to 
Partisan Bias
In my opinion, the findings concerning partisan bias 
contribute more to the literature in U. S. state politics 
than to the literature in legislative elections. On the 
whole, and somewhat surprisingly. Republicans tend to 
benefit from partisan bias in state legislative elections. 
Part of this bias is perhaps a result of the methodology 
used in this study. The decision to include uncontested 
elections means that Republicans (who are less likely to 
contest state legislative elections than are Democrats), 
would benefit from a bias i_£ they contested each election 
and attained a uniform vote following across districts.
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However, in states where there are few uncontested elec­
tions (i.e., where Republicans are likely to contest 
elections), a Republican bias is indicative of either 
Republican control of the redistricting machinery or the 
distribution of partisan votes according to demographic 
characteristics of the population.
The results of the bias model offer both confirmation 
and contradiction with the findings of Niemi and Jackman 
(1991). They find that partisan gerrymandering does occur 
in the states, but is less prevalent in the 1980s than in 
the 1970s. Unlike Niemi and Jackman, however, I disag­
gregate for each redistricting year. My results do show 
redistricting effects on partisan bias in 1970 and 1976 but 
do not illustrate redistricting effects for the large 
number of elections held in 1972 and 1974. In 1983 and 
1984 I find, as do Niemi and Jackman, no effects of redis­
tricting. However, in the large number of elections that 
took place in 1982 redistricting does seem to enhance 
partisan bias.
I think that my results for bias are somewhat surpri­
sing. If parties truly desire to engage in gerrymandering, 
they should be more aware of state demographics immediately 
after the census before migration effects can be felt. It 
is the case that in 1982, a year in which elections immedi­
ately follow redistrictings that are based on the decennial 
census, there tends to be a bias toward the party that
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controls redistricting. However, the 1972 elections do not 
show redistricting effects.
It should perhaps not be surprising that parties are 
unwilling or unable to institute blatant partisan gerryman­
dering in the 1980s. Increased judicial scrutiny to iden­
tify racial discrimination and the Supreme Court ruling 
that charges of partisan gerrymandering are justiciable 
would lead one to expect that the parties would be more 
hestitant to engage in gerrymanding over time. The 1982 
elections do illustrate moderately strong redistricting 
effects, but the almost equally important year of 1984 
shows no effect of redistricting on partisan bias.
In light of the relatively unsuccessful attempts by 
scholars to identify the widespread use of gerrymandering 
in U. S. state legislative elections, it has also been 
suspected that incumbents of both parties have used techno­
logical improvements, primarily in computers and software, 
to manipulate district boundaries virtually to ensure their 
own reelections. The suggested existence of a "sweetheart 
gerrymander" may well be factual since state elections are 
becoming less competitive over time. Lack of evidence that 
redistricting increases the level of partisan bias in favor 
of the party controlling redistricting over much of this 
time series may also point to a bipartisan or sweetheart 
gerrymander explanation.
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In addition, as was noted in Chapter six, national 
elections (particularly presidential elections), may be 
exerting a coattail effect on state legislative elections 
(Campbell 1986). In this case, the effects of redis­
tricting could be blurred by voters' tendency to favor the 
party of the presidential winner in presidential election 
years and to oppose the party of the president in off-year 
or midterm congressional elections. There is some evidence 
from Tables 6.7 through 6.10 that this phenomenon may be 
occurring. If presidential coattails are operating in 
state legislative elections, this may explain why redis­
tricting effects seem to be present but are not very strong 
(See Table 6.5). It could be that presidential coattails 
in presidential elections and the lack of coattails in 
nonpresidential election years are stronger influences on 
the seats-votes relationship than are the effects of redis­
tricting.
AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
While the findings for representational form and 
partisan bias offer a contribution to our knowledge of 
U. S. state legislative elections, much remains to be 
explained for both of these characteristics of state elec­
tion systems. One could point to a number of variables 
that could be included in future analyses of elections.
Which variables might one suggest as possible explana­
tions for variation in representational form? Tufte,
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commenting on national elections, suggests that the "more 
nationally oriented the politics of a country or the more 
nationalized the forces prevailing in a given election, the 
greater the swing ratio —  other things being equal (1973, 
547)." This should occur because the more nationalized the 
forces are in an election, the more uniform will be the 
electoral swings across the nation. Of course, Tufte's 
explanation is applicable to studies in which actual elec- 
tion results, rather than the uniform partisan swing 
approach, are used. However, since the uniform partisan 
swing method already assumes that all districts are uni­
formly affected by a partisan vote swing, then Tufte's 
suggestion must be modified to fit into the framework 
adopted in this dissertation.
It does seem reasonable that national- or state-level 
forces that counteract the prevailing electoral tendencies 
in a state should contribute to a higher level of party 
competition at the district level. In Georgia, for exam­
ple, if a popular Republican runs for President, for the 
U. S. Senate, or for Governor at the same time state legis­
lative elections are held, one might expect that the Repub­
lican state legislative candidates would benefit from a 
coattail effect (See Campbell 1986). If so, one would 
expect that partisan competition would be enhanced and 
representational form values would increase.
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District-level factors may also affect the representa­
tional form value of a state electoral system. Both King 
(1989) and Tufte (1973) point out that Incumbency voting 
could affect the swing ratio. King (1989) has illustrated 
that this factor decreases responsiveness in congressional 
elections. Incumbency could play a role due to voter 
loyalty to incumbents or to incumbents' ability to use 
legislative spending (i.e., spending on the institution 
itself, such as for personal staff who can engage in con­
stituency casework) to insulate themselves from electoral 
defeat (Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991, Weber, Tucker, and 
Brace 1991). Incumbency effects can also be asserted due 
to the unwillingness of challengers to face incumbents 
(Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991, Jewell and Breaux 1991) or to 
considerations granted to incumbents in redistricting 
(Basehart and Comer 1991, Niemi and Jackman 1991).
Whatever may be the basis for incumbency advantages, 
an increase in voting in favor of incumbents should reduce 
the value of the representational form parameter in state 
legislative elections. Interestingly enough, all the 
previously mentioned variables that might increase incum­
bency voting (and the variable "incumbency voting" itself) 
are increasing over time in lower house state legislative 
elections. Finally, if the size of districts is important 
in explaining representational form, one could analyze 
state senate elections with the expectation of finding
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larger representational form values since state senate 
districts are larger than state representative districts.
What factors might affect partisan bias in a state?
As noted in Chapters Three and Six of this dissertation, 
the literature centers around redistricting effects. In 
addition to the attempts by King (1989) and Basehart and 
Comer (1991) to identify elections where the record indi­
cated a partisan attempt to gerrymander, there are other 
objective characteristics of parties that might give a clue 
about willingness to utilize redistricting for partisan 
gain. There is some evidence that parties in two-party 
competitive states are less willing to engage in partisan 
gerrymandering. On the one hand, Niemi and Jackman (1990, 
16) suggest that dominant parties in a strong two-party 
environment use restraint in redistricting because of fear 
that they may be victims of gerrymandering should they 
become the minority party. On the other hand, Niemi and 
Jackman believe that majority parties in a strong two-party 
state may be more afraid of close scrutiny by the opposi­
tion party and, potentially, by the courts.
Another factor that could contribute to partisan bias 
is difference in partisan turnout across districts. For 
example, Campbell (1991) has found that Democratic candi­
dates in U. S. congressional elections win dispropor­
tionately in electoral districts that have low total voter 
turnout and low voter turnout for the winning candidate.
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This means that Republican candidates have been the victims 
of partisan bias because they expend more votes to win a 
seat than do their Democratic counterparts. In order to 
test this turnout theory, one must use the historical 
method of calculating seats and votes. Using the uniform 
partisan swing method as I have done virtually necessitates 
using an aggregated mean district vote percentage so that 
the one percent incremental swings can be applied to the 
election data. However, use of the mean district vote 
controls for turnout and consequently weighs each district 
equally when party votes are aggregated to the state level. 
One must adopt the actual total votes from the districts 
and the state to test the theory that turnout differences 
affect partisan bias. In the absence of extremely strong 
findings pertaining to partisan gerrymandering, however, 
such a study may well be warranted.
In addition, it does seem to be the case that presi­
dential coattail effects operate in state legislative 
elections. The impact of presidential coattails on a 
party's seat total has been noted by Campbell (1986), but 
the question of the interaction between redistricting 
effects and coattail effects has not be answered. The 
question of redistricting effects versus coattail effects 
is certainly worthy of future research; some attempt to 
introduce a coattail variable into the partisan bias model 
would be a step in the right direction.
The relationship between seats and votes in democratic 
election systems has long been a subject of scholarly 
inquiry. Congressional elections have been the focus of 
much of the research on seats and votes undertaken by 
scholars of American politics. This dissertation is a 
contribution to the emerging seats-votes literature per­
taining to the U. S. states. Hopefully, the findings in 
this study will generate additional attempts to discover 
why certain seats-votes patterns exist in the election 
systems of both legislative houses of the U. S. states.
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Appendix a . Representational
and by Year
Form by state
Year
1909 1970 1972 1974 1970
State
Alabama — 9.482 — 7.018 —
Alaska 4 .831 3. 316 3.493 2.924 2.207
Arizona 1.386 0.867 1.334 1.262 1.902
Arkansas 9.996 2.464 10.974 9.411 10.941
Calif. 1.418 1.455 1. 877 2.494 2 .352
Colorado 2.537 2.533 2.568 2.808 1.645
Conn. 2.967 2.739 3.333 3.291 3 .178
Delaware 4.009 3.211 2.665 2.271 2 .126
Florida 1. 124 0.422 1.426 0. 611 0.521
Georgia 0. 369 0.286 0. 107 1.481 2 . 541
Hawaii 1. 343 1.750 1.212 1.638 1.721
Idaho 1.990 2.250 2.985 2.271 3 . 208
Illinois 0. 631 0.537 0. 807 0.748 0.637
Indiana 5. 096 5.072 4. 161 4 .059 3. 115
Iowa 3.490 3.672 3 . 581 2.805 2 . 601
Kansas 2.791 2.219 2 . 488 2.289 2 . 149
"Election was actually held in 1969
bElection was actually held in 1971
cElection was actually held in 1973
^Election was actually held in 1975
'Election was actually held in 1977
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1909 1970
Year
1972 1974 1970
State
Kentucky 1.735' 1.503" 1.236' 0.990d 0. 899
Maine 2.395 2.556 2 . 467 1.685 1.907
Maryland — 1.643 — 1.066 —
Mass. 1.495 0.716 0.969 0.565 0.852
Michigan 1.410 0.962 1.556 1.260 1. 630
Minnesota — — — 2.649 2 . 683
Miss. — 9.367" — 6.861d —
Missouri 2. 316 1.536 2 . 040 1.298 0.996
Montana 3.613 2.481 3.009 2.838 2 . 737
Nevada 1.723 1.440 2 . 191 2.001 1. 619
New Hamp. 1.185 1. 108 1.615 1.236 1. 856
New Jer. 4 . 126* 3.935b 3.870' 3 . 099d 3.042'
New Mex. 3.319 2.668 2 .492 2.034 1.726
N . Caro. — 1.682 1. 139 1.619 0. 158
N. Dak. 5. 337 3 .477 5.063 4.797 5. 117
Ohio 2.400 1.838 2 . 476 1.751 1.809
Oklahoma 0.818 0.646 0. 650 0. 584 0. 649
Oregon 2.173 3.163 2.945 2.991 2.258
'Election was actually held in 1969
"Election was actually held in 1971
‘Election was actually held in 1973
dElection was actually held in 1975
'Election was actually held in 1977
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1909 1970
ifvflr
1972 1974 1970
State
Penn. 2. 301 2.311 2. 333 1.898 1.879
R. Isl. 2.939 2 .901 3.037 1.728 1.967
S. Caro. 7.784 1. 246 0.891 0.668 0. 641
S . Dak. 1.874 3 . 233 4.823 4.230 5.323
Tenn. 0. 615 0.986 1. 180 1.119 0. 406
Texas 0.365 0. 330 0. 699 0.878 0.325
Utah 3 . 553 3.100 2. 683 2.259 2.899
Virginia 1. 066‘ 1. 2 6 5b 0.704' 0.424“ 0.510'
Wash. 1. 684 2 . 015 2.761 1.999 2 . 265
W. Virg. 3.209 3 . 170 2.652 1.775 1.071
Wiscon. 2.004 2.336 1.825 1.669 1.772
Wyoming 2.760 3 .193 3 . 308 3.120 3 .140
‘Election was actually held in 1969
bElection was actually held in 1971
‘Election was actually held in 1973
dElection was actually held in 1975
'Election was actually held in 1977
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1978 19 8 Q
Year
1982 1984 1998
State
Alabama 3.535 3.702 0.891b 0. 626
Alaska 2. 100 2 . 010 2.791 2.818 1.541
Arizona 1.820 1.692 1.966 1.316 1.250
Arkansas 8. 192 7. 353 9. 594 5.511 3.702
Calif. 2.104 1. 929 1. 526 1.130 0. 968
Colorado 1. 528 1. 940 2. 137 1.970 2 . 235
Conn. 2.914 2 . 531 2.521 2 . 501 2 . 016
Delaware 1.788 2. 327 2. 110 1. Ill 1.247
Florida 0. 855 0.386 1.205 0.859 1. 209
Georgia 1. 557 0. 143 0.215 0.098 0. 199
Hawaii 0.902 0. 399 1.466 1.145 1.507
Idaho 2.087 1.868 1.703 2.175 1. 729
Illinois 0.537 0.404 1. 532 1.353 0. 979
Indiana 2. 564 2.304 2. 438 1.950 1. 686
Iowa 2.537 2.487 2.783 2.175 1.817
Kansas 1.861 1.523 1.789 1.363 1. 120
Kentucky 0. 763f 0.668' — 0. 667 0.823
Maine 1. 508 1.965 1. 778 1.526 1. 673
Maryland 1.081 — 0.975 — 1.237
Election
'Election
^Election
actually
actually
actually
held in 
held in 
held in
1979
1981
1983
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1979 1999 1992 1994 1999
State
Hass. 0.971 0.791 0.751 0.766 0.549
Michigan 1.210 1.395 1. 133 1.534 1.048
Minn. 2.515 1. 962 2.378 2.446 2.017
Miss. 4 . 076f — 5. 653h — 5.435*
Missouri 1.329 1. 186 1. 363 0. 621 1.027
Montana 2. 156 2. 459 2.269 2.039 1.281
Nevada 1.107 1.739 2.054 2 .268 2.375
New Hamp. 1.471 1. 636 1.587 1.459 1.140
New Jer. 2 . 67 lf 2 . 334* 2. 324" 2. 644' 1.966*
New Mex. 1.709 1. 159 1. 528 1.409 1.476
N. Caro. 0.238 1.457 0.628 0. 312 —
N. Dak. 3.881 4. 175 3.952 3.634 3. 164
Ohio 1.858 1. 361 2.062 1.586 1.572
Oklahoma 0.647 0.267 0.428 0.663 0.713
Oregon 2.223 2 . 093 2. 120 2.235 2.282
Penn. 1.625 1.442 1. 192 0.908 0. 648
R. Isl. 0.942 1.458 1. 004 1.368 1.768
fE lection 
•Election 
"Election 
'Election 
JElection
actually
actually
actually
actually
actually
held in 
held in 
held in 
held in 
held in
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
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rear
State
1979 1990 1992 1994 1999
S. Caro. 2.812 0.248 0. 617 0.126 0.323
S. Dak. 3.692 2.771 3.689 2.864 2.273
Tenn. 0.867 1.213 0. 631 0.490 0.828
Texas 0. 592 0.822 0.823 0.207 0. 489
Utah 2.571 3.240 2.584 2.367 2 . 338
Virginia 1. 180f 0.595* 1.432 0. 843h 1.084
Wash. 1.827 2.087 2 .867 2.298 1.882
W. Virg. 1.482 2.783 1.212 1.928 1. 529
Wiscon. 1.940 1.689 1. 865 1.679 1. 024
Wyoming 2. 170 2 . 162 2 . 086 1.918 1.922
'Election actually held in 1979 
'Election actually held in 1981 
hElection actually held in 1983 
'Election actually held in 1985
kVirginia exhibited a coefficient of 0.691 in the 1987 
election
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Figure B.1
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovtr Tima for Alaska. 1968-1986
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Figure B.3
Representational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for CaKfomia. 1968-1986
Figure B.2
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tfane for Arizona, 1968-1986
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Figure B.4
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for Colorado. 1968-1986
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Figure B.5
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Conn.. 1968-1986
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Figure B.7
Representational Form and Partisan Bias 
over Time for Florida. 1968-1986
Figure B.6
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Delaware, 1968-1986
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Figure B.8
Representational Form and Partisan Bias 
over Time for Hawaii, 1968-1986
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Figure B.9
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Idaho, 1968-1986
Figure B.11
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for ImBana. 1968-1986
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Figure B.10
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for Mmois, 1968-1986
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Figure B.12
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for Iowa, 1968-1986
Figure B.13
Representational Form end Partisan Bias
over Time for Kenses, 1968-1986
Figure B.15
Representational Form and Partisan Bias 
over Time for Maine, 1968-1986
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Figure B.14
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Tana for Kentucky. 1969-1986
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Figure B.16
Representational Form and Partisan Bias 
over Time for Maryland, 1970-1986
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Figure B.17
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Time for Massachusetts, 1968-1986
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Figure B.19
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for Minnesota, 1974-1986
Figure B.18
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Time for Michigan, 1968-1986
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Figure B.20
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for Missouri, 1968-1986
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Figure B.21
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Montana. 1968-1986
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Figure B.23
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for Now Hampshira, 1968-1986
Figure B.22
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Time for Nevada. 1968-1986
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Figure B.24
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
over Tima for New Jersey. 1969-1987
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Figure B.25
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima for Now Maxico, 1968-1986
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Figure B.27
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for North Dakota, 1968-1986
Figure B.26
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for North CaroKna, 1970*1984
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Figure B.28
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for Ohio, 1968*1986
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Figure B.29
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tkna for Oklahoma, 1968-1986
Figure B.31 j
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tkna for Pennsylvania, 1968-1986
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Figure B.30
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Oregon. 1968-1986
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Figure B.32
Representational Form and Partisan Bias 
over Time for Rhode Island, 1968-1986
Figure B.33
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Tima for South Dakota, 1968-1986
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Figure B.35
Representational Form and Partisan Bias 
over Time for Texas, 1968-1986
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Figure B.34
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
over Time for Tennessee, 1968-1986
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Figure B.36
Representational Form and Partisan Bias 
over Time for Utah, 1968-1986
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Figure B.37
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tima lor Virginia, 1969*1987
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Figure B.39
Re^ . jsentational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Tima for Wast Virginia, 1968-1986
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Figure B.38
Raprasantational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Tana for Washington, 1968-1986
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Figure B.40
Representational Form and Partisan Bias 
ovar Time for Wisconsin, 1968-1986
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Figure B.41
Representational Form and Partisan Bias
ovar Time for Wyoming, 1968-1986
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Appendix c. Partisan Bias by Stats 
and by Ysar
Year
State
19$8 197 Q 1972 1974 197$
Alabama — 2.462 — 0.866 —
Alaska 0.190 0. 358 0.153 0.242 0. 337
Arizona 0.199 0. 378 0.426 0.615 0.233
Arkansas 1.803 -0.069 2.151 0.991 0.400
Calif. 0.096 0. 035 -0.051 0. Ill 0.024
Colorado 0.185 0.031 0.199 0. 134 0.440
Conn. 0.049 0. 099 0.158 0.016 0. 151
Del. -0.210 -0.006 0.057 0.035 -0.136
Florida 0.093 -0.064 0.211 -0.005 -0.132
Georgia -0.749 -0.880 -1.038 -0.764 -0.501
Hawa i i -0.107 0.110 0.033 -0.083 0.117
Idaho 0. 14 5 -0.191 0.312 -0.256 -0.077
Illinois 0. 072 -0.002 0.038 -0.129 -0.057
Indiana -0.366 -0.010 0.119 0. 056 0.315
Iowa -0.066 -0.108 0.068 0.270 -0.125
Kansas 0.305 -0.169 0.030 0.095 -0.054
'Election was actually held in 1969
bElection was actually held in 1971
'Election was actually held in 1973
dElection was actually held in 1975
'Election was actually held in 1977
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Year
1968 1970 1972 1974
State
Kentucky 0.170* 0.093" -0.195* -0.090
Maine 0.057 0.263 0.203 0.454
Maryland — 0.285 — 0. 108
Mass. -0.030 -0.141 -0.130 -0.311
Michigan 0. 120 0.090 0. 156 0.158
Minn. — — — 0.275
Miss. — 1.801" — 0. 556d
Missouri 0. 085 0. 153 0. 151 0.001
Montana -0.067 0. 555 0.474 0. 337
Nevada 0. 079 0. 186 -0.004 -0.037
New Hamp. 0. 087 0. 110 0. 066 -0.040
New Jer. 0. 033‘ 0.370" 0.016* 0.229d
New Mex. 0.215 -0.068 0.131 0.124
N. Caro. — 0.405 0. 326 0.191
N. Dak. 0.225 -0.339 0. 023 0.133
Ohio 0.02 3 0.268 0. 046 0. 087
Okla. -0.122 -0.316 -0.021 -0.235
Oregon -0.342 -0.160 0.121 0. 209
‘Election was actually held in 1969
"Election was actually held in 1971
‘Election was actually held in 1973
dElection was actually held in 1975
‘Election was actually held in 1977
1976
-0.239*
0.222
-0.465 
0. 052 
0. 043
- 0.101 
0.241 
-0.079 
0.249 
0.115* 
0. 062 
-0.390 
0. 150 
0.032 
-0.390 
0. 186
1969 1970
Year
1972 1974 1979
State
Penn. 0.110 0. 122 0. 184 0. 157 0.234
R. Isl. -0.117 0. 022 0.211 0.040 0. 044
s . Caro. 1.250 0.138 0.073 -0.209 -0.382
S . Dak. -0.399 -0.171 0.194 0. 128 -0.226
Tenn. 0.243 0. 152 0. 244 -0.071 -0.235
Texas -0.228 -0.555 -0.183 -0.532 -0.598
Utah 0.233 -0.012 -0.092 0.310 0.093
Virg. —0. 780* 0.352b 0.131‘ -0.227d -0.003
Wash. 0. 077 0. 107 0. 087 0. 135 0.051
W. Virg. 0. 150 0.274 0.408 0.284 0.251
Wiscon. -0.136 0. 022 0.011 0.284 -0.173
Wyoming -0.2 51 -0.278 -0.183 -0.167 -0.310
‘Election was actually held in 1969
bElection was actually held in 1971
‘Election was actually held in 1973
“Election was actually held in 1975
‘Election was actually held in 1977
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1976 1960
Year
1962 1964 1966
State
Alabama 0.009 -0.015 -0.309" -0.372
Alaska 0. 378 0. 521 0.530 0.402 -0.250
Arizona 0.455 0.415 0.249 0. 178 0. 132
Arkansas 0.559 0.320 0.916 -0.160 -0.635
Calif. 0.026 0. 142 -0.061 -0.019 -0.117
Colorado 0.347 0. 205 -0.085 0.051 0. 180
Conn. 0.086 0. 139 0. 062 0.087 0. 123
Delaware 0.029 0. 200 0. 217 -0.012 0. 134
Florida 0. 021 -0.123 0. 150 -0.034 -0.012
Georgia -0.940 -1.040 -0.886 -0.809 -0.726
Hawaii -0.195 -0.544 -0.018 -0.067 -0.242
Idaho 0. 506 -0.103 -0.142 0.070 -0.005
Illi. -0.023 0.061 0. 121 -0.095 -0.235
Indiana 0.170 0.428 0.227 -0.074 0. 035
Iowa -0.125 -0.201 0. 064 0.049 -0.245
Kansas -0.164 0.156 0.078 0.040 0.001
Kent. -0.319f -0. 187* — -0.108 -0.331
Maine 0.271 0.152 0.142 0.167 -0.010
Mary. -0.031 — -0.068 — -0.073
rElection
•Election
bElection
actually
actually
actually
held in 
held in 
held in
1979
1981
1983
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1976 1960
Year
1962 1964 196$
State
Hass. -0.232 -0.347 -0.430 -0.385 -0.669
Mich. -0.018 0.061 0.236 0.092 0. 003
Minn. 0.175 -0.024 0.239 0.057 0.005
Miss. 0. 227f — 0.331" — 0.066*
Missouri -0.182 -0.096 -0.075 -0.207 -0.114
Montana 0. 171 0.435 0.088 0.312 -0.047
Nevada -0.154 0.096 -0.132 0.110 -0.010
New Hamp. 0. 060 0.032 -0.042 0. 138 0.116
New Jer. 0. 191f 0. 090‘ 0. 066" 0. 023' 0.040*
New Mex. 0. 098 0.214 0.097 0.232 -0.029
N. Caro. -0.176 0. 379 -0.063 0.121 —
N . Dak. 0.072 -0.162 -0.029 0. 346 -0.009
Ohio -0.018 0.123 0. 060 -0.009 0. 098
Okla. -0.279 -0.487 -0.426 -0.122 0. 021
Oregon -0.062 0.156 -0.073 0. 054 0. 064
Penn. 0. 063 0.150 0. 009 0.062 0.006
R. isl. -0.164 0.024 -0.032 0.059 -0.062
rElection
‘Election
"Election
'Election
jElection
actually
actually
actually
actually
actually
held in 
held in 
held in 
held in 
held in
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
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Year
State
1979 199Q 1992 1999
S. Caro. -0.396 -0.850 -0.627 -0.572 -0.570
S . Dak. -0.227 -0.205 0. 080 -0.079 -0.249
Tenn. -0.016 -0.015 -0.204 -0.178 -0.201
Texas -0.405 -0.131 -0.278 -0.295 -0.172
Utah 0.064 0. 128 -0.086 0.000 -0.190
Virginia 0.079' 0. 130* 0.127 -0.150" -0.154
Hash. 0. 040 -0.023 0. 173 0.113 -0.030
W. Virg. 0.426 0.202 0. 141 0.364 0. 312
Wiscon. 0.069 -0.089 0. 282 0.152 -0.197
Wyoming -0.269 -0.241 -0.279 -0.118 0.018
rElection actually held in 1979 
•Election actually held in 198?
"Election actually held in 1983 
‘Election actually held in 1985
"Virginia exhibited a coefficient of -0.132 in the 1987 
election
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